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Essays on Macroeconomics and Labor Markets
Neil R. Mehrotra
Chapter 1 of my dissertation focuses on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stabilizing the
business cycle. Both government purchases and transfers figure prominently in the use of fiscal
policy for counteracting recessions. However, existing representative agent models including
the neoclassical and New Keynesian benchmark rule out transfers by assumption. This paper
provides a role for transfers by building a borrower-lender model with equilibrium credit
spreads and monopolistic competition. The model demonstrates that a broad class of deficit-
financed government expenditures can be expressed in terms of purchases and transfers. With
flexible prices and in the absence of wealth effects on labor supply, transfers and purchases
have no effect on aggregate output and employment. Under sticky prices and no wealth effects,
fiscal policy is redundant to monetary policy. Alternatively, in the presence of wealth effects,
multipliers for both purchases and transfers will depend on the behavior of credit spreads,
but purchases deliver a higher output multiplier to transfers under reasonable calibrations
due to its larger wealth effect on labor supply. When the zero lower bound is binding, both
purchases and transfers are effective in counteracting a recession, but the size of the transfer
multiplier relative to the purchases multiplier is increasing in the debt-elasticity of the credit
spread.
The second chapter of my dissertation examines the relationship between shifts in the
Beveridge curve, sector-specific shocks and monetary policy. In this joint work with Dmitriy
Sergeyev, we document a significant correlation between shifts in the US Beveridge curve in
postwar data and periods of elevated sectoral shocks. We provide conditions under which
sector-specific shocks in a multisector model augmented with labor market search frictions
generate outward shifts in the Beveridge curve and raise the natural rate of unemployment.
Consistent with empirical evidence, our model also generates cyclical movements in aggregate
matching function efficiency and mismatch across sectors. We calibrate a two-sector version
of our model and demonstrate that a negative shock to construction employment calibrated
to match employment shares can fully account for the outward shift in the Beveridge curve
experienced in the Great Recession (2007-2009).
The final chapter of my dissertation considers the decline in labor market turnover expe-
rienced in the US in the Great Recession, and its link to the housing crisis. In this joint work
with Dmitriy Sergeyev, we analyze the behavior of job flows to test the hypothesis that the
housing crisis has impaired firm formation and firm expansion by diminishing the value of real
estate collateral used by firms to secure loans. We exploit state-level variation in job flows
and housing prices to show that a decline in housing prices diminishes job creation and lagged
job destruction. Moreover, we document differences across firm size and age categories, with
middle-sized firms (20-99 employees) and new and young firms (firms less than 5 years of age)
most sensitive to a decline in house prices. We propose a quantitative model of firm dynamics
with collateral constraints, calibrating the model to match the distribution of employment
and job flows by firm size and age. Financial shocks in our firm dynamics model depresses
job creation and job destruction and replicates the empirical pattern of the sensitivity of job
flows across firm age and size categories.
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The Great Recession has brought renewed attention to the possibility of using fiscal policy to
counteract recessions. Since 2007, policymakers have adopted a series of historically large fiscal
interventions in an attempt to raise output, reduce unemployment, and stabilize consumption
and investment. In addition to some increases in government purchases, policymakers have
also relied heavily on transfers of various forms - to individuals, institutions, and state and
local governments - as instruments of fiscal policy. Table 1.1 provides the Congressional
Budget Office breakdown of the various components of the Recovery Act and estimates for
the associated policy multiplier. Transfers account for more than half of the expenditures in
the Recovery Act.
Table 1.1: Outlays and estimated multipliers for American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
Category Estimated Multiplier (High) Estimated Multiplier (Low) Outlays
Purchases of goods and services by the federal government 2.5 1.0 $88 bn
Transfers to state and local governments for infrastructure 2.5 1.0 $44 bn
Transfers to state and local governments not for infrastructure 1.9 0.7 $215 bn
Transfers to persons 2.2 0.8 $100 bn
One-time Social Security payments 1.2 0.2 $18 bn
Two-year tax cuts for lower and middle income persons 1.7 0.5 $168 bn
One-year tax cuts for higher income persons (AMT fix) 0.5 0.1 $70 bn
In contrast to government purchases, the effectiveness of transfers as a instrument of sta-
bilization has only recently garnered attention in the literature. Empirical work by Johnson,
Parker, and Souleles (2006) demonstrate that an economically significant portion of tax re-
bates (intended as stimulus) are spent. The authors track changes in consumption in the
Consumer Expenditures Survey and use the timing of rebates as a source of exogenous vari-
ation. Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles (2007) provide additional evidence of sizable consumption
effects by examining spending and saving behavior of households using credit card data. This
literature finds an economically significant and persistent response of household consumption
to rebates. Recent work by Oh and Reis (2012) and Giambattista and Pennings (2012) have
emphasized the important role of transfers in recent stimulus programs and have posited
models to determine the effect of these programs. Similarly, work by Kaplan and Violante
(2011) and Bilbiie, Monacelli, and Perotti (2012) have further examined the channels by which
3transfers effect aggregate output, employment and consumption.
In this paper, I examine the role of transfers as an instrument of fiscal policy with an
emphasis on purchases and transfers as alternative policies. To provide a role for transfers,
the model features patient and impatient households along with a credit spread which gen-
erates borrowing and lending in steady state. The model allows for flexible or sticky prices
to determine how the conclusions of the representative agent RBC and New Keynesian mod-
els carry over to a multiagent setting. Additionally, the model demonstrates how a broad
class of deficit-financed government expenditures can be represented as some combination of
government purchases and transfers.
My analysis reveals that several insights from the representative agent setting carry over to
a multiagent setting with credit spreads. Under flexible prices, fiscal policy only affects output
and employment through a wealth effect on labor supply. If preferences or the structure of
labor markets eliminate wealth effects on labor supply, neither purchases nor transfers will
have any effect on output or employment. However, even in the presence of wealth effects,
the deviations from the representative agent benchmark are small for plausible calibrations.
The government purchases multiplier on output is positive and driven by the negative wealth
effect on labor supply, while the transfers multiplier is close to zero as wealth effects lead to
offsetting movements in hours worked by the households that provide and receive the transfer.
A sensitivity analysis reveals that the variability of the credit spread does not affect these
results.
Under sticky prices, fiscal policy now has both an aggregate supply effect (via wealth effect
on labor supply) and an aggregate demand effect (via countercyclical markups). In the absence
of wealth effects, a Phillips curve can be derived in terms of output and inflation. So long as
the instrument of monetary policy is not constrained, the central bank may implement any
combination of output and inflation irrespective of the stance of fiscal policy. In this sense,
fiscal policy is irrelevant for determining aggregate output or inflation as monetary policy
is free to undo any effect of fiscal policy. More generally, the tradeoff between purchases
and transfers will depend on the monetary policy rule. In the presence of wealth effects,
4purchases or transfers may lower wages and shift the Phillips curve. Under a Taylor rule and
a standard calibration, transfers continue to have small effects on output and employment
relative to purchases. The primacy of monetary policy in determining the effect of fiscal
policy is analogous to the conclusions of Woodford (2011) and Curdia and Woodford (2010).
The presence of a credit spread and intermediation alters the implementation of monetary
policy (rule) but not the feasible set (Phillips curve).
When the instrument of monetary policy is constrained by, for example, the zero lower
bound on the nominal interest rate, the choice between purchases and transfers once again
becomes relevant and monetary policy cannot substitute for fiscal policy. Moreover, the
behavior of the credit spread and its dependence on endogenous variables such as aggregate
borrowing and income will determine the relative merits of purchases versus transfers. In the
model, an exogenous shock to the credit spread causes the zero lower bound to bind. Under
the calibration considered, purchases act more directly to increase output and inflation while
transfers allow for a faster reduction in private sector debt. Both types of policies allow a
faster escape from the zero lower bound relative to no intervention due to the endogenous
effect of debt reduction on credit spreads, and consumption multipliers for each policy are
typically positive. A credit spread that is more elastic to changes in private sector debt favors
transfers, while a spread that is more elastic to borrower income favors purchases.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 briefly summarizes related literature on
fiscal policy in a non-representative agent setting and its role in stabilizing business cycles.
Section 1.3 presents the model and introduces credit spreads and fiscal policy. Section 1.4 com-
pares purchases and transfers in the case of no wealth effects on labor supply. Alternatively,
Section 1.5 considers purchases and transfers in the presence of wealth effects. Section 1.6
examines the effect of purchases and transfers at the zero lower bound and Section 1.7 con-
cludes1.
1The Appendix relates the credit spread model considered here to models with rule-of-thumb households,
models with borrowing constraints, and overlapping generations models.
51.2 Related Literature
The model of patient and impatient agents draws on the borrower-saver model used in Camp-
bell and Hercowitz (2005), Iacoviello (2005), and Monacelli (2009) where different rates of
time preference among households allow for borrowing and lending in steady state. Differing
rates of time preference are a staple in financial accelerator models such as Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999), but these models typically go further and link the discount rate to the
structure of production. The structure of model considered here closely relates to the model
used by Bilbiie, Monacelli, and Perotti (2012) which focuses on the aggregate effects of income
redistribution. My work differs in considering the role of credit spreads on the choice of pur-
chases and transfers and the analysis of alternative fiscal instruments at the zero lower bound.
Also, like Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), I also analyze fiscal policy in a two-agent setting
where an exogenous debt shock causes the zero lower bound to bind and borrowers reduce
consumption as debt is repaid. However, my model differs in considering deficit-financed fiscal
policy, credit spreads that are partly determined endogenously, and analyzing the importance
of wealth effects on labor supply both at the zero lower bound and away from the zero lower
bound.
The effect of fiscal policy has also been examined in models with rule-of-thumb agents
- agents who do not participate in financial markets and simply consume their income each
period. Mankiw (2000) analyzes the effects of changes in taxation in a savers-spenders frame-
work, noting that such a model provides a justification for temporary reductions in taxes as
stimulus. Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) examine the effect of rule-of-thumb consumers
on the government purchases multiplier, and find that the presence of these agents can boost
the multiplier above one. However, the effect of nominal rigidities and labor market frictions
in their model have substantial effects on the government purchases multiplier even in the
absence of rule-of-thumb consumers. In a model with rule-of-thumb agents, Giambattista and
Pennings (2012) also compare the transfers multiplier to the government purchases multiplier
finding cases in which the former can exceed the later. In contrast to a rule-of-thumb model,
my model allows for intertemporal optimization on the part of both households and better
6fits the empirical evidence on tax rebates by allowing for a persistent response to temporary
tax rebates as documented in Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles (2007).
My work also relates to a literature on the effects of the public debt and transfers on pro-
duction in settings with credit frictions such as borrowing constraints and incomplete markets.
Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) examine the optimal level of public debt in a heterogenous
agent model with idiosyncratic earnings risk and capital as the variable factor of production.
A higher level of public debt can increase welfare by easing liquidity constraints but tends
to lower output by reducing precautionary saving and decreasing capital. Woodford (1990)
presents a stylized overlapping generations model with capital to illustrated that increases in
the public debt can both increase welfare and increase output, countering the view that high
levels of debt must necessarily crowd out investment. This paper differs from this literature
by considering an aggregate demand channel for changes in the public debt and focusing on
short-term rather than long-run effects of fiscal policy.
A small literature has studied the conduct of fiscal policy for stabilization purposes in
heterogenous agent models with incomplete markets. Heathcote (2005) considers the short-
run effect of tax cuts in a model with idiosyncratic income risk, but where both hours and
capital are variable factors of production. He finds that a tax rebate has a multiplier of 0.15,
and somewhat higher multipliers when considering reductions in distortionary taxes. His
work does not consider the aggregate demand effect of alternative fiscal policies. Moreover,
the output effect comes from investment rather than hours since he assumes GHH preferences
and no wealth effects on labor supply. Similarly, Oh and Reis (2012) consider the effect
of targeted transfers as fiscal stimulus and find very low transfer multipliers. The increase
in hours worked by households that experience a negative wealth shock does not offset the
decrease in hours worked by households that receive transfers. The model considered here
differs by treating only hours as a variable factor, considering sticky prices as the nominal
rigidity, and using credit spreads as opposed to borrowing constraints to allow for financial
intermediation.
71.3 Model
The model consists of two types of household, monopolistically competitive firms, a monetary
authority that sets the deposit rate as its policy instrument, and a fiscal authority. The
two-agent model facilitates the introduction of sticky prices and monetary policy to examine
aggregate demand effects, and allows for the use of log-linearization to understand the key
mechanisms at work. To generate borrowing and lending in steady state, the lender and
borrower household are assumed to differ in their rates of time preference. An equilibrium
credit spread is introduced to ensure that both agent’s Euler equations are satisfied in steady
state.
1.3.1 Households
A measure 1 − η of patient household chooses consumption and real savings to maximize
discounted expected utility:
max{Cst ,Nst ,Dt} E
∞￿
t=0
βtU (Cst , N
s
t )





Dt−1 −Dt +Πft − Tt
where Dt is real savings of the patient household and Πft are any profits from the real or
financial sectors2. The government may collect non-distortionary lump sum taxes Tt that are
levied uniformly across households. The period utility function U (C,N) is twice continuously
differentiable, increasing, and concave in consumption: Uc (C,N) > 0, Ucc (C,N) < 0 and
decreasing and convex in hours: Uh (C,N) < 0, Uhh(C,N) < 0. While patient households
could choose to borrow, for sufficiently small shocks, the interest rate on borrowings would
be too high and the patient household only saves.
A measure η of impatient household chooses consumption and real borrowings to maximize
2If equity in the firms and intermediaries were traded and short-selling ruled out, the patient household
would accumulate all shares in steady state. For sufficiently small shocks, the assumption that patient house-
holds own all shares would continue to hold in the stochastic economy.
8discounted expected utility:















where Bt is the real borrowings of the impatient household. The impatient household’s dis-
count rate γ < β ensures that the household chooses not to save and to only borrow in
the neighborhood of the steady state. The impatient household’s optimality conditions are



























for i￿{s, b} in equations (1.1) and (1.2). The difference between the borrowing rate and the
deposit rate allows both agents Euler equations to be satisfied in the non-stochastic steady
state, with the interest rates determined by the patient and impatient household’s discount
rates.
Aggregate consumption Ct and labor supply N supt are simply the weighted sum of each
household’s consumption and labor supply:
Ct = ηCbt + (1− η)Cst (1.5)
N supt = ηN
b
t + (1− η)N st (1.6)
As my analysis demonstrates, wealth effects play a critical role in determining the effect
of fiscal policy on output, employment and consumption.
Definition 1.1. Wealth effects are absent from household labor supply if the household’s labor





for some function vi that is increasing.
Wealth effects on labor supply are eliminated under the preference specification considered
by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988):
U (C,N) =
￿
C − γN1+ 1ϕ
￿1−σ
1− σ
where ϕ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Under GHH preferences, labor supply takes









Aside from GHH preferences, wealth effects on labor supply would also be absent in a model
with labor market rigidities. Under a rigid real wage, the labor supply relation no longer














for i￿ {s, b}. In a model where wages remained constant - the case of perfect wage rigidity
considered by (Blanchard and Gali, 2010) and Shimer (2012) - fiscal multipliers are determined
exclusively by firm’s labor demand condition. Under wage rigidity, household’s labor supply




= c =W satisfying the definition
of no wealth effects.
To obtain an aggregate labor supply curve and an aggregate IS curve, I must log-linearize
the household’s labor supply and Euler equations. In the general case with wealth effects,









for i￿{s, b} where the lower case variables represent log deviations from steady state, ϕi is the
household’s Frisch elasticity and σi is the household’s intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Solving for each agent’s labor supply nit, aggregate labor supply is the weighted sum of each
agent’s log-linearized labor supply (where the weight is the steady state share of employment
for each household). Similarly, an aggregate IS equation can be obtained by a weighted sum











ct = Etct+1 + sbσbibt + (1− sb)σsidt − σ˜Etπt+1 (1.8)
with lb = ηN b/N and sb = ηCb/C. The parameters ϕ˜ = lbϕb + (1− lb)ϕs and σ˜ =
sbσb + (1− sb)σs are the appropriate weighted aggregate Frisch elasticity and aggregate
intertemporal elasticity of substitution respectively. Relative to a standard representative
household model, the labor supply curve depends on the distribution of consumption (as op-
posed to just the level of consumption) and the IS curve depends on the real borrowing rate
(in addition to the real deposit rate).
1.3.2 Credit Spreads
The credit spread - the difference between the borrowing rate and deposit rate - is treated as
a reduced form equation:
1 + ibt
1 + idt







The function Γ is assumed to be weakly increasing in its first and last arguments and weakly
decreasing in its middle argument. The assumption that the spread is increasing with the level
of household debt Bt is needed to ensure determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium
and is analogous to the stationarity conditions needed in small open economy models3. The
effect of expected borrower income,Wt+1N bt+1 on credit spreads is consistent with the observed
3See discussion in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003
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countercyclicality of credit spreads and the fact that spreads lead the business cycle. The
dependence of the spread on borrower income would emerge in a model where lending is
subject to adverse selection or limited commitment.
The shock Zt is an exogenous financial shock that can increase spreads. The financial
shock may be interpreted as either a shock to the supply or demand side of the credit market.
On the supply side, if financial intermediaries’ capacity to raise funds is constrained by their
own net worth, a depletion of equity due to an unexpected loss on the asset side of the balance
sheet will cause an increase in borrowing rates. Alternatively, on the demand side, a shock
to borrower collateral can likewise make borrowers less creditworthy thereby raising spreads.
In particular, in a model with housing as collateral, a shock to house prices would reduce the
value of collateral and raise credit spreads for the borrower household.
The log-linearized credit spread can be summarized by two parameters: the elasticity of
the spread to private borrowings and the elasticity of the spread to borrower income with
χb > 0 and χn ≥ 0:





The elasticity on debt strictly exceeds zero to ensure stationarity. The credit spread may rise
due to an exogenous increase in zt or may rise due to some fundamental shock that drives up
the level of debt or decreases borrower’s household income. The log-linearized credit spread is
flexible enough to incorporate the type of interest rate spreads seen in a broad class of models.
When χn = 0, the model exhibits a debt elastic spread as in standard small open economy
models. When χb = χn > 0, the credit spread varies with the leverage of the borrower
household. The canonical financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) features a leverage elastic spread. Finally, when χn > χb > 0, the credit spread may
be described as income elastic strengthening comovement with the business cycle. Variations
in these parameters will be used to determine the effect of credit spreads on the choice among
fiscal instruments.
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1.3.3 Fiscal and Monetary Policy
The instruments of fiscal policy consist of a set of uniform nondistortionary taxes, government
consumption, and transfers. The fiscal authority may also run a budget deficit subject to a
fiscal rule that ensures that the debt returns to its steady state level and subject to an
intertemporal solvency condition:
Gt = Bgt −
1 + idt−1
Πt









t (1 + idt−1)
(1.12)
where rebt is a lump sum tax rebate delivered to all households. The instruments of fiscal
policy are government purchasesGt and a reduction in lump sum taxes rebt. The government’s
cost of funds is the policy rate idt , not the borrowing rate ibt . This assumption best fits larger
economies like the United States where the government controls the currency. For small open
economies and countries in a currency union (such as the Eurozone), the rate at which the
government borrows may carry a premium to the policy rate.
The monetary authority is assumed to set a rule for monetary policy so long as its instru-
ment of policy, the deposit rate idt , is not constrained by the zero lower bound. I will consider
when monetary policy follows a standard Taylor rule (without interest rate smoothing) or











Πt = 1 (1.14)
When monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound, I assume that the deposit rate
is set at zero or inflation is perfectly stabilized.
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1.3.4 Firms
Monopolistically competitive firms set prices periodically and hire labor in each period to
produce a differentiated good. Cost-minimization for firms and production function play a





Yt = Nαt (1.16)
where α is the labor share, Nt is labor demand and MCt is the firm’s marginal cost which
varies over time depending on the rate of inflation and the stance of monetary policy.
Prices are reset via Calvo price setting where θ is the likelihood of firm to reset it’s prices
in the current period. When θ = 1, prices are set each period, monopolistic competitive firms






where ν is the elasticity of substitution among final goods in the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. If
the initial price level is unity, then prices will be normalized to unity, and marginal costs will
be fixed at all periods MCt = MC = 1/µp. When θ < 1, firms will set prices on the basis of
future expected marginal costs. The firms prices problem and the behavior of the price level
are summarized by the following equations:
Ft = µpλstMCtYt + θβEtΠ
ν
t+1Ft+1
Kt = λstYt + θβEtΠ
ν−1
t+1Kt+1





Firms are owned by the saver households and therefore future marginal costs are discounted
by the saver household’s stochastic discount factor.
When prices are flexible, marginal costs are fixed and, to a log-linear approximation,
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mct = 0. When prices are sticky, a log-linear approximation to the firm’s pricing problem
around a zero inflation steady state implies the standard expectations-augmented Phillips
curve:
πt = κmct + βEtπt+1
where κ = (1−θ)(1−θβ)θ .
1.3.5 Equilibrium
Asset market clearing requires that real saving equals real borrowing:
ηBt +Bgt = (1− η)Dt
Combining the household’s budget constraints and the government’s budget constraint and
firm profits implies an aggregate resource constraint of the form:
Yt = Ct +Gt (1.17)
Labor market clearing requires:
Nt = N supt = ηN
b
t + (1− η)N st (1.18)
Definition 1.2. An equilibrium is a set of allocations
￿










t , Bt, Ft, Kt
￿
,
a price process for
￿
Wt, Πt, idt , ibt , MCt
￿
, a fiscal policy {Bgt , Tt, Gt, rebt}, and initial values
for private debt B0 and public debt Bg0 that jointly satisfy the equilibrium conditions listed in
the Appendix.
The fiscal policy considered consists of government purchases and tax rebates, as opposed
to transfers. However, deficit-financing of these fiscal policies is equivalent to a transfer from
saver to borrower households and back again.
Proposition 1.1. Consider an equilibrium under a deficit financed fiscal policy {Bgt , Tt, Gt, rebt}.
There exists a set of household-specific taxes T bt and T st that implement the same equilibrium
15
and satisfies a balanced budget: Gt = ηT bt + (1− η)T st
Proof. Since the saver household purchases the issuance of government debt, the saver’s bud-
get constraint may be expressed using the asset market clearing condition and substituting
out for taxes using the government’s budget constraint (1.10):
Cst +
1
1− η (ηBt +B
g
















Rearranging, we may define saver specific tax T st :
Cst +
η






























It is readily verified that the household specific taxes satisfy the balanced budget constraint.
￿
The proposition illustrates an equivalence relation between deficit-financing and transfers
between agents. As the budget deficit increases, taxes fall for the borrower household and
rise for the saver. A tax rebate represents a pure transfer from savers to borrowers despite
the fact that both households receive the tax rebate. A deficit financed increase in purchases
represents a combination of both transfers and purchases.
However, the transfer cannot be one way. As the debt is stabilized or decreased, the
transfer reverses - borrowers make a transfer back to savers. Thus, in general, the converse
of the proposition will not hold. A fiscal authority that can levy household specific taxes
can implement a richer set of policies than a fiscal authority constrained to uniform taxation
and deficit financing. For example, a one-way transfer cannot be implemented as a deficit-
financed rebate. Moreover, the capacity of the fiscal authority to engineer transfers depends
16
on the initial level of debt - with high levels of public debt, an increase in transfers requires an
increase to higher debt levels where the overall transfer will be blunted by the size of interest
payments.
1.4 Case of No Wealth Effects on Labor Supply
In this section, I examine the effect of purchases and transfers in a setting where household
preferences or the structure of labor markets eliminate wealth effects on labor supply. The
absence of wealth effects eliminates any effect of fiscal policy on aggregate supply. With
prices set freely each period, firms’ incentives to hire labor are not changed because neither
its marginal costs nor its production technology are affected by the change in fiscal policy.
When prices are changed only periodically, changes in fiscal policy will have an effect on
aggregate demand. When prices are fixed, producers must meet demand at posted prices
raising marginal costs. However, the monetary authority is always free to tighten interest
rates and dampen demand so long as it is not constrained by the zero lower bound.
1.4.1 Flexible Prices
When producers are free to set prices each period, prices are a constant markup over marginal
costs. Since price is normalized to unity, marginal costs are constant: MC = 1µp in all periods.
Proposition 1.2. If labor supply depends only on the wage for both households, then output
and employment are determined independently of fiscal policy





for i￿{s, b}. Under the assumptions in Section 1.3, the function v is strictly increasing. There-
fore, it’s inverse exists and combining the labor supply equation with labor market clearing:
Nt = ηv−1b (Wt) + (1− η) v−1s (Wt)
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Using the firm’s production function (11) and labor demand condition (10), wages can be
expressed in terms of employment:
Wt = αMCNα−1t
Replacing wages, aggregate employment is determined independent of fiscal policy. The pro-
duction function implies that output is also determined independent of fiscal policy. ￿
Importantly, the irrelevance of fiscal policy holds irrespective of any of the properties of the
credit spread, and would continue to obtain in a model with other types of financial frictions
(such as borrowing constraints) or a larger number of agents so long as the labor supply
relation holds for each agent. Using the economy’s resource constraint (1.17), it follows that a
tax rebate or transfer has no affect on aggregate consumption while an increase in government
purchases is offset by an equivalent decrease in consumption. Significantly, the insights of the
representative agent model are unchanged in the multiple agent setting.
Wealth effects on labor supply are eliminated under the preference specification considered
by (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman, 1988):
U(C,N) =
￿
C − γN1+ 1ν
￿1−σ
1− σ











Aside from GHH preferences, wealth effects on labor supply would also be absent in a
model with labor market rigidities. Under a rigid real wage, the labor supply relation no















for i￿ {s, b}. In a model where wages remained constant - the case of perfect wage rigidity
considered by (Blanchard and Gali, 2010) and Shimer (2012) - fiscal multipliers are determined
exclusively by firm’s labor demand condition. As long as wages exceed the marginal rate of
substitution, output and employment will be unaffected by fiscal policy. More generally, if
the wage only adjusts gradually to changes in the households’ marginal rates of substitution,
the effect of fiscal shocks can be made arbitrarily small.
1.4.2 Sticky Prices
Under sticky prices, marginal costs are no longer constant and fiscal shocks will affect output
and employment through the aggregate demand channel. However, monetary policy can also
affect output and employment via the aggregate demand channel, and, since the feasible set of
combinations of output and inflation is unchanged by the presence of credit spreads, monetary
policy and fiscal policy are redundant.
To show that the Phillips curve is unchanged, I use a log-linear approximation to the
equilibrium conditions to obtain the output inflation tradeoff. Under GHH preferences, the





for i￿{s, b}. Aggregating using a log-linearized version of (1.18) and eliminating wt using
(1.15):
mct = nt − yt + 1
ν
nt
Eliminating nt using the log-linearized production function (1.16) and using the equation for














(1− α)yt + βEtπt+1
If monetary policy seeks to stabilize some combination of output and inflation, the tar-
geting rule for optimal monetary policy will be unaffected by the presence of credit spreads
or their variability. Formally, if the central bank chooses a path of πt, yt to minimize a loss














(yt − yt−1) = 0
where ϑ is the slope of the Phillips curve4. Though the loss function here does not follow from
a second-order approximation of average utility in a multiple household economy, it seems
reasonable to assume that the central bank will be primarily concerned with maintaining
aggregate output rather than distributional considerations. The primacy of monetary policy
in determining the effect of fiscal shocks is similar to the conclusions in Woodford (2011).
He showed that the government purchases multiplier could be larger or smaller than the
neoclassical multiplier depending on how aggressively monetary policy responds to inflation.
Though, the inflation/output tradeoff is unchanged by credit spreads, the implementation
of monetary policy will be affected. This result is analogous to the results presented in Curdia
and Woodford (2010) who show that the presence of financial intermediation does not affect
the targeting rule for optimal monetary policy but may affect the implementation of optimal
monetary policy. In general, setting the correct policy rate idt to implement optimal policy
will require the monetary authority to take into account changes in the credit spread. A log-
linear approximation to the household’s Euler equations (1.1) and (1.3) - (1.4) and a log-linear
4The optimal targeting criterion features output instead of the output gap because the natural rate of
output is simply steady state output.
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approximation to the resource constraint (1.17) can be combined to derive an aggregate Euler
equation:
idt = Etπt+1 −
1
scσ˜
(yt − gt − Et (yt+1 − gt+1))− sbσb
σ˜
ωt
where ωt is the credit spread, σb is the borrower household’s intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution, σ˜ is a weighted average of households intertemporal elasticity of substitution, sb is
the share of borrower’s consumption in total consumption in steady state, and sc is the share
of private consumption in total output in steady state. Fiscal policy will directly affect the
determination of interest rates through government purchases and also affect interest rates
via the spread. So long as the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is not binding, there
exists a path of interest rates consistent with the target path of output and inflation set by
the monetary authority. Any changes in fiscal policy can be accommodated by suitable ad-
justment of the interest rate. Since a path of output implies a path of employment, monetary
policy and fiscal policy are redundant in determining those quantities when the zero lower
bound is not binding. Importantly, monetary policy and fiscal policy cannot achieve the same
equilibrium allocations and are not equivalent in terms of the distribution of consumption.
Fiscal policy may still have a role in achieving some distribution of consumption or level of
private debt.
1.5 Case of Wealth Effects on Labor Supply
In this section, I consider the more conventional case of government purchases and transfers
in the presence of wealth effects on labor supply. The canonical RBC and New Keynesian
models typically feature wealth effects ensuring both an aggregate supply and an aggregate
demand channel for fiscal policy. While the conclusions in this section are not as strong as the
case with no wealth effects, the insights from the previous section carry over in the calibrated
examples analyzed in this section.
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1.5.1 Representative Agent Benchmark
To allow for wealth effects on labor supply, I consider standard preferences where the level of
consumption affects agent’s labor supply. To a log linear approximation, each agent’s labor








for i￿{s, b}, where ϕi is the Frisch elasticity of hours with respect to the wage and σi is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The labor supply approximation given above holds
irrespective of whether utility is separable in consumption and hours. To examine how credit
spreads affect fiscal multipliers, it is useful to derive a representative agent benchmark for
comparison. In a representative agent model, marginal utilities must be equalized across
agents implying that cst = cbt = ct. Solving each agent’s labor supply equation in terms of nit














+ (1− lb) ϕsσs
￿
where lb is the share of borrower’s hours in total hours worked. Given this aggregate labor
supply condition, the output multiplier can be obtained by solving for consumption and the







where sc is the share of consumption in GDP and ϕ˜ is the average Frisch elasticity and σ˜ is the
representative agent’s intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Government spending increases
output via a negative wealth effect, but the government spending multiplier is necessarily less
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than one. Transfers and deficit-financing have no affect on output.
The representative agent model also admits a representation for the Phillips curve. Elim-
inating mct using the labor demand equation (1.15) and eliminating nt using the production









Using the resource constraint (1.17) to eliminate ct and the production function, wages can be
expressed in terms of output and government purchases. Replacing the wage in the Phillips















An increase in government purchases shifts back the Phillips curve by increasing labor supply
and lowering wages - purchases raise the natural rate of output.
1.5.2 Flexible Prices
In the case of a model with credit spreads, the labor supply relations can be solved for
consumption cit in terms of the wage wt and hours worked nit for each agent. Substituting
into the resource constraint and eliminating the wage using (1.15), output can be expressed














where σ = sbσb+ (1− sb)σs is a weighted average elasticity of intertemporal substitution and
other parameters as defined earlier.
The expression for output can be further simplified by solving for nbt from labor market



















Proposition 1.3. Transfers and the means of financing any government expenditure have no
effect on output and employment if:
1. Preferences are linear in hours worked as in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988)
2. Labor supply by households is coordinated: nst = nbt










Proof. In the first case, as the Frisch elasticities ϕs = ϕb →∞, the coefficient on the second
term in the expression for output goes to zero, and output is only affected by purchases. In
the second case, hours worked by the saver hours equal aggregate hours: nst = nt = 1αyt and
output is solely a function of purchases. In the last case, the coefficient on hours of the saver
household is zero. ￿
The proposition illustrates that, even with wealth effects on labor supply, transfers and
deficit-financing may have little effect on output or employment. The deviations from the
representative agent benchmark stem solely from the second term in the output expression.
If households are sufficiently homogenous - that is, if household do not differ appreciably in
underlying parameters and shares of consumption and hours, the coefficient on the second
term is likely to be small. If this coefficient is positive, fiscal policies that strengthen the
negative wealth effect on the saver household will boost the output multiplier relative to the
representative agent benchmark. In particular transfers away from the saver household should
boost multipliers. However, if the coefficient is negative, fiscal policies that boost the negative
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wealth effect on borrowers will increase multipliers.
1.5.3 Sticky Prices
In the case of sticky prices, fiscal policy has both an aggregate supply element that reduces
marginal costs and an aggregate demand element that raises marginal costs. Monetary policy
does not face a stable Phillips curve relation between inflation and output, and the choice
of fiscal policy may shift the Phillips curve in favorable or unfavorable ways. As before, the









However, unlike the representative agent model, in the presence of wealth effects, wages cannot
generally be expressed in terms of aggregate output.
In the cases considered in the previous proposition, transfers have no effect on aggregate
output and the Phillips curve can be represented in terms of inflation, output, and government
purchases as in the representative agent model. Since transfers do not shift the Phillips curve,
credit spreads do not affect the Phillips curve and the output-inflation tradeoff is unchanged.















where the first term gives the wealth effect on labor supply and the second term gives the
substitution effect. Because government purchases act to directly lower the wage while trans-
fers cause offsetting movements in hours between households, purchases are likely to have a
greater downward effect on wages. A reduction in wages will provide the monetary authority
with a more favorable output and inflation tradeoff and allow for a less restrictive monetary
policy. In this sense, one can conjecture that purchases may be better than transfers for
boosting output and employment.
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Table 1.2: Calibration summary
Parameter description Parameter Value Parameter Description Parameter Value
Intertemporal elasticity σi 1 Deposit rate id 1.020.25
Frisch elasticity ϕi 2 Borrowing rate ib 1.060.25
Calvo parameter θ 0.75 Borrower share η 50%
Markup µp 0.25 Debt elasticity χb 0.1
Wage bill WN/Y 0.70 Income elasticity χn 0
Gov’t purchases G/Y 0.20 Taylor rule (inflation) φπ 1.5
Debt/GDP Bg/Y 2 Taylor rule (output) φy 0.25
Household debt B/WN b 4 Fiscal rule φb 0.2
1.5.4 Calibration
As I have shown, in the presence of wealth effects on labor supply, fiscal policy will have
both aggregate supply and aggregate demand channels. To assess the degree to which the
multiple agent model differs from the representative agent model, I calibrate the model with
wealth effects and examine the effect of deficit-financed purchases and tax rebates. While each
deficit-financed policy can be expressed as a balanced budget combination of purchases and
transfers, the deficit-financed policies considered here are closest to fiscal policy in practice
and avoid issues of incentive compatibility5.
The baseline calibration assumes standard separable utility function of the form
U (C,N) =
C1−σ−1
1− σ−1 − νN
1+ϕ−1
with standard values for the Frisch elasticities and intertemporal elasticities of substitution. In
the baseline calibration these values are equal across agents with ϕb = ϕs = 2 and σb = σs = 1.
In steady state, output Y is normalized to 1 and the disutility of labor supply for each
household νs and νb is set to ensure that each household supplies labor such thatN b = N s = 1.
The markup due to monopolistic competition is set at 25% and the labor share α is set to
ensure that the wage bill is equal to 70% of GDP, consistent with U.S. data. The Calvo
5In the case of household specific taxes and transfers, household have an incentive to mask their type and
represent themselves as borrowers or lenders based on the proposed fiscal policy.
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Figure 1.1: Deficit-financed purchases and tax cuts




































































































parameter θ is set to 0.75 so that firms change prices every 4 quarters on average. The rates
of time preference β and γ are set to target an annual deposit rate of 2% and an annual
borrowing rate of 6%. The disutilities of labor supply, the rates of time preference, and the
markup do not enter the log-linearized equilibrium conditions and, therefore, do not affect
the dynamics of the model. In steady state, the consumption of the borrower household is
less than that of the saver household since the saver household earns both wage income and
profits from the firm. Government spending is 20% of GDP in steady state. The steady state
public debt is 50% of GDP consistent with recent U.S. levels. In steady state, the household
debt for the borrower household is equal to annual household income consistent with data on
household wealth from the Survey on Consumer Finances.
The nonstandard parameters for the model include the credit spread parameters χb and
χn that control, respectively, the endogenous response of spreads to private sector debt and
expected borrower income and the share of borrower households η in the economy. In the
baseline case, I will consider a debt-elastic spread such that χb = 0.1 and χn = 0 - a calibration
that implies a 1% increase in debt raises spreads by roughly 50 basis points. In general, a
regression of spreads on measures of indebtedness and income in aggregate data is unlikely
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to accurately estimate these elasticities given that common shocks may induce a comovement
of income and spreads even though χn = 0. As shown in Section 1.6, the financial shock
zt causes income and spreads to comove even with χn = 0. As it turns out, these credit
spread elasticities have little effect on the experiments here suggesting that spreads may have
a fairly small effect on fiscal policy transmission away from the zero lower bound. The share
of borrower household η is set to 50% as in Curdia and Woodford (2010); this parameter has
no obvious analogue in the data and is selected conservatively to minimize heterogeneity. The
calibration values are summarized in Table 1.2.
1.5.5 Fiscal Policy Experiments and Sensitivity
The first experiment in Figure 1.1 considers the effect of a 1% of GDP increase in government
purchases (top panel) and a 1% of GDP increase in tax rebates (bottom panel), each with a
persistence of ρ = 0.9. The figure also shows the response of the representative agent economy
with parameters as defined in Section 1.5.1. The fiscal authority runs a budget deficit and
taxes follow a fiscal rule - taxes adjust upwards to return the public debt to its steady state
level. The response parameter in the fiscal rule φb is close to the rule used in Gali, Lopez-
Salido, and Valles (2007), which is based on VAR estimates for U.S. data. Prices are reset
each period and, therefore, firm markups are constant.
In this environment, the effect of purchases and rebates is driven by wealth effects on labor
supply. Under the baseline calibration where the Frisch elasticity and intertemporal elasticity
of substitution are equal, the only source of heterogeneity is the share of borrower consumption
sb <
1
2 since the borrower household pays interest to the intermediary and does not receive
any profits from firms6. Under this calibration, the coefficient on saver’s hours (in the output
expression Section 1.5.2) is negative. As a result, the tax rebate multiplier is slightly negative
- the fall in hours worked by the borrower household is not fully offset by the rise in hours
by the saver household. The transfer acts to dampen aggregate incentives to work. Likewise,
6Steady state government purchases are financed by a tax on patient households to reduce differences in
steady state levels of consumption (through a tax on capital holdings). However, it is assumed that both
household pay taxes proportional to their size in the economy to finance government purchases in excess of
steady state levels. In steady state, Cs/Cb ∼ 1.3.
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Figure 1.2: Alternative credit spread elasticities

















































































the government purchases multiplier on output is slightly lower than the representative agent
multiplier since the labor supply effects for the borrower are dampened by the increase in
the deficit. As the second column shows, the response in hours worked by each household is
quite different reflecting the transfer component of fiscal policy. However, these movements
wash out in the aggregate - the difference in aggregate hours between the representative
agent model and the multiagent model is miniscule. The dynamics of public debt illustrate
the degree of transfers from the saver household - periods of increasing debt represent net
transfers to borrowers, while periods of stabilizing and falling debt represent transfers from
borrowers back to savers. Importantly, these policies do not imply the same debt dynamics
since changes in the interest rate have an effect on debt accumulation in a calibration with a
positive steady state level of debt. With zero debt and a linear approximation, both policies
would imply the same path of the public debt. Government purchases have larger output
multipliers than tax rebates simply because purchases have a larger wealth effect on labor
supply. Output and employment rise as the wage falls due to the increased willingness of
both households to work.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 examine how sensitive these results are to the credit spread elasticities
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Figure 1.3: Alternative intertemporal elasticities of substitution

















































































χb and χn and to heterogeneity in wealth effects across households by adjusting the rela-
tive intertemporal elasticities of substitution. Figure 1.2 show that different models of the
spread have little effect on the deviations of output multipliers from the representative agent
benchmark - in particular that tax rebate multiplier is still negative and close to zero. Fig-
ure 1.3 considers three cases: debt elastic spreads (χb = 0.5, χn = 0), leverage elastic spread
(χb = χn = 0.5), and income elastic spread (χb = 0.1, χn = 0.5). In all cases, the purchases
and rebate multipliers deviates by less than 5% from the representative agent benchmark.
In each case, the behavior of hours and spreads differs, but the aggregate effect on output,
hours, wages, and consumption are all close to the representative agent benchmark. The
second column shows that saver’s hours respond strongly to the tax rebate shock, but the
borrower’s response almost fully offsets this rise in hours resulting in little net effect.
Figure 1.3 examines the effect of variations in the relative intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution holding the average intertemporal elasticity fixed at σ˜ = 1 where σ˜ is as defined
in Section 1.5.2. In the case of “high borrower elasticity,” wealth effects for the borrower
household are diminished by choosing an intertemporal elasticity of substitution three times
higher than that of the saver household. Alternatively, in the case of “high saver elasticity,”
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the borrower household has an intertemporal elasticity of substitution one-third the size of
the saver household and, therefore, the borrower’s labor supply is more sensitive to changes
in wealth. When the borrower household exhibits smaller wealth effects, the tax rebate multi-
plier becomes positive. Savers respond to the negative wealth shock by working harder while
borrowers reduce their hours but by less than in the baseline case. As a result, aggregate
hours and output rises. The opposite occurs in the case of high saver elasticity for the same
reason. As before, the government purchases multiplier is an order of magnitude higher than
the tax rebate multiplier simply because of the stronger wealth effects on aggregate labor
supply under purchases.
Figure 1.4: Deficit-financed purchases and tax rebates under a Taylor rule









































































































Figure 1.4 relaxes the assumption of flexible prices and examines the effect of an increase
in purchases and tax rebates when monetary policy follows a Taylor rule. To ensure that a tax
rebate is expansionary, the calibration used in Figure 1.4 assumes the case of a high borrower
elasticity of intertemporal substitution - that is, σb/σs = 3. As the experiment demonstrates,
fiscal multipliers rise sizably under an operative aggregate demand channel. Moreover, a
more elastic credit spread raises multipliers further - when the elasticity of the spread to debt
rises from χb = 0.1 to χb = 0.5, the output multiplier on purchases rises from 0.69 to 0.82.
31
Likewise, the output multiplier for tax rebates rises from 0.05 to 0.15. The falling credit
spread dampens the transmission of monetary policy as the rise in the deposit rate is not fully
incorporated into the borrowing rate (since spreads are falling). However, as noted earlier,
bigger multipliers come only at the cost of higher inflation as seen in the last column. This
rise in inflation is due to the fact that the Phillips curve has not shifted, and larger multipliers
are the product of an accommodative stance of monetary policy. As before, the purchases
multiplier is an order of magnitude larger than the transfers multiplier. However, if monetary
policy responds asymmetrically to different fiscal shocks, it is possible to obtain cases where
the tax rebate multiplier is as high or higher than the purchases multiplier. Finally, purchases
are preferred to tax rebates in that sense that purchases generate a larger rise in output and
employment for a given amount of inflation. The negative wealth effect of purchases raises
labor supply, reduces marginal costs, and improves the Phillips curve tradeoff.
1.6 Zero Lower Bound
In this section, I examine how credit spread shocks may cause the zero lower bound to bind
and consider the effect of government purchases and transfers on output and consumption.
Consistent with evidence from representative agent models, the government purchases mul-
tiplier is above unity at the zero lower bound. Additionally, transfers (implemented by tax
rebates) may be similarly effective as purchases in stabilizing output and consumption. The
choice among policies depends on the endogenous feedback of debt and income on the credit
spread.
Representative agent models typically rely on preference shocks or other reduced form
shocks to the natural rate of interest to cause the zero lower bound to bind. However, in a
model with multiple agents, disruptions to the financial system that raise the credit spread
may also cause the zero lower bound to bind. As shown in Section 4.2, an aggregate IS-
equation can be obtained by summing the agent’s Euler equations:
idt = Etπt+1 −
1
scσ˜




Any shock to the credit spread ωt will drive down the interest rate when monetary policy seeks
to maintain yt = πt = 0, and for sufficiently large shocks, the interest rate will fall to the zero
bound. The reduced form credit spread depends endogenously on debt and borrower income
and, exogenously, on a financial shock. Any underlying shock that drives up debt and/or
decreases borrower income may reduce the deposit rate, but I will consider an exogenous
financial shock as the shock that binds the zero lower bound.
The special case of real wage rigidity and a credit spread with zero debt elasticity (χb = 0)
illustrates the role of purchases versus transfers in determining output and inflation. Under
















where the credit spread is replaced by the log-linearized version of (1.9). By setting the debt-
elasticity of the spread to zero, the law of motion for debt and the distribution of consumption
between saver and borrower households is decoupled from the determination inflation and
output. A zero lower bound episode is caused by a temporary increase in zt to z that reverts to
zero with probability 1−ρ in each period caused the zero lower bound to bind: idt = −r. Given
the absence of a state variables, this two-equation system is forward-looking and multipliers
may be computed explicitly as in Woodford (2010):
yzlb = νgg − ζ
νg =
(1− ρ) (1− βρ)
(1− βρ) ￿1− ρ− scsbσbρχnα ￿− scσ κα (1− α) ρ
ζ =
sc (1− ρ) (sbσbz − σr)
(1− βρ) ￿1− ρ− scsbσbρχnα ￿− scσ κα (1− α) ρ
The constant term gives the decrease in output in the absence of any policy intervention
and under the assumption that monetary policy ensures that yt = πt = 0 after the financial
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shock dissipates. If the credit spread does not respond (or responds weakly) to changes
in private debt, transfers and tax rebates have no effect on output and inflation and are
ineffective as fiscal stimulus. Government purchases are effective in counteracting the effects
of a financial shock, but the mechanism is essentially the same as any representative agent
model of government purchases at the zero lower bound. The means of financing the increase
in purchases are irrelevant. In fact, the multiplier is identical to the multiplier in Woodford
(2011) except for the endogenous effect of output on the spread through χn. When χn > 0,
the multiplier on government purchases is higher as is the negative effect of the financial
shock.
This simple example highlights how transfers operate through the credit spread. To the
extent that transfers decrease the credit spread by lowering household indebtedness, trans-
fers will have a positive multiplier. This analysis suggests that deficit-financed government
purchases will be preferred to purchases financed by taxes because the transfer component of
the policy further reduces credit spreads; indeed, this result holds in the numerical examples
considered in the next section. Moreover, since transfers only operate through the spread,
the transfers multiplier is unlikely to exceed the government purchases multiplier unless pur-
chases worsen the rise in spreads. In the calibrated examples considered next, purchases
reduce private sector indebtedness and the credit spread.
1.6.1 No Policy Intervention
The experiment here roughly attempts to capture the type of disruption experienced in the
U.S. after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. The model and calibration are the same as
considered in the previous section, however, for simplicity, that monetary authority is assumed
to follow perfect inflation stabilization πt = 0 for all periods after the zero lower bound ceases
to bind. While monetary policy may, in principle, mitigate the effects of the financial shock by
committing to higher future inflation (as discussed extensively in Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003)), I assume that time inconsistency diminishes the effectiveness of these commitments.
Additionally, steady state public debt is assumed to be zero to ensure that each policy implies
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Figure 1.5: Financial shock with flexible wages






































































the same path for the public debt (to a linear approximation) and the shock generates no
endogenous movements in debt or taxes.
Figure 1.5 shows the effect of a financial shock that raises (annualized) credit spreads
16 percentage points7. The model is solved using the solution algorithm described in the
appendix of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and the financial shock is assumed to have a
persistence of ρ = 0.8. The point at which the economy exits the zero lower bound depends
on the endogenous behavior of private sector debt and the value of the elasticity χb. For high
elasticities, a faster rate of deleveraging will cause the credit spread to fall faster hastening
the exit from the zero lower bound. However, as shown in Figure 1.5, agents actually increase
their debt loads since the elasticity of the spread to debt is fairly low (χb = 0.1).
A 16 percentage point financial shock raises credit spreads by 20 percentage points and
leads to a very large fall in output and consumption in excess of 20%. The negative wealth
effect drives down wages 40% and the fall in demand and wages combines to cause a very
steep deflation. The zero lower bound episode lasts for 10 quarters or two and half years, and
7The actual rise in the credit spread is larger because of the endogenous component due to the increase in
private sector debt.
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Figure 1.6: Financial shock with perfectly rigid real wages
































































rates gradually normalize as debt and spreads fall. After the ZLB ceases to bind, inflation
remains at zero and output is marginally positive due to wealth effects that keep wages lower
than their steady state level.
Given the role of wealth effects in determining the sharp fall in wages and inflation, I also
consider a similar shock in a model without wealth effects on labor supply. In the presence of
a perfectly rigid wage, changes in household wealth have no affect on output or employment.
Figure 1.6 provides the impulse responses to a larger 20 percentage point financial shock.
Under rigid wages, the fall in output and inflation are significantly dampened with output
falling 6% and (annualized) inflation falling 1% on impact - values that are comparable to
the U.S. output and inflation response in the fourth quarter of 2008. The zero lower bound
ceases to bind in 12 quarters and, since the Phillips curve is independent of spreads, output,
consumption and inflation jump to their steady state levels. Households deleverage throughout
the crisis period and only begin to releverage after three years; interest rates remain below
their steady state level for the entire period of 24 quarters or six years. The output and
inflation response in the rigid wage model suggest that some degree of wage rigidity might be
desirable for fitting the model to the current recession.
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Figure 1.7: Deficit-financed purchases and tax rebates in flexible wage model















































































I consider deficit financed fiscal policies where the intervention ends as soon as the zero lower
bound ceases to bind. Fiscal policy may either raise government purchases or reduce taxes by
some level so long as the zero lower bound binds. The choice of a flexible or rigid wage has
significant implications for the efficacy of policy. Figure 1.7 shows the effect of a 1% of GDP
increase in government purchases and a 1% decrease in taxes for all periods that the zero lower
bound binds. Small policy interventions have very large effects relative to no intervention. For
both government purchases and tax rebates, the economy exits the zero lower bound within
a year instead of 2.5 years. Under the tax rebate, the fall in output is 2.5% versus a 22% fall
absent intervention. For government purchases, the fall in output only last a quarter with
output falling by only 0.5%. Instead of continuing to increase leverage, households deleverage
between 3% and 5% and the intervention reduces the rise in spreads by 1/3. Deficit-financed
purchases are preferred to tax rebates both in terms of output and consumption. Purchases
act more directly to raise output and inflation, reducing the real interest rate faced by saver
households and “crowding-in” consumption.
Figure 1.8 shows the much more limited effect of a 1% increase in purchases and tax rebates
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Figure 1.8: Deficit-financed purchases and tax rebates in rigid wage model





































































in the rigid wage model. Both policies are successful in boosting both output and consumption
relative to a policy of inaction, but these policies carry much smaller multipliers than the case
of flexible wages. Government purchases limit the fall in output to 3.8% and rebates limit the
fall in output to 5.3% relative to the 5.7% fall absent any intervention. Purchases, once again,
act more directly to boost inflation and raise the consumption profile of the saver household
while the borrowers consumption path is a function primarily of the credit spread. Output
and inflation actually rise above their steady state values before jumping to those values once
the zero lower bound stops binding. Relative to no intervention, the economy exits the zero
lower bound only one period earlier.
1.6.3 Role of Credit Spreads
The choice between purchases and transfers/tax rebates depends, in part, on which policy is
more effective in reducing credit spreads. Since the solution for the model at the zero lower
bound is nonlinear, the model response to various fiscal shocks will not be invariant to the size
of the shock. In other words, a 2% of GDP deficit-financed increase in purchases is not simply
a scaled version of the 1% of GDP experiment; therefore, a fiscal multiplier is not readily
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defined. Moreover, given that the model features endogenous state variables, the response of
various variables of interest will depend on the persistence and shape of the fiscal response,
even if the total size of the fiscal intervention is held constant. However, to provide insight









where ypolt is the response of output, in log-deviations, under a particular fiscal intervention,
ynopolt is the response of output under no intervention, and xt is the total expenditure on the
policy. The multiplier is a equally weighted sum over 24 quarters (6 years) of the deviations
of output from the path it would have taken absent any intervention, conditional on the same
underlying shock.
Two natural variables of interest are output (which is also employment in this model) and
aggregate consumption. To isolate the effect of variations in the debt and income elasticity
of the credit spread, I consider fiscal interventions of the following form: a 1% of GDP
increase in government purchases financed by current taxes or a 1% transfer from saver to
borrower households in all periods. The underlying shock is a 5 percentage point increase in
the financial shock that decays deterministically at rate ρ = 0.9, and fiscal interventions end
once the zero lower bound stops binding. For simplicity, only the model with perfect wage
rigidity is considered.
Table 1.3 provides output and consumption multipliers and the time to exit for different
values of the debt and income elasticity parameters in the credit spread. As Table 1.3 shows,
the output multiplier on government purchases exceeds the output multiplier on transfers,
though transfers may be more effective in boosting aggregate consumption than government
purchases. The effectiveness of transfers relative to purchases rises with the debt-elasticity
of the credit spread χb, and the time to exit the zero lower bound falls with χb8. Absent
8Evidence from Edelberg (2006) suggest very low elasticities of risk premia on consumer loans with respect
to debt and borrowing. Using data from the Survey on Consumer Finances, even for large differences in income
and personal debt, spreads vary by less than two percentage points. A naive extrapolation suggests elasticity
of spreads with respect to borrowing and income of less than 0.01 - an order of magnitude lower than shown
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Table 1.3: Output and consumption multipliers
χn = 0.0 χb = 0.0 χb = 0.1 χb = 0.2 χb = 0.3 χn = 0.2 χb = 0.0 χb = 0.1 χb = 0.2 χb = 0.3
Purchases = 1% of GDP
Exit 16 qtr 15 qtr 14 qtr 13 qtr Exit 17 qtr 16 qtr 15 qtr 14 qtr
Output 1.35 1.22 1.19 1.15 Output 2.53 2.37 2.12 1.92
Consumption 0.35 0.22 0.19 0.15 Consumption 1.53 1.37 1.12 0.92
Transfers = 1% of GDP
Exit 16 qtr 14 qtr 13 qtr 12 qtr Exit 17 qtr 15 qtr 14 qtr 12 qtr
Output 0.00 0.26 0.29 0.30 Output 0.00 0.48 0.50 0.52
Consumption 0.00 0.26 0.29 0.30 Consumption 0.00 0.48 0.50 0.52
any fiscal intervention, a higher debt elasticity leads to faster deleveraging by borrowers and
a quicker exit from the zero lower bound as the endogenous component offsets the financial
shock component in the credit spread. Transfers facilitate this process of deleveraging allowing
for quicker exits from the zero lower bound. As the debt elasticity rises, transfers are more
effective in reducing credit spread and mitigating the effects of the financial shock. Unlike
transfers, an increase in government purchases leaves the path of the credit spread largely
unchanged along with the timing of exit. Consistent with the analytical results shown earlier
for a debt inelastic spread, transfers are ineffective when χb = 0; while transfers redistribute
consumption from savers to borrowers, aggregate output and inflation will be unaffected.
An increase in the income-elasticity of the credit spread χn (shown on the right-hand
side of Table 1.3) tends to magnify the effect of either type of fiscal intervention with output
multipliers approaching the values estimated by the Congressional Budget Office. The time
to exit the zero lower bound increases because the fall in output from the financial shock feeds
back into the credit spread, amplifying its effect. The amplification of both the underlying
shock and the effect of fiscal policy is consistent with the analytical results shown earlier.
Despite the importance of the debt and income elasticity parameters for fiscal policy, a simple
regression of credit spread measures on output and private sector borrowing is unlikely to
accurately estimate these parameters since the error term is likely to be highly correlated
with output and borrowing.
in the numerical experiments in this section. However, given the extensive use of non-price tools such as credit
limits, downpayments, and credit history in rationing credit, these elasticities should be viewed as a lower
bound rather than an upper bound on credit spread elasticities.
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1.6.4 Savers and Borrowers Policy Preferences
Given that the model features distinct agents, optimal fiscal and monetary policy will, in
general, depend on the weighting of each agent in the social welfare function. Moreover, even
in the absence of financial shocks, the fiscal authority may wish to redistribute income among
agents by changes in the level of the public debt9. However, even at the zero lower bound
- where fiscal policy is most relevant - savers and borrowers may disagree on which fiscal
interventions they prefer and may, in some cases, prefer no intervention at all. Furthermore,
when fiscal policies are financed by deficits, preferences will differ on the rate with which
the deficit is returned to its steady state. As shown earlier, when the credit spread is fairly
debt inelastic, tax rebates and transfers simply have the effect of redistributing income and
consumption with little effect on aggregates and savers may prefer inaction to any fiscal
intervention. Importantly, the financial shock itself is redistributive - saver households benefit
from the increase in credit spreads because, under the assumption that intermediary profits
flow to the savers and absent no default (no real costs of intermediation), intermediary profits
increase with a rise in spreads.
A simple metric, analogous to the output multiplier, for gauging household’s preferences
over various policy options is the difference in household consumption under a fiscal interven-









Table 1.4 displays each households’ consumption relative to the no intervention baseline under
two alternative fiscal policies:
1. Debt-financed increase in government purchases by 1% of GDP for all periods the zero
lower bound binds
2. Debt-financed tax rebates to all households of 1% of GDP for all periods the zero lower
9For instance, a higher government debt implies greater inequality in steady state given higher interest
payments to borrowers. Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) consider the optimal level of public debt in a model
with idiosyncratic risk and incomplete markets.
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Table 1.4: Relative consumption (% deviation)
Fiscal Parameter: ϕb = 0.1 ϕb = 0.2 ϕb = 0.3 ϕb = 0.4 ϕb = 0.5
Purchases = 1% of GDP
Saver Household -0.03 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.10
Borrower Household 1.01 0.81 0.78 0.71 0.65
Tax Rebates = 1% of GDP
Saver Household -0.12 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
Borrower Deviation 0.72 0.52 0.41 0.33 0.28
bound binds
Under the assumption of zero initial public debt, these policies imply equivalent fiscal cost for
the government, with the debt increasing during the ZLB episode and subsequently converging
back to zero. The rate at which taxes are raised to pay back the public debt is controlled
by the parameter ϕb with higher values leading to a faster increase in taxes. As Table 1.4
indicates, saver households prefer policies that minimize the increase in the public debt, and
therefore minimize the degree of transfers. Borrower households instead prefer a greater degree
of deficit-financing which increases disposable income in the near term when the cost of credit
is high. In the particular calibration considered (χb = 0.1, χn = 0), any fiscal intervention
offers a higher consumption path for borrowers relative to no intervention. In contrast, savers
often enjoy a higher consumption path absent any fiscal intervention. Under this calibration,
savers never prefer tax rebates (even though savers receive this rebate and are paid market
rate on public debt), and only prefer purchases if the transfer component is limited. Deficit-
financed purchases are the policy that most frequently increases the consumption path of
both households relative to the baseline of no intervention. The preference for government
purchases in this example is somewhat driven by the low debt elasticity of the credit spread,
which renders transfers less effective for stabilization. Though this analysis abstracts from
welfare costs of labor supply and inflation, it illustrates the potential for disagreement over
fiscal policy and deficits.
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1.7 Conclusion
Existing representative agent models, by Ricardian equivalence, rule out any role for transfers,
tax rebates, or deficit-financing as tools for stabilizing business cycles. This paper analyzes
a borrower-lender model with credit spreads to examine transfers as an instrument of fiscal
policy and compare transfers to government purchases. I showed that deficit-financed policies
such as an increase in purchases or temporary lump sum tax rebates financed budget deficits
can be expressed as a combination of two fiscal instruments: purchases and transfers, and I
distinguished between two important channels for these instruments: aggregate supply and
aggregate demand. I find, in general, that government purchases are a more effective means
of boosting output and employment than transfers/tax rebates, primarily because of its large
wealth effects on labor supply.
The aggregate supply channel for fiscal policy is the wealth effect on labor supply. Pur-
chases or transfers will boost output only to the extent that the policy increases labor supply.
In the absence of wealth effects, the aggregate supply channel is inoperative and neither pur-
chases nor transfers have any effect on output. In the presence of wealth effects, purchases
increase output by making both agents poorer, but transfers (as implemented by tax rebates)
have little effect on aggregate labor supply. On the whole, the aggregate supply channel favors
purchases over transfers for boosting output and employment.
The aggregate demand channel for fiscal policy stems from countercyclical markups due
to sticky prices. While both fiscal policy instruments can boost demand, monetary policy
can undo or amplify any fiscal shock. When monetary policy is unconstrained, fiscal policy
is redundant for aggregate demand management. While fiscal policy may play a role in
the distribution of production or consumption, monetary policy is sufficient to manage the
inflation-output tradeoff. However, when monetary policy is constrained, fiscal policy becomes
the sole tool for managing aggregate demand. As a result, the choice between purchases and
transfers or some combination thereof is not inconsequential. As the numerical experiments in
Section 6 illustrate, both tools of fiscal policy can have substantial effects on aggregate demand
at the zero lower bound, and the choice between these policies will depend on the details of
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the credit spread. However, the low estimated elasticities of credit spreads to borrowing and
income as reported in Edelberg (2006) suggest that tax rebates and transfers are unlikely to
match government purchases in boosting output, employment or consumption.
Given the role of the credit spread elasticities in determining the multiplier on transfers
relative to government spending, the details of financial intermediation are likely to be impor-
tant for determining relative multipliers. While there is no single consensus model of financial
intermediation, particularly among households, business cycle models of intermediation have
generally focused on the importance of either collateral constraints for the borrower or the
net worth of the intermediary10. In a model where quantity is constrained by the value of
collateral, fiscal multiplier depend on the effect of policy on the shadow price of the collateral
constraint. Both transfers and government purchases by boosting disposable income could
ease these constraints temporarily or may boost the value of collateral, with the multiplier
depending on how much each policy boosts borrower’s disposable income. Moreover, given
the importance of housing as household collateral, relative multipliers are also likely to de-
pend heavily on the effect of these policies on housing values. Even for relatively large fiscal
outlays, these effects are likely to be small absent a policy directed towards housing.
Alternatively, in a model where the cost of financial intermediation depends on the net
worth of intermediaries, fiscal multipliers are likely to operate via the default channel. If the
net worth of financial intermediaries is low, the cost of credit will only fall if intermediaries are
able to restore their net worth. Absent direct recapitalizations or changes in dividend policy,
fiscal policy is only likely to impact intermediary net worth by reducing default rates. By
raising disposable income either by raising output or through direct transfers, fiscal policy may
reduce default rates and increase the rate at which intermediaries recapitalize. Alternatively,
if fiscal policy leads to more defaults via households’ decisions to strategically default, could
increase the cost of credit resulting in negative multipliers. In the end, more direct fiscal
instruments that address the cause of the rise in credit costs - whether declining house prices
or insufficient intermediary net worth - are likely to be more effective than indirect policies
10For the former, see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or Iacoviello (2005). For the latter, see Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999).
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such as transfers and government purchases.
Given multiple instruments of policy, a natural extension will be analysis of optimal fiscal
policy at the zero lower bound and further analysis of disagreement among agents over policy.
Endogenizing the credit spread will be another important extension given the dependence of
policy on the behavior of the credit spread. These extensions are ongoing research.
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Chapter 2
Sectoral Shocks, the Beveridge
Curve and Monetary Policy
with Dmitriy Sergeyev1
1We would like to thank Andreas Mueller, Ricardo Reis, Jo´n Steinsson and Michael Woodford for helpful
discussions and Nicolas Crouzet, Hyunseung Oh, Andrew Figura, Emi Nakamura, Serena Ng, Bruce Preston,
Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe, Luminita Stevens, Martin Uribe, Gianluca Violante, and Reed Walker for useful
comments.
2.1 Introduction
You can’t change the carpenter into a nurse easily, and you can’t change the
mortgage broker into a computer expert in a manufacturing plant very easily.
Eventually that stuff will work itself out . . . [M]onetary policy can’t retrain
people. Monetary policy can’t fix those problems.
Charles Plosser, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Though the Great Recession ended in the middle of 2009, the US labor market remains weak
three years later with an unemployment rate near 8%. Some have speculated that a slow
recovery is inevitable as the labor force must reallocate from housing-related sectors to the
rest of the economy. Proponents of this view have cited the shift in the US Beveridge curve
as evidence for sectoral shocks leading to labor reallocation2. The view that Beveridge curve
shifts reflect sectoral disruptions and periods of increased labor reallocation was first eluci-
dated by Abraham and Katz (1986) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989). Figure 2.1 displays
unemployment and vacancies since 2000 using vacancy data from the Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey (JOLTs). The Beveridge curve has shifted during the recovery period with
the unemployment rate rising 1.5-2 percentage points at each level of vacancies3. Vacancy
rates in 2012 are consistent with an unemployment rate of less than 6% on the pre-recession
Beveridge curve. The observed shift in the Beveridge curve has prompted disagreement on
what implications, if any, this shift may have for monetary policy. Kocherlakota (2010) and
Plosser (2011) suggest that, if sectoral shocks require labor reallocation and that process is
costly and prolonged, then the natural rate of unemployment has risen, implying that further
monetary easing would be inflationary.
We investigate the relationship between sector-specific shocks, shifts in the Beveridge
curve, and changes in the natural rate of unemployment. In particular, we address three
2See Kocherlakota (2010), and Plosser (2011).
3See Barnichon, Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin (2010) for measurement of the shift in the empirical Beveridge
curve using JOLTs data. Exact size of the shift depends on the definition of the vacancy rate: job openings rate
used in JOLTs is V/ (N + V ) or alternative is vacancy to labor force ratio V/L (analogous to the unemployment
rate).
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questions: Has the US labor market experienced sector-specific disruptions? Can sectoral
shocks account for the shift in the Beveridge curve? Do sectoral shocks raise the natural rate
of unemployment? We build a measure of sector-specific shocks using a factor analysis of
sectoral employment and augment a standard multisector model with labor market search to
analyze the relationship between sector-specific shocks, the Beveridge curve, and the natural
rate of unemployment.
Our first contribution is a new index of sector-specific shocks that measures the disper-
sion of the component of sectoral employment not explained by an aggregate employment
factor. Our measure is distinct from the Lilien (1982) measure of employment dispersion
and addresses the Abraham and Katz (1986) critique that asymmetric responses of sectoral
employment may be attributable to differing sensitivities of sectors to aggregate shocks. We
confirm that the recovery from the Great Recession is characterized by a substantial increase
in sectoral shocks that matches the timing of the shift in the Beveridge curve. Moreover, we
show that shifts in the US Beveridge curve in postwar data are correlated with periods in
which sector-specific shocks are elevated as measured by our index.
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Our second contribution is to define the Beveridge curve in a multisector model and ex-
amine its behavior in the presence of sectoral shocks. The Beveridge curve is defined as the
set of unemployment and vacancy combinations traced out by changes in real marginal cost,
which captures the effect of a variety of aggregate disturbances. We show that sectoral pro-
ductivity or demand shocks will, in general, shift the Beveridge curve. Sectoral shocks shift
the Beveridge curve through two channels: a composition effect and a mismatch effect. The
former channel is operative if a sectoral shock shifts the distribution of vacancies towards a
sector with greater hiring costs, thereby increasing unemployment for any given aggregate
level of vacancies. The latter channel stems from decreasing returns to the matching func-
tion and costly reallocation: a sectoral shock that leaves overall vacancies unchanged raises
unemployment because the reduction in vacancies in one sector increases unemployment by
more than the corresponding fall in unemployment in the other sector. Our model validates
our empirical strategy and verifies the hypothesized relationship between our sector-specific
shock index and shifts in the Beveridge curve.
Our third contribution is to clarify the relationship between the Beveridge curve and the
natural rate of unemployment. In the baseline model with exogenous sectoral productivity
or demand shocks, shifts in the Beveridge curve necessarily imply a movement in the natural
rate of unemployment in the same direction as the shift in the Beveridge curve. However,
the converse need not hold: for example, a negative aggregate productivity shock raises the
natural rate of unemployment without shifting the Beveridge curve. Changes in the natural
rate affect monetary policy by changing the inflation-employment tradeoff for the central
bank.
We calibrate a two-sector version of our model to data on the construction and non-
construction sectors of the US labor market to quantify the effect of sectoral shocks on the
Beveridge curve and the natural rate of unemployment. A sector-specific shock to construction
of sufficient magnitude to match movements in construction’s employment share generates
a shift in the Beveridge curve that quantitatively matches the shift observed in the US.
Moreover, the shock to construction raises the natural rate of unemployment by 1.4 percentage
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points - insufficient to fully explain the rise in unemployment observed in the current recession
and of similar magnitude to the estimates in Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2010) who
examine the contribution of mismatch to overall unemployment.
Our final contribution is an extension of the model to incorporate financial frictions. In
this environment, it is no longer the case that a Beveridge curve shift implies a change in the
natural rate. We show that financial shocks or systematic changes in monetary policy increase
mismatch in the same way as a sector-specific productivity or demand shocks. Events like
a binding zero lower bound could act like a sector-specific shock, generating a shift in the
Beveridge curve while not implying any change in the natural rate of unemployment. Given
our analysis, we conclude that a Beveridge curve shift is not sufficient to draw any conclusions
about the behavior of the natural rate of unemployment.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes our method for constructing a long-
run sector-specific shock index and its correlation with historic shifts in the Beveridge curve.
Section 2.3 lays out our baseline model: a sticky price multisector model augmented with
labor market search within sectors and costly reallocation across sectors. Analytical results
establishing the relationship between sectoral shocks, labor reallocation, and the Beveridge
curve along with implications for the natural rate are described in Section 2.4. Section 2.5
describes our calibration strategy and shows the effect of sectoral productivity shocks in a
two-sector model. Section 2.6 extends the multisector model to incorporate financial frictions
and illustrates how financial frictions and changes in the monetary policy rule can act as
sectoral shocks and shift the Beveridge curve. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Empirics on Sectoral Shocks and the Beveridge Curve
To examine the relationship between sectoral shocks and the Beveridge curve, we construct
the long-run US Beveridge curve and build a summary measure of sector-specific shocks. Since
vacancies data from the JOLTs survey is only available after 2000, the Conference Board’s
Help-Wanted Index is frequently used as a proxy for the vacancy rate prior to 2000. Figure
2.2 displays the Beveridge curve using the Help-Wanted Index (HWI) normalized by the labor
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force as a proxy for the vacancy rate4. Figure 2.2 shows that the historic Beveridge curve
exhibits periods when the vacancy-unemployment relationship is stable and periods when it
appears to shift.
Historic shifts in the US Beveridge curve are documented in Bleakley and Fuhrer (1997)
and Valletta and Kuang (2010). Importantly, shifts in the Beveridge curve are not a business
cycle phenomenon with some recessions accompanied by shifts but other shifts occuring during
expansions - the behavior of vacancies and unemployment in the mid 1980s provides a good
example. Like the Beveridge curve obtained using JOLTs data, the composite HWI Beveridge
curve exhibits an upward shift since 2009.
2.2.1 Existing Measures of Sector-Specific Shocks
Lilien (1982) proposed the dispersion in sectoral employment growth as a measure for sector-
specific shocks, arguing that these shocks are an important driver of the business cycle given
the strong countercyclical behavior of his measure. Figure 2.3 plots the Lilien measure using
4After 1996, the HWI is the composite index derived in Barnichon (2010) and updated to 2011, which
adjusts for the shift away from newspaper advertising of vacancies to online advertising.
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monthly sectoral employment data5. The figure demonstrates the strongly countercyclical
behavior of the series including most recent recessions that have featured a slower recovery
in the labor market in comparison to past recessions. In the current recession, the Lilien
measure peaks in the summer of 2009 at the recession trough.
Abraham and Katz (1986) questioned the Lilien measure by arguing that increases in
the dispersion of employment growth could be attributed to differences in the elasticity of
sectoral employment to aggregate shocks. As an alternative, Abraham and Katz argued that
sector-specific shocks should result in periods in which vacancies and unemployment are both
rising and showed that the Lilien measure does not comove positively with vacancies.
2.2.2 Constructing Sector-Specific Shock Index
To derive a measure of sector-specific shocks, we conduct a factor analysis of sectoral em-
ployment. The factor analysis addresses the Abraham and Katz critique by allowing sectoral
employment to respond differently to aggregate shocks.
5The Lilien measure is: σt =
“PK
i=1 (git − gt)2
”1/2
where git is the growth rate of employment in sector i
and gt is the growth rate of aggregate employment.
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We estimate the following approximate factor model:
nt = ￿t + λFt,
where nt is a N × 1 vector of employment by sector, ￿t is a N × 1 vector of mean-zero
sector-specific shocks, Ft is a K × 1 vector of factors, and λ is a N × K matrix of factor
loadings.
As is standard in the approximate factor model discussed in Stock and Watson (2002), we
assume that nt and Ft are covariance stationary processes, with Cov (Ft, ￿t) = 0. As shown
by Stock and Watson (2002), the approximate factor model allows for serial correlation in Ft,
￿t, and weak cross-sectional correlation in ￿t - the variance-covariance matrix of ￿t need not
be diagonal. The factor analysis implicitly identifies the sector-specific shock by assuming
that loadings on the aggregate factor are invariant over time; that is, sectoral employment
responds in a similar manner over the business cycle to aggregate fluctuations.
The sectoral residual ￿it represents the sector-specific shock, and we construct an index to
examine the time variation in sector-specific shocks by measuring cross-sectional dispersion,










Given that variances are normalized to unity before estimating, the sector specific shocks
need not be weighted by their employment shares. We also construct an alternative measure








This measure of sector-specific shocks is always positive and weights all sectors equally.
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2.2.3 Data
To estimate the sectoral shock index, we use long-run US data on sectoral employment.
These data are available for the US from January 1950 to July 2012 on a monthly basis for
14 sectors that represent the first level of disaggregation for US employment data. Due to its
relatively small share of employment, we drop the mining and natural resources sector. The
sectoral data is taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics establishment survey. While, in
principle, we could use sectoral data on variables like real output, relative prices, or relative
wages, employment data offers the longest available history at the highest frequency and
is presumably measured with the least error. The principal concern with this data set is
the small number of cross-sectional observations relative to the number of observations in
the time dimension. While traditional factor analyses draw on highly disaggregated price,
output, or employment data, these series are not available before the 1970s. Given our aim
of investigating shifts in the Beveridge curve and the relative infrequency of these events, we
try to construct the longest possible series for sector-specific shocks.
The log of monthly sectoral employment is detrended to obtain a mean-zero stationary
series and the variance of each series is normalized to unity. This normalization ensures that
no series has a disproportionate effect on the estimation of the national factor.
We detrend employment in each sector by means of a cubic deterministic trend. The
underlying trend in sectoral employment differs substantially among sectors, and employment
shares are nonstationary over the postwar period. For example, manufacturing employment
falls as a share of total employment over the whole period, but even decreases in absolute
terms starting in the 1980s. Sectors, such as construction and information services show a
general upward trend in levels characterized by very large and long swings in employment
that are longer than simple business cycle variation. Higher-order deterministic trends fit
certain sectors much better than a simple linear or quadratic trend. Moreover, most of the
sectoral employment series obtained by removing a linear or quadratic trend fail a Dickey-
Fuller test at standard confidence levels. For robustness, as will be shown in the next section,
we also consider detrending by first-differences, computing quarter-over-quarter or year-over-
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year growth rates for each sector, normalizing variances, and then estimating the factor model.
Given that our full sample from 1950-2012 has a small number of cross-section observations
relative to the time dimension, we also estimate the same model using a larger cross-section
of 85 sectoral employment series at the 2-digit NAICS level available monthly since 1990. We
find the same pattern for the shock index as in our larger sample.
2.2.4 Sectoral Shock Index and Shifts in the Beveridge Curve
The sector-specific shock index shown in Figure 2.4 displays several notable features. First,
the shock index rises rapidly in late 2009. The rise in the shock index occurs at the beginning
of the recovery, not at the beginning of the recession, matching the timing of the shift in the
Beveridge curve6. Second, the sector-specific shock index is not a business cycle measure. Its
correlation with various monthly measures of the business cycle is highlighted in Table 2.1,
with all correlations below 0.15. Third, the sectoral shock index displays a low and negative
6The rise in the index in the recovery period after the Great Recession is also consistent with the elevated
dispersion in labor market conditions highlighted by Barnichon and Figura (2011) and sectoral dispersion
measures computed by Rissman (2009).
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Table 2.1: Correlation of shock index with business cycle measures
correlation with the Lilien measure7. Finally, the average level of the shock index is higher
in the Great Moderation period as shown by the gray line in Figure 2.4. This behavior is
consistent with the behavior of sectoral employment documented in Garin, Pries, and Sims
(2010).
Just as the current shift in the Beveridge curve coincides with a rise in the sector-specific
shock index, historic shifts in the Beveridge curve are also correlated with elevated levels of
sector-specific shocks. We illustrate this correlation between shifts in the Beveridge curve
and the sector-specific shock index by plotting the shock index against the intercept of a
5-year rolling regression of vacancies on unemployment (five-year trailing window). Absent
any shifts in the Beveridge curve, the intercept should be constant. Therefore, variation in
the intercept series captures movements in the Beveridge curve. Figure 2.5 shows a clear
correlation between movements in the intercept of the Beveridge curve and the sector-specific
shock index. This correlation in monthly data calculated from 1956-2012 is 0.363 and is shown
in the last column in Table 2.1. This result is robust to the use of a 4th order trend, though
somewhat weaker. Our evidence provides support for the mechanism described by Abraham
and Katz where sector-specific shocks generate a shift the Beveridge curve.
To examine the robustness of this correlation, we also estimate the Beveridge curve aug-
7For the index obtained using growth rates, the correlation with business cycle measures and the Lilien
measure is markedly higher than the time trend specifications. This correlation is driven by the behavior of
the index in the first half of the sample. The correlation of the sectoral shock index with the Lilien measure
drops to 0.18 from 0.56 in the Great Moderation period.
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mented with our sector-specific shock index:
vt = c+ β (L)ut + γ (L)St + ηt
where vt is log vacancies, ut is log unemployment, β (L) and γ (L) are lag polynomials, c is
a constant, and ηt is a mean zero error term8. The Beveridge curve is estimated with four
lags of unemployment to control for the persistence of both vacancies and unemployment and
with Newey-West standard errors (4 lags) to account for serial correlation in ηt. We consider
several variants of our sector-specific shock index using both the dispersion measure (Panel
A) and the absolute-value measure (Panel B). Employment is detrended with either time
trends and growth rate trends. Given the persistence exhibited by the sector-specific shock
indices obtained from time detrending, we estimate specifications both with and without an
additional lag of the shock index.




























































































































































Table 2.2 displays the estimates for the coefficient γ on the sector-specific shock index.
This coefficient enters significantly for most of the time trend specifications we consider. Our
8An earlier version of this paper estimates the Beveridge curve using vacancies and unemployment rates
in levels. Given the nonlinear nature of the Beveridge curve, the log specification is preferred. However, the
use of log or levels does not greatly affect the estimation.
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baseline cubic detrending is highlighted in bold in the table with positive and statistically
significant coefficients in all cases. The shock index based on growth rate detrending delivers
a significant negative coefficient in the case of the year-over-year specification. While our
reduced form model makes no prediction about the sign of the coefficient γ, we show in
section 2.4.3 that our model-implied measure of Beveridge curve shifts delivers coefficients
that are consistent in sign across all specifications. We defer further discussion until then.
Table 2.2: Effect of shock index on Beveridge curve intercept
2.3 Multisector Model with Labor Reallocation
We augment a multisector sticky-price model as in Aoki (2001) or Carvalho and Lee (2011)
with search and matching frictions in the labor market as in Shimer (2010).
There model features four types of agents: continuum of identical households, intermediate
good producers, wholesale firms and retailers. The households hold preferences over consump-
tion and leisure, they trade state-contingent assets, own all firms, and provide different types
of workers to intermediate goods producers through a frictional labor market.
The intermediate goods producers are competitive and hire labor to produce an interme-
diate good. Each intermediate firm operates in one of several sectors. A firm working in
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a particular sector hires sector-specific workers and produces a sector-specific intermediate
good. Their production is subject to sector-specific productivity shocks. The intermediate
goods producers sell their output to the wholesale firms.
Wholesale firms are competitive and combine sector-specific intermediate goods into a
homogenous final good. Their production is subject to sector-specific demand shocks, which
affects the relative demand of the wholesale firms for different intermediate goods. The
wholesale firms sell their final goods to retailers.
Retailers are monopolistically competitive. A retailer buys final goods from the wholesale
firms, costlessly differentiates these goods, and sells their good to a household exploiting their
market power to set prices in excess of marginal cost. In a sticky price version of the model,
we assume that prices for these differentiated goods are updated a` la Calvo.
The labor market is sector-specific and subject to search and matching frictions. Each
sector has a pool of unemployed workers who search for jobs in this sector. Intermediate
goods producers from this sector search for workers in the unemployment pool of this sector.
The households can reallocate its unemployed workers among different sectors. Sectors may,
in principle, conform to geographies, industries, occupations or other dimensions of worker
heterogeneity. Households reallocate their workers across sectors subject to a utility cost of
changing the distribution of the labor force.
Next we provide a detailed description of the agents problems followed by analysis of wage
setting and the definition of equilibrium.
2.3.1 Households
Households supply labor across K distinct sectors and invest in a full-set of state-contingent
securities. While hiring in each sector is subject to search frictions, the household is free to
reallocate workers across sectors subject to a utility cost of changing the distribution of labor.
This utility cost captures costs associated with worker retraining, relocation, or the loss of
industry-specific skills. With costly reallocation, the household’s problem differs from the
standard labor market search model since the household has an active margin of adjustment
59
by reallocating the pool of available workers across sectors. As a result, the initial distribution
of the labor force is a state variable for the household in addition to the last period distribution
of employment.

























Ni,t = (1− δi)Ni,t−1 + pi,tUi,t, (2.3)
Li,t = Ni,t−1 + Ui,t, (2.4)
K￿
i=1
Li,t = 1, (2.5)
where Nt = {Ni,t}Ki=1 and Lt = {Li,t}Ki=1 for t ≥ 0 are K × 1 vectors of sectoral employment





and Ct is an index of the household’s consumption of the differentiated goods. The initial
conditions for this problem are {B0,N−1,L−1}. The household maximizes utility net of re-
allocation costs subject to a standard budget constraint (2.2), where Pt is an index of the
prices of the differentiated goods, Wi,t is the nominal wage that workers receive when work-
ing in sector i, Πft ,ΠInti,t ,Π
ret
t (l) represent wholesale, intermediate and retailer firms nominal
profits distributed to households, Bt are nominal payments from state contingent securities
and Qt,t+1 is an asset-pricing kernel9. For each sector, sectoral employment Ni,t evolves by
9The existence and uniqueness of the asset-pricing kernel is guaranteed by the absence of arbitrage oppor-
tunities in equilibrium.
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a law of motion (2.3) where pi,t is the job-finding rate in sector i and δi is a sector-specific
separation rate. Sectoral unemployment is the difference between the labor force allocated
in that sector Li,t and last period sectoral employment (2.4). The total labor force of the
household is normalized to unity (2.5). The household takes the sectoral job-finding rate and
profits from firms as exogenous.














We assume that the cost of reallocation of a worker from sector i to sector j ￿= i depends
on the current and past labor force in sector i and on the current and the past employment in
sector j. The function R (·, ·) is assumed to be continuous and differentiable in its arguments
and minimized when Li,t−1 = Li,t for any sector i.
The optimal choice of assets purchases and consumption implies the following relation
determining the nominal one-period interest rate:










See Appendix B.1.1 for a detailed discussion of the household optimality conditions.
Optimal choice of the allocation of the labor force across sectors implies
pi,tλ2,t,i = λ3,t +R2(Li,t−1, Li,t) + βEtR1(Li,t, Li,t+1), (2.8)
where λ2,t,i is a Lagrange multiplier on constraint (2.3), λ3,t is a Lagrange multiplier on
constraint (2.5). λ2,t,i represents the utility value of an additional employed worker in sector
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i for the household given the equilibrium path for wages {Wi,t}∞t=0, while λ3,t represents the
utility value of an increase in the labor force by one worker for the household. This first
order condition states that the household equalizes the costs and benefits when choosing to
allocate an additional worker to sector i. The left-hand side represents the utility benefit of
an additional worker employed λ2,t,i weighted by the probability of finding a job pi,t. The
right-hand side is the cost of an additional worker in sector i, which is the sum of the shadow
value of a person for the household λ3,t plus the adjustment costs of the labor force in sector
i: R2(Li,t−1, Li,t) gives the immediate costs of adjustment while the term βEtR1(Li,t, Li,t+1)
takes into account the affect on future adjustment costs.
Optimality with respect to Ni,t gives a recursive formula for λ2,t,i
λ2,t,i = uN (Ct, Nt) +
Wi,t
Pt
uc(Ct, Nt) + βEt [(1− δi − pi,t+1)λ2,t+1,i] . (2.9)
This expression states that the value of an additional employed worker equals the sum of
the disutility from working un(Ct, Nt), the utility value of the nominal wage Wi,t, and the
expected discounted value from having this worker employed in the next period weighted
by the probability of retaining a job βEt [(1− δi)λ2,t+1,i] less the expected discounted value
that the worker could be worth next period if he was not employed in the current period
βEt [pi,tλ2,t+1,i].
It will prove useful to introduce a variable closely related to λ2,t,i that will be used to
determine workers wages. Let Ji,t
￿￿W￿ denote the marginal utility for a household at the
equilibrium level of employment of having one additional worker employed at a wage ￿W in
period t rather than unemployed and with the wage returning to an equilibrium sequence
from the next period for this worker. We can express this new variable as follows:
Ji,t
￿￿W￿ = λ2,t,i + uc(Ct, Nt)
Pt
￿￿W −Wi,t￿ .
This expression states that the value of an additional worker employed at wage ￿W equals the
value of a worker employed at the equilibrium wage, the first term, plus a gain from receiving
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wage ￿W rather than Wi,t expressed in units of marginal utility, the second term.
Two extreme cases for labor reallocation will prove useful in our analysis and are defined
here.
Definition 2.1.
• Costless reallocation: R (Li,t−1, Li,t) = 0 for all Li,t−1, Li,t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,K and
t ≥ 0.
• No labor reallocation: R (Li,t−1, Li,t) = ∞ for any Li,t−1 ￿= Li,t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,K
and t ≥ 0.
If reallocation is costless, then the right-hand side of equation (2.8) is always equalized
across sectors to λ3,t. Alternatively, if there is no reallocation the labor force is fixed across
sectors and equation (2.8) becomes redundant.
Also, for reference in later sections, we define the case of no wealth effects on labor supply.
Definition 2.2. Let
−un(Ct, Nt)/uc(Ct, Nt) = f (Nt)
for some function f . That is, the marginal rate of substitution does not depend on consumption
Ct. Then, labor supply does not exhibit wealth effects10.
2.3.2 Retailers
The consumption goods are sold to households by a set of monopolistically competitive re-
tailers who can costlessly differentiate the single final good purchased from wholesale firms.
These retailers periodically set prices a` la Calvo at a markup to marginal cost, which is the
real cost of the final good Pft/Pt, where Pft is the nominal price of the final good. The
10The standard search and matching model, see, for example, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), assumes
neither wealth effects nor any variable disutility of labor supply. This conforms to the case of f(N) = z for
some constant reservation wage z.
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retailers problem is standard to any New Keynesian model:
max
Pt(l)




T−t [Pt(l)− PfT ]YT (l),






where Pt (l) is the nominal price chosen by a retailer that sells differentiated good l and
who faces a downward sloping demand schedule and discounts future profits by the nominal
stochastic discount factor Qt,T . Parameter χ is the Calvo parameter governing the degree of










































The last two relations can be expressed in recursive form:
Kt =
ζ
ζ − 1uc(Ct, Nt)
Pft
Pt
Yt + βχEtΠζt+1Kt+1, (2.11)
Ft = uc(Ct, Nt)Yt + βχEtΠζ−1t+1Ft+1. (2.12)
where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1. The inflation rate is derived from the Calvo assumption with a fraction
1− χ of firms resetting their prices to Pt (l) /Pt:
Pt =
￿













At the zero inflation steady state, a log-linearization of these equilibrium conditions delivers
the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve.
2.3.3 Wholesale Firms
The final good purchased by retailers is sold by wholesale firms who purchase an intermediate
output good produced by firms in each sector. We assume a finite set of sectors that produce






















where φi,t represents a relative preference shock (or relative demand shock) and η is the
elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods. Optimization by final good firms provides






. ∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,K (2.15)
For η = 1, the CES aggregator is Cobb-Douglas and intermediate goods are neither com-
plements nor substitutes. If η < 1, intermediate goods are complements, while if η > 1,















2.3.4 Intermediate Good Firms
Intermediate goods are produced by competitive firms in each sector who hire labor and post
vacancies subject to a linear production function and a law of motion for firm employment.
The production function has linear form:
Yi,t = Ai,tNi,t, (2.17)
where Ai,t is sector-specific productivity. Firms in each sector take sectoral productivity
shocks, wages, separation rates, and a job-filling rate as given. The firm solves the following
problem:




Qt,T [Pi,TAi,tNi,t −Wi,TNi,T − κVi,TPT ] , (2.18)
s.t.: Ni,t = (1− δi)Ni,t−1 + qi,tVi,t. (2.19)
where qi,t is the vacancy yield or job-filling rate. Optimal choice of vacancies is determined
as follows:
qi,tλ4,t,i = κ, (2.20)
where λ4,t,i is the Lagrange multiplier on (2.19) expressed in real terms; this multiplier can
be interpreted as the value of an additional hired worker in period t at the equilibrium wage.
This condition states that the cost of posting a vacancy, the right-hand side, equals the value







+ EtQt,t+1 (1− δi)λ4,t+1,i (2.21)
where Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor of the representative household between period
t and t+ 1. The condition states that the value of an additional employed worker equals the
revenue this worker brings net of wage costs plus the future value of the worker tomorrow
conditional on not separating.
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It will prove useful to introduce a variable closely related to λ4,t,i that determines workers
wages. Let JInti,t
￿￿W￿ be the value for an intermediate goods firm at equilibrium employment
levels of having one additional worker employed at a wage ￿W in period t and with the wage
returning to an equilibrium sequence from the next period for this worker. We can express
the new variable as follows:
JInti,t




This expression states that the value of an additional worker employed at wage ￿W equals the
value of a worker employed at the equilibrium wage net of a gain from paying wage ￿W rather
than Wi,t.
2.3.5 Labor Market and Wages Determination
Hiring is mediated by a sectoral matching function that depends on the level of vacancies
and unemployment in each sector. We allow sectoral matching functions to differ in matching
function productivity, but require the matching function to display constant returns to scale










The job-finding probability is taken as exogenous by the household and is determined
in equilibrium by the sectoral matching function and the level of vacancies and unemployed









Wages are determined via Nash bargaining in each sector. Assuming that there are gains






Nash-bargaining implies that the sectoral wage satisfies the following condition:
νJInti,t




In equilibrium it will be true that ￿W = Wi,t which implies that JInti,t ￿￿W￿ = λ4,t,i and
Ji,t
￿￿W￿ = λ2,t,i. Hence,




Our model features both aggregate and sector-specific shocks. We consider two types of
sector-specific shocks: sectoral productivity shocks Ai,t and sectoral preferences (or demand)
shocks φi,t. Fluctuations in government purchases Gt provide an aggregate demand shock,
though, as we will show, other types of demand shocks like preference shocks or monetary
shocks could be considered without affecting our conclusions. A uniform change in {Ai,t}Ki=1
can be an example of aggregate productivity shock.
Since our model features a finite number of sectors, it is necessary to account for the
aggregate component of variation in Ai,t and φi,t. In the absence of productivity shocks and
assuming a uniform level of productivity, i.e., Ai,t = Ah,t = At for i, h = 1, 2, . . . ,K, the
only sector-specific shock is the product share φi,t in the CES aggregator. Naturally, a sector-
specific shock is any change in the distribution of φi,t subject to the restriction that
￿K
i=1 φi,t =
1. However, given that sectors have nonzero mass, an increase in sectoral productivity will
have aggregate effects if not offset by declines in sectoral productivity elsewhere. Moreover,
the size of the offsetting shock depends on the degree of substitutability for goods across
sectors. For example, if goods are perfect complements and productivity is initially equalized
across sectors, a negative shock to one sector shifts in the production possibilities frontier of
the economy even if offset by a corresponding positive shock to another sector. We address
this issue by redefining aggregate productivity and sectoral shocks as follows:
Definition 2.3.
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2. sector-specific productivity is given by ￿Ai,t ≡ Ai,t/At,
3. sector-specific demand is given by ￿φi,t ≡ φi,t ￿Aη−1i,t .
Note that ￿Ai,t and ￿φi,t are functions of the underlying sectoral shocks Ai,t and φi,t. Also




￿φi,t = 1 and ￿Ki=1 ￿φi,t/ ￿Aη−1i,t = 1. Let these independent variables
be {At, { ￿Ai,t}K−1i=1 , {￿φi,t}K−1i=1 }, where we removed ￿AK,t and ￿φK,t.
This definition of aggregate and sector-specific shocks is motivated by a simple decomposi-
tion of the CES aggregator where output can be expressed in terms of aggregate productivity,
aggregate employment, and a misallocation term that reflects the deviation from the equi-












































where the last inequality follows from the fact that both φi (Ai/A)η−1 and Ni/N must sum
to one12. When the distribution of productivity is uniform, a sector-specific preference shock
satisfies the typical CES condition that product shares sum to one.
11In the absence of sectoral reallocation costs and a search-and-matching friction the following condition
φi,tA
η−1
i,t = const · Ni,t for i = 1, 2, . . . ,K holds in equilibrium. This implies that the output of the wholesale
firms can be expressed as Yt = AtNt.
12The fact that φi (Ai/A)
η−1 and Ni/N sum to one follows directly from the definition of At and











with xi, yi ≥ 0 and 1/p + 1/q = 1, see, for example, Kolmogorov and Fomin
(1970). In our case xi = φi (Ai/A)
η−1 , yi = Ni/N, p = η, q = η/(η − 1).
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2.3.7 Government Sector
We assume that the central bank can control riskless short-term nominal interest rate it13
















The fiscal authority chooses a sequence of government purchases Gt. We assume that the
fiscal authority insures intertemporal government solvency regardless of the monetary policy
chosen by the central bank.
2.3.8 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of aggregate allocations {Yt, Nt, Ct,Kt, Ft,λ3,t}∞t=0, sectoral
allocations
￿




























1. (2.3) - (2.9) (household optimization)
2. (2.11) - (2.13) (retailers optimization and inflation dynamics equation),
3. (2.14), (2.15) (wholesale firms optimization),
4. (2.17), (2.20), (2.21) (intermediate goods firms optimization),
5. (2.22), (2.23) (job-filling and job-finding rates),
6. (2.24) (wages are determined by Nash bargaining),
13See Woodford (2003) for the analysis of monetary policy in the absence of the demand for central bank
liabilities.
14See Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) for the analysis of the consequences of the binding zero lower bound
constraint on short-term nominal interest rate.
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7. (2.25) (monetary policy rule),
8. Yt = Ct +
￿K
i=1 κVi,t +Gt (goods-market clearing),
2.4 Sectoral Shocks, the Beveridge Curve and Unemployment
Rate
In this section, we characterize the Beveridge curve in a multisector model and provide an-
alytical results relating sectoral shocks, the Beveridge curve, and the natural rate of unem-
ployment.
2.4.1 Preliminaries
The definition of equilibrium implies that the economy is characterized by 11K+9 endogenous
variables with 11K +9 equilibrium conditions, 2K +1 exogenous shocks and K initial values
for {Ni,−1}Ki=1. The aggregate productivity shock is derived from the sectoral shocks using
Definition 2.3.
Substituting the relation determining Nash wages (2.24) into the dynamic equation for
the household value of an additional worker (2.9), we can express the wage in terms of the
job-filling rate and job-finding rates in each sector:












While the optimality condition for worker reallocation (2.8) may appear cumbersome, the
costless reallocation limit is instructive. When reallocation is costless or in the nonstochastic
steady state, the right hand side of the reallocation condition is equalized across sectors and
household surpluses are equalized for all sectors. In particular, this condition implies the
Jackman-Roper condition that labor market tightness must be equalized across sectors15.
15The condition that labor market tightness is equalized across sectors was postulated in Jackman and
Roper (1987) as a benchmark for measuring the degree of structural unemployment.
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Proposition 2.1. Let R (Li,t−1, Li,t) = 0 for all Li,t−1, Li,t ≥ 0. Then, for any sectors i and
j, θi,t = θj,t where θi,t = Vi,t/Ui,t.
Proof. Observe that for any two sectors, household optimality and Nash-bargaining imply:














where the first equality follows from the relation of firm surplus and household surplus from
Nash-bargaining and the second equality follows from the definition of pi,t and qi,t. ￿
This result requires bargaining power and flow vacancy costs to be equalized across sectors
but places no restriction on the parameters of the matching function or separation rates.
In contrast to the environment considered by Jackman and Roper (1987), our results show
that this condition continues to hold in a fully dynamic setting and allowing for greater
heterogeneity in hiring costs across sectors. More generally, if bargaining power or vacancy
posting costs differ across sectors, a generalized Jackman-Roper condition will obtain where
sectoral tightness will be equalized up to a wedge term reflecting differences in bargaining
power and vacancy costs. This condition is analogous to the generalized Jackman-Roper
condition derived in Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2010).
When reallocation is costly, the probability-weighted household surplus will generally fail
to be equalized across sectors and the household will have an incentive to transfer workers
to sectors with a higher surplus or a greater job-finding rate. In the no reallocation limit
with a fixed labor force distribution, tightness across sectors will generically depart from the
Jackman-Roper condition.
2.4.2 Defining the Beveridge Curve
For the US, labor market flows are large and vacancies and unemployment quickly converge to
their flow steady state. To derive the Beveridge curve, we treat the sectoral equations deter-
mining vacancies, unemployment and employment as steady state conditions. In particular,
in the analysis that follows, equations (2.3) - (2.5), (2.21) and (2.26) are assumed to be at
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their flow steady state16.
In the standard one-sector model (i.e., K = 1), the Beveridge curve is a single equation
defining the relationship between unemployment and vacancies and given by the steady state
of the employment flow equation (2.3):
δ(1− U) = ϕUαV 1−α.
Only changes in the separation rate δ and matching function productivity ϕ shift the Beveridge
curve, while other shocks like aggregate productivity shocks simply move unemployment and
vacancies along the pair of points defined by this equation. This relation also explains why the
one-sector Beveridge curve is the same irrespective of real or demand-driven business cycles.
In a multi-sector model, an analytical relationship between U and V does not exist, and the
aggregate steady state Beveridge curve is an equilibrium object. It is useful to construct the
multisector analog of the one-sector steady state employment flow equation. Summing over






















where θ = V/U is aggregate labor market tightness and θi = Vi/Ui is sectoral labor market
tightness. The left-hand side is an expression solely in terms of aggregate unemployment and
vacancies but the right-hand side will generally depend on both the type of aggregate shocks
and the distribution of sectoral shocks. This term is the source of shifts in the Beveridge
curve.
In a solution to our model, aggregate vacancies and unemployment are a function of the
exogenous shocks: government purchases, aggregate productivity and the full set of sectoral
16Impulse responses for the multisector model calibrated to monthly data show that unemployment and
vacancies converge to the log-linearized Beveridge curve within 3 months. The rapid convergence of the labor
market to the steady state Beveridge curve explain the high correlation of vacancies and unemployment in the
calibration exercise in Shimer (2005).
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productivities ￿Ai,t and preferences ￿φi,t:
U = U
￿
Gt, At, { ￿Ai,t, ￿φi,t}￿ ,
V = V
￿
Gt, At, { ￿Ai,t, ￿φi,t}￿ ,
The full set of equations that determine unemployment and vacancies are listed at the begin-
ning of Appendix B.2. We use variations in Gt as the variable that traces out the Beveridge
curve and drop time subscripts:
Definition 2.4. The Beveridge curve is a function f (·) given by V
￿





G;A, { ￿Ai, ￿φi}￿￿, where G is the parameter varying U and V , holding constant ag-
gregate productivity, sectoral productivity and preferences: A, { ￿Ai} and {￿φi}.
Aggregate Shocks and the Beveridge Curve
To separate movements along the Beveridge curve from shifts in the Beveridge curve, it is
necessary to choose a single shock as the source of business cycles. Indeed, in the absence
of any other aggregate or sectoral shocks, the Beveridge curve in a multisector model never
shifts. However, in the presence of several different types of aggregate and sectoral shocks, the
Beveridge curve could be equally well-defined as the locus of points in the U-V space traced
out by aggregate productivity shocks or shocks to any given sector.
While our definition of the Beveridge curve as the locus of points in the U-V space traced
out by government purchases shocks may seem fairly restrictive, a variety of real and nominal
shocks trace out the same Beveridge curve. In the absence of wealth effects on labor supply, the
equations that determine aggregate vacancies and unemployment and the sectoral distribution
of vacancies and unemployment can be decoupled from the remaining equations that determine
other endogenous variables.
Proposition 2.2. Assume no wealth effects and either costless labor reallocation or no re-
allocation. For any value of government spending shock G, there exists an A such that
V
￿




1, A, { ￿A}Ki=1, {￿φ}Ki=1￿.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.1. ￿
This proposition shows that an aggregate productivity shock traces out the same Beveridge
curve as a government purchases shock. Moreover, the same proposition applies to other types
of demand shocks like monetary policy shocks not specified in our model. Indeed, any shock,
real or nominal, that does not enter the steady state labor market equations that determine
vacancies and unemployment, traces out the same Beveridge curve.
In the absence of wealth effects, holding constant sectoral productivity and preferences,
aggregate vacancies and unemployment can be parameterized by real marginal cost times
aggregate productivity: AtPft/Pt. Real marginal cost, an endogenous variable, is the only
link between the block of equations that determine aggregate vacancies and unemployment
and the rest of the model equations. Under no wealth effects on labor supply (as in Shimer
(2005) or Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)), our multisector model effectively generalizes the
behavior of the one-sector Beveridge curve under aggregate shocks.
Moreover, given the results on aggregate productivity shocks in Proposition 2.2, our con-
clusions about the relationship between sectoral shocks and shifts in the Beveridge curve
continue to hold in a model without sticky prices where business cycle fluctuations are driven
by real shocks instead of demand shocks.
Neutrality of Sector-Specific Shocks
As our derivation of the Beveridge curve suggests, sectoral shocks can shift the Beveridge
curve if these shocks alter the distribution of vacancies or generates mismatch across sectors.
However, as showed earlier, when labor reallocation is costless, the Jackman-Roper condition
obtains and tightness is equalized across sectors. In this case, we can once again obtain an
aggregate Beveridge curve that is identical to the one-sector Beveridge curve:
Proposition 2.3. If labor reallocation is costless across sectors and separation rates and
matching function efficiencies are the same across sectors (i.e. δi = δ,ϕi = ϕ), then sector-
specific shocks do not shift the Beveridge curve.
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Proof. Under costless labor reallocation, the Jackman-Roper condition holds and labor market
tightness across sectors is equalized: Vi,t/Ui,t = Vh,t/Uh,t for all i, h = 1, 2, . . . ,K. Summing
















As a result, neither aggregate nor sector-specific shocks generate a shift in the Beveridge
curve, providing a useful benchmark for our analysis of the effects of sector-specific shocks
when reallocation is costly.
The conditions that recover the aggregate Beveridge curve in Proposition 2.3 highlight
the two channels through which sector-specific shocks shift the Beveridge curve: the mis-
match channel and the composition channel. If sectors share identical hiring technologies and
separation rates, a sector-specific shock can only shift the Beveridge curve by changing the
distribution of θi/θ - in other words, by generating mismatch. When labor market reallocation
is costly, a sector-specific shock increases tightness in one sector while decreasing tightness
in the other. Because of the decreasing returns to scale of the matching function, the rise
in vacancies for the sector experiencing a positive shock exceeds the fall in vacancies for the
sector with a negative shock. In contrast, an aggregate shock depresses tightnesses more or
less uniformly, lowering vacancies in all sectors. The composition effect is present even when
labor reallocation is costless. If some sectors feature greater hiring frictions, a shock favoring
those sectors will shift the distribution of vacancies toward that sector, raising overall vacan-
cies relative to a shock that leaves the distribution unchanged. Together, these two channels
account for the effect of sector-specific shocks on the Beveridge curve.
2.4.3 Model-Implied Measures of Sectoral Shocks and Beveridge Curve
Shifts
Our multisector model provides a useful framework for assessing the validity of empirical
measures that rely on the labor market to measure sector-specific disturbances. As discussed
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earlier, Lilien (1982) argued that sector-specific shocks could be measured by dispersion in
employment growth across sectors, with Abraham and Katz (1986) countering that increases
in employment growth dispersion could be generated by aggregate shocks if sectors feature
asymmetric responses to aggregate shocks.
Our model verifies that the Lilien measure is a biased measure of sector-specific shocks val-
idating the Abraham and Katz critique. To a log-linear approximation, sectoral employment
can be expressed as a function of sectoral shocks and aggregate output. Below, we express
sectoral employment under the polar cases of no reallocation nnrit and costless reallocation n
r
it
respectively, assuming no wealth effects on labor supply:
nnrit = λi [φit − (1− η) ait]￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿it
+λi [yt − (1− η) at]￿ ￿￿ ￿
Ft
,
nrit = [φit − (1− η) ait] + yt − (1− η) at − η [siϕi + (1− si)α] θt,
where λi =
￿
1 + η [siϕi + (1− si)α] Li/U i1− α
￿−1
,
where ϕi is a macro Frisch elasticity that reflects the dependence of the Nash-bargained
sectoral wages on labor market tightness and 1−si is the steady state size of the surplus17. This
parameter is a function of steady-state job-finding rates and vacancy-filling rates along with
others parameters of the model such as the sectoral separation rate, etc. These expressions
for sectoral employment are not materially changed by allowing for wealth effects or convex
disutility of labor supply, which would simply add linear functions of yt and nt to each
expression.
These expressions for sectoral employment show that both sector-specific shocks and ag-
gregate shocks will increase employment dispersion in both the costless reallocation and no
reallocation cases. In the case of the latter, the sensitivity of a sector to aggregate and sector-
specific shocks increases with the elasticity λi which is larger for sectors with a lower Frisch
elasticity. For example, if household’s bargaining power is zero, wages are set at a constant
level and ϕi = 0 for all sectors. Then sectors with a lower surplus display greater sensitivity
17Specifically, si = W i/P iAAi.
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to aggregate shocks consistent with the volatility of employment in a one-sector search model
as discussed by Hall (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
Since sector-specific shocks are generally correlated with output, our model shows that
the assumptions underlying our factor analysis in Section 2.2 will generally not be satisfied.
In short, simply allowing for differential elasticities to aggregate shocks is insufficient to iden-
tify sector-specific shocks. However, following the procedure in Foerster, Sarte, and Watson
(2011), we can conduct a structural factor analysis by using a calibrated version of the model
to correct for the endogeneity problem. For simplicity, assume only sectoral productivity
shocks ait and assume that aggregate productivity shocks are simply a linear combination of
sectoral productivity shocks. Let at = (a1t, . . . , aKt)
￿
be the vector of sectoral productivity
shocks taken as exogenous. Assume a factor decomposition of this exogenous process such
that:
at = Φzt + ￿t,
where ￿t is a K × 1 vector of sector-specific productivity shocks and zt is a scalar defined
as the aggregate productivity shock with cov (zt, ￿t) = 0. Combining the expressions for
sectoral employment and output, sectoral employment is a function of the vector of sectoral
productivity shocks:
Mnt = Hat,
where M is a nondiagonal matrix with 1/λi − γi as its diagonal elements and -γj as its
off-diagonal elements. Similarly H is a nondiagonal matrix with η − 1 + γi as its diagonal






η - the steady
state share of output for each sector - enters the solution for sectoral employment since
yt =
￿K
i=1 γi (ait + nit). Unless M is diagonal, a factor analysis of nt will not accurately
identify the sectoral shocks ￿t. However, for higher degrees of substitutability, the off-diagonal
elements of M and H are dominated by the diagonal elements and the endogeneity correction
becomes less important. In the limit, when goods are perfect substitutes, the reduced-form
analysis in Section 2.2 is the correct procedure for identifying sector-specific shocks.
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Proposition 2.4. Assume the case of no labor reallocation and let η → ∞. Then nt = Hat
and a factor analysis of employment identifies the sector-specific shock ￿t.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.2. ￿
To correct for possible endogeneity in our estimates of sector-specific shocks, we calibrate
our model to derive the rotation matrix M , apply this rotation to sectoral employment data,
and then perform a factor analysis on this rotation of the data. The calibration used to derive
the matrix M is discussed in the Appendix. Our structural factor analysis follows the same
procedure as in Section 2.2 with the exception of applying the rotation M to the data and
using quarterly data instead of monthly data before removing the first principal component
and computing the sector-specific shock index18. As shown in Figure 2.6, the model-implied
sectoral shock index displays a strong correlation with our reduced form shock index. As
hypothesized, the correlation is stronger when goods are moderate substitutes (the case of
η = 2) because the off-diagonal elements of M are less important. Table 2.3 provides the
correlation for alternative specifications of the sector-specific shock index obtained using 4th
order detrending or year-over-year growth rates.
18We use quarterly data instead of monthly data since, in our model, we assume the labor market is in its
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Table 2.3: Reduced-form and structural sectoral shock index correlation
Sectoral Shock Index and Shifts in the Beveridge Curve
In Section 2.2, we correlated our sector-specific shock index with movements in the Beveridge
curve intercept and showed that the index appears significant in explaining variation in va-
cancies controlling for the the variation explained by unemployment. Our model can also
be used to think about the relationship between sector-specific shocks and movements in the
Beveridge curve.
Under the assumption of no reallocation across sectors and log-linearizing around a steady
state with θi = θh for all i, h = 1, 2, . . .K, we can derive an expression for the Beveridge curve
augmented with sectoral dispersion:


















where α is the matching function elasticity, and the weights on sectoral employment are differ-
ence between the unemployment share and employment share in each sector. When matching
function parameters are identical, these weights are all zero, and we obtain a standard log-
linearized Beveridge curve relating vacancies and unemployment. Positive shocks to sectors
with a higher share of employment than unemployment shift in the Beveridge curve since
these sectors have lower search frictions while the opposite happens to sectors with a lower
employment share then unemployment share.
Using our calibration described in the Appendix B.3, we compute the model-based distri-
flow steady state.
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Table 2.4: Regression analysis for reduced-form and model-implied index
bution of unemployment and run a regression of vacancies on unemployment and the model-
based measure of shifts in the Beveridge curve. Log vacancies (measured by the HWI) and
log unemployment are quarterly from 1951 to 2011. We replicate the regression in Section 2.2
using quarterly instead of monthly data.
Our results are presented in Table 2.4. The top panels A and B compute the Beveridge
curve estimate using the reduced form shock index from Section 2.2 and the model-implied
index respectively using the full sample. In quarterly data, the reduced-form regressions are
similar to the regressions presented in Table 2.2 but feature higher standard errors. Panel
B shows that sectoral employment detrended with time trends displays coefficients that are
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negative and often insignificant, inconsistent with the predictions of our model. However, in
the case of growth rate detrending, coefficients are positive and significant.
Panels D shows that the negative coefficients on the specifications using detrending via
time trends are driven by the early part of the sample. If we consider a sample only after 1980,
the coefficients are positive, consistent with our model, and frequently greater than one as
predicted by the model. Given that our model is a log-linearization around a steady state and
that our calibration relies on unemployment and employment weights computing averages in
the last decade, our model-implied measure is likely to be less accurate farther back in time.
Given the large movements in employment share across sectors over time, our model-implied
measure should fit better in more recent data. It is also worth noting that our model-implied
measure delivers positive coefficient across all detrending procedures in Panel D, in contrast
to the reduced-form measure considered in Section 2.2.
2.4.4 Beveridge Curve and the Natural Rate of Unemployment
We define the natural rate of unemployment as the unemployment rate at which inflation is
stabilized. This is a policy-relevant variable for a central bank that seeks to lower unemploy-
ment to a point at which inflation remains stable.
Definition 2.5. The natural rate of unemployment is unemployment rate when Pft/Pt = 1.
Undistorted Initial State
A useful benchmark for assessing the relationship between sector-specific shocks, Beveridge
curve shifts, and the natural rate is the case of an undistorted initial state with no misallo-
cation of output and no differences in labor market tightness across sectors. The household’s
marginal rate of substitution is assumed to be constant at z < 1. If sectors share the same
separation rates δ and matching function efficiencies ϕ, then hiring costs are equalized, rel-
atives prices Pi/P are equalized and determined by the inverse markup. In this setting, the
model admits a symmetric solution with Y = AN , AiPi/P = µ−1A, Ni = ￿φiN where ￿φi is the
productivity-adjusted product share defined in Section 2.3.6 and µ = ζ/(ζ − 1) is a markup.
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Aggregate employment N and labor market tightness θ are implicitly defined by a common









where g is an increasing and concave function of labor market tightness θ. Total employment is
simply the job-finding rate over the sum of job-finding rate and the separation rate. Moreover,
the distribution of labor market variables: employment, unemployment, vacancies and the
labor force all equal the productivity-adjusted product share ￿φi.
Proposition 2.5. Assume costless labor reallocation and for i = 1, 2, . . . ,K, δ = δi and
ϕ = ϕi. Then a sector-specific demand or productivity shock does not change the natural rate
of unemployment and does not shift the Beveridge curve.
Proof. The first result follows from the solution for the undistorted steady state and the joint
determination of employment and tightness in the equations (2.27) and (2.28). Observe that
sector-specific productivity and preferences shares do not enter these equilibrium conditions
implying that total employment is determined independently of any sector-specific shock. The
second result is an application of Proposition 2.3. ￿
With costless reallocation, a sector-specific shock results in an immediate redistribution of
the labor force. Because the cost of hiring is equalized across sectors, a sector-specific shock
does not shift the production possibilities frontier leaving aggregate tightness and employment
unchanged. Thus, both the Beveridge curve and the natural rate after left unchanged by a
sector-specific shock. While the Beveridge curve does not shift under sectoral or aggregate
shocks (due to Proposition 2.3), the natural rate of unemployment may change under real
aggregate shocks. A negative productivity shock raises the natural rate, but an increase
in markups due to a negative aggregate demand disturbance will leave the natural rate of
unemployment unchanged. This provides a simple instance in which changes in the natural
rate do not imply a shift in the Beveridge curve.
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However, the neutrality of sector-specific shocks for both the Beveridge curve and the
natural rate of unemployment hinge on the assumption of costless labor reallocation.
Proposition 2.6. Assume no reallocation of labor with δi = δ and ϕi = ϕ for i = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
Then a sector-specific demand or productivity shock such that Li ￿= ￿φi raises the natural rate
of unemployment and shifts the Beveridge curve outward (i.e. for any level of unemployment,
aggregate vacancies rise).
Proof. See Appendix. ￿
In this case, shifts in the Beveridge curve and changes in the natural rate are tightly con-
nected, with an outward shift in the Beveridge curve implying an increase in the natural rate
of unemployment. Our proof relies on the properties of convex functions to show how mis-
match raises the unemployment rate. Intuitively, a sector-specific shock generates mismatch
since labor must be reallocated across sectors to ensure that employment shares equals the
product shares. If the labor force cannot be reallocated, tightness rises in the sector where
desired employment rises and falls in the other sector. This causes aggregate employment
to fall since hiring costs rise faster in the sector that is positively impacted relative to the
fall in costs for the sector that is negatively impacted. Similarly, due to the convexity of the
matching function, vacancies in the sector with a positive shock rise more than the fall in
vacancies in the sector that is negatively hit.
Distorted Initial State
When separation rates or matching function efficiency differ across sectors, the relationship
between shifts in the Beveridge curve and changes in the natural rate are not as straightfor-
ward. Assuming that labor market reallocation is costless, the steady state of the two-sector
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where labor market tightness θ, total employment N , and employment share nA are the
endogenous variables. The function gi measures hiring costs (inclusive of wages) and is in-
creasing and concave in labor market tightness. Without loss of generality, if sector A has a
higher relative matching function efficiency or lower relative separation rate, then gA < gB
for θ > 0.
Differences in hiring frictions across sectors imply that even in the absence of sectoral
shocks, employment shares respond asymmetrically to changes in labor market tightness as
can be discerned from equation (2.31). If sector A has lower hiring costs, it follows that
nA > φ˜ since relative prices are distorted by the asymmetry in hiring costs. Effectively, sector
A has higher productivity than sector B and the competitive allocations of labor are distorted
toward that sector. A sector-specific shock favoring sector A lowers hiring costs and shifts
out the production possibilities frontier for the economy thereby reducing the natural rate of
unemployment. Moreover, this reduction in the natural rate is accompanied by a decrease in
the aggregate quantity of vacancies needed to attain a particular level of employment. Since
labor market tightness is equalized, shifts in the Beveridge curve due to sectoral shocks in this
case stem from a composition channel. Moreover, shifts in the Beveridge curve and changes
in the natural rate of unemployment move in the same direction; the Beveridge curve may
shift inward or outward depending on the whether or not the sector-specific shock favors the
sector with lower hiring costs. The following proposition summarizes this result:
Proposition 2.7. Consider the two-sector version of the model with costless labor reallocation
and zero bargaining power for households ν = 0. Without loss of generality, assume that
ϕA > ϕB and δA = δB or vice versa (i.e. sector A has lower hiring costs than sector B). Then,
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a positive sector sector-specific shock to sector A lowers the natural rate of unemployment (i.e.
if φ˜A < φ˜￿A ⇒ N < N ￿) and shifts the Beveridge curve inward.
Proof. See Appendix. ￿
The assumption of zero bargaining power simply guarantees that the ratio gA/gB as a
function of θ is monotonic. For moderate values of θ, the ratio of hiring costs will be locally
monotonic with nonzero bargaining power as confirmed in numerical experiments.
With the combination of costly reallocation and asymmetric hiring costs, the connection
between the direction of Beveridge curve and the natural rate of unemployment appears to
hold in our numerical examples. However, we cannot analytically rule out cases in which a
sector-specific shock lowers the natural rate but shifts out the Beveridge curve or vice versa.
The analysis here however suggests that this would be the exception rather than the rule.
2.4.5 Alternative Labor Market Measures and Sectoral Shocks
Our model also provides a framework for assessing how well alternative labor market measures
capture sector-specific shocks and shifts in the Beveridge curve.
Aggregate Matching Function Efficiency and Mismatch
Recent papers by Sedlacek (2011) and Barnichon and Figura (2011) perform a decomposition
analysis of the matching function analogous to measuring the Solow residual in a growth
accounting exercise. Constructing measures of unemployment, vacancies, and hires, these




and show that aggregate matching function efficiency is procyclical. In our multisector model,
























where ϕ¯ is the average level of matching function efficiency. Changes in mismatch and the
distribution of vacancies will lead to variations in measured aggregate matching function
efficiency. To a log-linear approximation, mismatch is a function of sectoral employment in
our model:
θit =





Since sectoral employment is a function of both aggregate and sector-specific shocks, dispersion
in mismatch will also be subject to the Abraham and Katz critique. Therefore, fluctuations
in matching function efficiency are not, as such, an indicator of either sector-specific shocks
or shifts in the Beveridge curve. For a suitably long time series, if the relationship between
matching function efficiency and aggregate shocks is stable, then sector-specific shocks could
be identified as periods where movements in matching function efficiency are not explained
by the business cycle. Unlike a one-sector model with constant matching function efficiency,
our multisector model with costly reallocation is consistent with the empirical observation of
movements over the cycle in aggregate matching efficiency.
Similarly, work by Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2012) and Lazear and Spletzer (2012)
construct mismatch indices by industry, region and occupation to examine whether mismatch
has increased in the current recession. Like measurements of matching function efficiency, our
model shows that variation in these measures over the cycle is not sufficient to identify sector-
specific shocks or Beveridge curve shifts. Instead, these measures are evidence of the feature
in our model that generates mismatch: costly labor reallocation. These empirical mismatch
indices rely on direct measures of labor market tightness with vacancies data from either
the JOLTs or from online vacancy postings collected by the Conference Board. Measures
of sectoral or regional unemployment are constructed from the Current Population Survey
(CPS). Data availablity limits the time series dimension of these measures, with the mismatch
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indices begining in either 2001 or 2006. Since, mismatch can be driven by either aggregate or
sectoral shocks, the cyclical increase in mismatch shown in Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante
(2012) is consistent with either aggregate or sectoral shocks.
Labor Productivity
Garin, Pries, and Sims (2010) document systematic changes in the behavior of labor produc-
tivity in post Great Moderation recessions. Our model supports the view that measured labor
productivity behaves differently under sectoral shocks than aggregate shocks. To a log-linear
appoximation, measured labor productivity is a function of sectoral employment:







where γi is the share of sector i’s output in total output and N i/N is sector i’s employment
share. In an undistorted state where these shares are equalized, measured labor productivity
equals true productivity, but if these shares are not equalized, measured labor productivity
will be a biased indicator of labor productivity and sectoral shocks can both raise or lower
labor productivity depending on whether the sector experiencing a positive shock has a larger
output share than its employment share. To the extent that sector-specific shocks contribute
more to business cycles in the Great Moderation, labor productivity’s correlation with the
business cycle will be weakened.
Okun’s Law
Our multisector model provides a straightforward relationship between output and the unem-
ployment rate. The typically stable relationship between output growth and the changes in
the unemployment rate is labeled as Okun’s Law and, like the Beveridge curve, is a reduced
form relationship that occasionally breaks down. Combining the CES aggregator with our
definition of sector-specfic shocks and total employment, a structural relationship between
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where the last term reflects the effect of labor misallocation on output.
The misallocation term is maximized at one - any misallocation must reduce output hold-
ing constant the level of unemployment. In this case, sector-specific shocks can disrupt the
Okun’s law relationship between output growth and changes in the unemployment rate. If
the economy is typically characterized by some steady state level of misallocation, then sec-
toral shocks can shift Okun’s law relationship in either direction. For example, a sectoral
shock that improves the allocation of labor raises output for any level of unemployment - as
shown in Proposition 2.7, this case would conform to an inward shift in the Beveridge curve.
However, without a direct measure of aggegate productivity, it is not clear how to separate
the misallocation channel from changes in aggregate productivity.
2.4.6 Reservation Wage Shocks and Implications for Structural Change
We can readily extend our model to consider the effect of exogenous shocks to the reservation
wage with no wealth effects. Now, a solution for vacancies and unemployment is a function
of the reservation wage z in addition to the other exogenous shocks described earlier.
Proposition 2.8. Assume no reallocation and no wealth effects. Assume that Ai = Aj =
A, δi = δj ,ϕi = ϕj for i, j = 1, 2, . . .K. For any value of the government spending shock G,
there exists a z such that V (G, z0, A,φi) = V (1, z, A,φi) and U (G, z0, A,φi) = U (1, z, A,φi).
Proof. See Appendix. ￿
A uniform increase in the reservation wage reduces the surplus in each sector in the same
way as a productivity or demand shock leaving aggregate vacancies and unemployment on
the same Beveridge curve. This proposition shows that, to the extent that unemployment
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benefits act as an increase in the household’s reservation wage, extensions in the duration of
unemployment insurance cannot generate a shift in the Beveridge curve.
With some assumptions on functional forms, our multisector model can be augmented to
address the effect of structural change in the long-run on labor market variables and employ-
ment shares. Structural change refers to the long-run trends in employment and output shares
across sectors. Over the postwar period, employment in manufacturing has steadily dropped
from nearly 1/3 of total employment to less than 10%. Over the same period, sectors like
education, health care and professional services have all steadily grown. Alternatively, sectors
like construction have displayed highly persistent fluctuations without any clear time trend.
A recent literature highlighted by Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) and Ngai and Pissarides
(2007) consider the implications of structural change for aggregate growth rates in models
without labor market search. Our model extends these models to allow for consideration of
structural change on unemployment and vacancies.
Under the assumption of balanced growth preferences (i.e., King-Plosser-Rebelo) and va-
cancy posting costs that are proportional to the household’s marginal rate of substitution, our
model admits a balanced growth path with constant unemployment and vacancy rates and
constant growth rates for employment. Wages and output grow at the same rate as aggregate
productivity, though, aggregate productivity growth is only asymptotically constant if sectors
diverge in their growth rates of productivity. The assumption that vacancy posting costs are
proportional to the household’s MRS is a natural one if hiring is an activity that requires
labor. Similar assumptions in Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Michaillat (2012) on vacancy
costs are justified by assuming that the cost of hiring is proportional to the wage paid to
workers.
Proposition 2.9. Consider the K sector flexible-price version of the model with costless
labor reallocation and identical separation rates and matching function parameters. Ad-
ditionally, assume that vacancy posting costs are proportional to the households marginal
rate of substitution: κt = −χcUn (Ct, Nt) /Uc (Ct, Nt), preferences are King-Plosser-Rebelo:
U (C,N) = log(C) − v(N), and the number of households grows at a constant rate gl with
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each household supplying a unit measure of labor inelastically. Then, in the labor market
steady state:
1. Employment shares equal product shares: Nit/Nt = φ˜i
2. Unemployment rates Ut/Lt and vacancy rates Vt/Lt are constant
3. Employment growth ∆N/N equals labor force growth gl
4. Aggregate output ∆Y/Y and consumption growth ∆C/C is equal to productivity plus
labor force growth: gy = gc = gA + gl
5. Wage growth equals productivity growth: gw = gA
If initial productivity is equalized across sectors and grows at the same rate or if η = 1,
then gA is constant and equal to input-share average of productivity growth across sectors.
If sectors grow at different rates, productivity growth is asymtotically constant with gA = γj
where j = 1, 2, . . . ,K is the sector with the highest growth rate if η > 1 or j is the sector with
the lowest growth rate if η < 1.
Proof. See Appendix. ￿
Under KPR preferences and symmetry across sectors in hiring costs, the household reallo-
cates labor to mirror the movements in productivity-adjusted product shares. Since the cost
of labor is equalized across sectors, relative prices are equalized and an aggregate vacancy
posting condition obtains. The assumption that vacancy posting costs are proportional to the
household’s MRS ensures that market tightness and employment have no trend. If real va-
cancy posting costs did not change over time, productivity growth would result in a downward
trend for unemployment. In contrast, US unemployment exhibits, if anything, a slight up-
ward trend. In general, if sectors exhibit persistent differences in matching function efficiency
or separation rates, unemployment, vacancies and employment would not exhibit constant
growth rates. However, the proposition presented here establishes a useful benchmark for
thinking about long-run trends in unemployment and vacancies.
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2.5 Quantitative Predictions of the Model
To examine whether a sector-specific shock can account for the observed shift in the Beveridge
curve and the rise in the unemployment rate in the Great Recession, we calibrate a two-sector
version of our model. In this recession, the construction sector is the largest contributor to
the sector-specific shock index and is frequently identified as the sector where the employment
dislocation has been most severe and persistent. We calibrate the two-sector model to match
various moments on employment, unemployment and vacancies across construction and non-
construction sectors. Since construction displays a far higher job-filling rate than the rest of
the economy, our calibration requires that construction either feature markedly lower hiring
costs or reduced labor market tightness relative to the non-construction sector. We consider
each explanation in turn.
2.5.1 Calibration Strategy
The economy is partitioned into construction and non-construction sectors with initial labor
market tightness equalized across sectors as would be the case in the model steady state.
Several standard parameters in search models are chosen exogenously: the discount rate
β = 0.961/12 to target an annual interest rate of 4%, and the matching function elasticity
α = 0.5 is assumed to be the same across sectors consistent with evidence from Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001). We also assume that sectoral productivity is equalized and normalized
to unity along with the price markup19.
Parameters unique to our model determine hiring costs in each sector: the sectoral sepa-
ration rates δc and δnc, sectoral matching function efficiencies ϕc and ϕnc, the cost of posting
vacancies κ, the reservation wage z, and the household’s bargaining power ν. Moreover, we
must also choose parameters in the CES aggregate - namely the input share of construction
φ in the CES aggregator and the elasticity of substitution η that determines the degree of
complementarity or substitutability across goods. We fix η = 0.5 so that construction and
19A positive markup has no effect on our calibration other than changing the average price of each good.
Alternatively, if the fiscal authority provides a production subsidy to retailers, the markup will be fully offset
in steady state with the price index equal to unity.
92
non-construction goods are moderate complements. However, we consider other values of η
in our robustness checks.
Separation rates are set using the 2001-2006 averages of employment-weighted sectoral
separation rates in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover survey; construction exhibits a
significantly higher separation rate than other sectors. Bargaining power is set at ν = 0
to deliver real wage rigidity as in Hall (2005) to ensure large employment effects from small
changes in markups or aggregate productivity. As Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) emphasize,
the key variable determining the variability of employment is the size of the surplus rather
than the bargaining power. Moreover, since bargaining power is the same across sectors, the
level of bargaining power does not affect the mismatch channel by which sector-specific shocks
shift the Beveridge curve.
The remaining five parameters - matching function efficiencies, reservation wage, vacancy
posting cost, and product share - are jointly chosen to match the following targets: unemploy-
ment rate U/L = 5%, vacancy rate V/L = 2.5%, construction’s share in total employment
Nc/N = 5.7%, construction’s share in total vacancies Vc/V = 3.7%, and a product share-
weighted average accounting surplus of 10% as in Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari (2010) and
close to the surplus delivered in the calibration of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)20. The
construction share of employment is chosen to match the peak of construction employment
in 2007 and the vacancy share is the average level of vacancies from 2001-2006. Parameter
values and targets are summarized in the Table 2.5.
Under the assumption that labor market tightness is equalized across sectors, the model
generates a lower unemployment rate for construction relative to non-construction sectors,
3.3% vs. 5.1%. Because hiring costs are considerably lower in the construction sector under
this calibration, the household allocates fewer worker to the construction sector to search in
order to equalize labor market tightness, 5.6% vs. 94.4% in non-construction sector. How-
ever, using sectoral unemployment shares calculated in the CPS, the level of unemployment
in the construction sector appears counterfactually low. Nevertheless, the correspondence
20The surplus is defined as AiPi/P − z, the difference between the marginal product of labor and the
household’s marginal rate of substitution.
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Table 2.5: Summary of calibration parameters
between the CPS measure of sectoral unemployment and the economic concept of sectoral
unemployment in the model is unclear. The CPS measures sectoral unemployment by as-
signing workers to sectors based on the industry of previous employment with those workers
outside the labor force or entering the labor force unassigned to any sector. In the model,
a worker is unemployed in sector i if that worker is searching for jobs in sector i. The CPS
measure may not accurately capture the sector in which a worker is searching, particularly
among those workers transiting between participation and non-participation. In any case, in
the next section, we show that an alternative calibration matching the unemployment and
vacancy shares of workers does not substantially alter our results.
2.5.2 Experiment
We depict the shift in the steady state Beveridge curve generated by a permanent shock to the
construction share φ that reduces the share to φ￿ = 0.04. This reduction in construction share
is chosen to match the observed drop in construction employment shares from a pre-recession
peak of 5.7% to its 2012 level of 4.1%. The pre-shock Beveridge curve traces out the locus of
aggregate vacancies and unemployment rates for different levels of real marginal cost, while
the post-shock Beveridge curve traces the same locus with φ = φ￿ leaving the distribution of
the labor force either unchanged (in the case of no reallocation) or shifting the distribution
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to ensure equalized labor market tightness across sectors (in the case of perfect reallocation).
Figure 2.7 illustrates our main quantitative results. We show that, in the absence of
reallocation (left-hand panel of Figure 2.7), a sector-specific shock to the construction sector
generates a shift in the Beveridge curve of about 1.3% (horizontal shift - the rise in the
unemployment rate at each level of vacancies). This matches the observed shift in the US
data on unemployment rates and the vacancy to labor force ratio. A comparison of simple
trend lines of V/L on U/L before and after 2009 (using data from December 2001-November
2011) reveals a shift in the horizontal intercept of 1.4%. While analyses using the job-openings
rate (a slightly different measure of vacancies then the vacancy to labor force ratio) reveal
a somewhat larger shift of 2%, the shift generated in our baseline calibration with no labor
reallocation explains a substantial fraction of the observed shift in either case.
In contrast, when reallocation is costless, the Beveridge curve is essentially unchanged
after the sector-specific shock. We take each case as bounds on the shift in the Beveridge
curve and, as we will argue, the case of no reallocation is both a good approximation for the
short-run behavior of the Beveridge curve and will continue to hold over the medium run
given evidence on the costs of labor reallocation for displaced workers. So long as the labor
force does not overshoot its long-run distribution, vacancies and unemployment along the
transition path will lie in the region between these curves21.
In our model, employment shares vary with both changes in the markup and sector-specific
shocks, though the movement in employment shares for aggregate shocks is quite small. For
a markup shock, employment shares in construction drop because the surplus in construction
is lower than that of the non-construction sectors. Lower hiring costs ensure a smaller surplus
and, therefore, a greater decrease in the relative surplus for the construction sector. While
construction shares displayed somewhat larger cyclical movements in employment shares be-
fore 1984, construction shares did not fall in the last recession and recovered quite slowly after
the 1990s recession. Our calibration is consistent with small cyclical effects of aggregate shocks
on employment shares consistent with evidence in the past three recessions where shares show
21Numerical simulations using a quadratic cost of reallocation in a two-sector model show that the labor force
moves monotonically after a permanent shock towards the labor force distribution that equates tightnesses.
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little systematic movement in recessions. In this experiment, construction’s employment share
falls to 4.2% when overall unemployment is at 9% and predicts that the share would only rise
to 4.3% at a 5% unemployment rate (with no labor reallocation). Once reallocation takes
place, this sector-specific shock lowers construction’s employment share further to 4.1%.
2.5.3 Distorted Initial State and Substitutability
As mentioned, the restriction that initial labor market tightness is equalized across sectors
results in a counterfactual sectoral unemployment rate and labor force distribution using
measures of these moments from the CPS. If we relax the assumption of equalized labor market
tightness, an alternative calibration matches the distribution of employment, unemployment
and vacancies. As before, five parameters - matching function efficiencies, the reservation
wage, the vacancy posting cost and the product share - are jointly chosen to match the same
targets as in Section 2.5.1. For consistency, we modify the targeted employment share of
construction at 5.3%, it’s 2000-2006 average. As Table 2.6 shows, aside from the matching
function efficiencies, the remaining parameters are largely unchanged.
Figure 2.8 shows the shift in the Beveridge curve for a preference shock that reduces the
construction share to φ￿ = 0.04. This shock generates a shift in the Beveridge curve slightly
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Table 2.6: Calibration for θc ￿= θnc
smaller than the previous calibration with an average 1% shift in the unemployment rate at
each vacancy rate. At higher levels of unemployment, the shift is mitigated since the sector-
specific shock favors the non-construction sector which has a lower cost of hiring for a given
level of market tightness. Even though job-filling rates are similar under both calibrations, the
reasons for the higher job-filling rate for construction in each calibration are quite different.
In our baseline calibration, job-filling rates in the construction sector are higher solely due to
higher matching function productivity (even after accounting for the higher separation rate).
However, in the distorted steady state calibration, job-filling rates are higher because of lower
labor market tightness in the construction sector - effectively the labor force is misallocated
with too many workers in construction. Absent labor reallocation, the sector-specific shock
still shifts the Beveridge curve outward because a negative sector-specific shock worsens the
mismatch between construction and non-construction sectors.
In addition to generating a similar shift in the Beveridge curve, employment shares exhibit
somewhat greater volatility under aggregate shocks, though the overall volatility remains low.
Since the initial level of mismatch is elevated in this case, the surplus is lower in construction
than in non-construction sectors. As a result, aggregate shocks have a greater effect on
employment and generate larger increases in mismatch and movement in employment shares.
The behavior of employment shares under aggregate shocks is also affected by the degree
of complementarity among goods. When goods are complements, aggregate shocks generate
relatively small movements in employment shares. This is due to the limited effect of prices
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In the limit, when η → 0, goods are perfect complements and employment shares are constant
irrespective of any aggregate shocks. For higher levels of substitutability, employment shares
exhibit greater variation with aggregate shocks, but the magnitude of the shift in the Bev-
eridge curve induced by a sector-specific shock decreases. Figure 2.9 displays the shift in the
Beveridge curve when η = 2 and η = 10 - moderate and high degrees of substitutability. For
the alternative values of η, we recalibrate the five parameters discussed earlier to maintain the
same aggregate and distributional targets. With a higher degree of substitutability, sectors
exhibit greater variation in employment shares over the business cycle but show a smaller
shift in the Beveridge curve conditional on a sector-specific shock that delivers the same
movement in employment shares from 5.3% to about 4% after labor reallocation. However,
in the absence of labor reallocation, sector-specific shocks do not match the observed fall in
construction employment shares. With η = 2, construction’s employment share is 4.5% at an
unemployment rate of 8% - too high relative to the data. Similarly, for η = 10, construction’s
share is 5.3%.
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Aside from counterfactually high employment shares in the short-run, high degrees of sub-
stitutability imply business cycle variation in employment shares inconsistent with evidence
in the Great Moderation period. Aside from trends, employment shares across sectors are
typically stable over the cycle with durable goods and service sectors displaying the strongest
business cycle movements (durables are countercyclical while services are countercyclical).
While construction’s share of employment fell in the early 1990s recession, the construction
share remained stable in the 2001 recession before rising and falling with the housing bubble.
This suggests that the assumption of mild complementarity or substitutability is not unrea-
sonable in the current recession. Moreover, evidence cited in the growth literature and in
studies of durable versus nondurable goods do not support very high levels of substitutability
in the CES aggregator22. In short, our conclusions that a sector-specific shock to construction
account for over 2/3 of the shift in the Beveridge curve hold under alternative assumptions
of labor market tightness and for reasonable values of the degree of substitutability.
2.5.4 Natural Rate of Unemployment
The experiments considered here also allows for an examination of the quantitative relation-
ship between shifts in the Beveridge curve and changes in the natural rate of unemployment.
22See Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), Carvalho and Lee (2011), and Monacelli (2009).
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Table 2.7 shows the natural rate of unemployment before and after a sector specific shock
for various specifications of our model. The baseline calibration, which fully accounts for the
shift in the Beveridge curve, finds a rise of 1.4 percentage points in the natural rate of unem-
ployment to 6.4%. Once labor reallocation takes place, the sectoral shock to construction has
a trivial effect on the unemployment rate, raising the rate to 5.06%. The initial rise in the
natural rate of unemployment is similar in magnitude to the estimate in Sahin, Song, Topa,
and Violante (2012) of the contribution of mismatch unemployment in the Great Recession.
The absence of labor reallocation is responsible for most of the rise in the unemployment
rate, while the composition effect accounts for the increase in the unemployment rate once
reallocation takes place. This slight long-run rise in the unemployment rate is due to the
fact that a sectoral shock shifts employment away from the sector with lower hiring costs.
For higher degrees of substitutability, sectoral shocks that deliver the same employment share
once reallocation takes place imply similar long-run unemployment rates but also a lower rise
in the natural rate even in the absence of labor reallocation. In each case, a higher degree of
substitutability implies less movement in employment shares as agents tolerate greater devia-
tions of employment shares from product shares leading to a smaller rise in the natural rate of
unemployment. Greater substitutability also generates a smaller shift in the Beveridge curve.
Table 2.7: Natural rate and Beveridge curve shift
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As the second panel of Table 2.7 illustrates, in the presence of some initial degree of
mismatch, the quantitative relationship between the natural rate and the shift in the Beveridge
curve is somewhat weaker. In the baseline case of η = 0.5, both the shift in the Beveridge
curve and the rise in the natural rate are somewhat lower than the undistorted case with a
somewhat larger increase in the natural rate than implied by the shift in the Beveridge curve.
Moreover, once reallocation takes place, the natural rate actually falls to 4.88% relative to the
initial unemployment rate. This reduction in the long-run unemployment rate differs from
the undistorted case because hiring costs are now greater in the construction sector relative to
the non-construction sector. Therefore, the sectoral shock favors the sector with lower costs.
For higher levels of substitutability, movements in the natural rate are attenuated, consistent
with the smaller shifts in the Beveridge curve.
Our experiment reveals an approximate one-to-one relationship between shifts in the Bev-
eridge curve and changes in the natural rate of unemployment. Moreover, when labor reallo-
cation is complete, the natural rate of unemployment returns to approximately the same level
despite a permanent sector-specific shock and differences across sectors in hiring costs and
matching function technology. However, the one-to-one link between Beveridge curve shifts
and the natural rate of unemployment does not hold under extensions of the model considered
in Section 2.6.
2.5.5 Labor Reallocation
As our quantitative results have emphasized, the ability of sector-specific shocks to explain
the shift in the Beveridge curve and generate any economically significant fluctuations in the
natural rate of unemployment depends crucially on the speed of labor reallocation across
sectors. The available evidence supports slow labor reallocation in the short-run (1-2 years)
but evidence on the pace of labor reallocation over the medium-run (2-8 years) is more mixed.
We review the available evidence on labor reallocation in both the short-run and medium-run.
Costless labor reallocation is likely to be a poor approximation for the short-run behavior
of the labor market. Given the quantitatively small role played by composition effects, costless
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reallocation would imply no mismatch across sectors and nearly constant aggregate matching
function efficiency over the business cycle. However, the empirical measures constructed in
Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2010), Barnichon and Figura (2011), and Sedlacek (2011)
show that these variables fluctuate significantly over the business cycle. Moreover, observed
vacancy to unemployment ratios using JOLTs and CPS data are not equalized across sectors,
which is also inconsistent with the view that labor market reallocation is costless.
Table 2.8: Reallocation rates by education level
However, to explain a persistent shift in the Beveridge curve, labor reallocation must also
be costly over the medium run. Transition rates for workers across sectors suggest large rates of
reallocation, while evidence for displaced workers suggest substantial and persistent barriers
to reallocation. The most natural measure of reallocation rates across sectors is monthly
transition rates for employed and unemployed workers in the CPS. Since the CPS features
a rotating panel design, households are tracked for four consecutive months and interviewed
again a year later for another four consecutive months. Using matched CPS data from 2003-
2006, we measure monthly reallocation rates for both employed and unemployed workers
across major industries and major occupations. These monthly transition rates averaged
2.1% and 2.4% for the industry and occuption reallocation rates respectively. As Table 2.8
shows, reallocation rates are decreasing with educational attainment and are generally higher
for workers who are currently unemployed. Interestingly, for workers with less than a high
school degree, reallocation rates drop for unemployed workers relative to employed workers.
This fact may be salient for construction workers since construction exhibits the lowest skill
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attainment of any major industry. The left-hand column of Table 2.9 gives the fraction of
workers in each industry who are college graduates or higher.
Given our interest in labor reallocation out of construction, we examine transitions for only
workers in the construction sector over the same period. Table 2.9 also shows the distribution
of transitions from construction to other industries both unconditionally and conditional on
the initial skill level. As Table 2.9 reveals, low-skilled construction workers reallocate toward
other low skill industries like retail trade and leisure and hospitality. Service-sector industries
- like education and health services, financial activities, and government - which account for a
significant share of aggregate employment, are relatively underrepresented. While a significant
fraction of transitions take place into professional and business services, these transitions may
reflect movements into low skilled jobs like janitorial services and office support rather high-
skilled occupations like lawyers, scientists, and managers which both belong to this sector.
Table 2.9: Skill distribution and reallocation for construction
The aggregate industry and occupation transition rates reported here are similar in mag-
nitude to the rates documented in Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) who examine transition
rates at a higher level of disaggregation across occupations instead of industries. However,
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Kambourov and Manovskii (2004) argue that classification errors are significant in year-to-
year transitions in the CPS, leading to spurious transitions. Indeed, measurement error always
biases transition rates upwards since a transition is recorded for any consecutive change in
recorded industry. Moreover, these transition rates are silent on whether newly transitioned
workers are a good substitute for existing workers with industry experience. Therefore, while
the raw transition rates suggest large flows across sectors, these transitions are subject to sig-
nificant measurement error and may not capture whether workers who reallocate are screened
by firms. Measurement error and the absence of any measures of match quality may also bias
the mismatch measures of Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2012), who record a sharp fall in
mismatch in the recovery period despite the shift in the Beveridge curve.
High rates of reallocation in the medium term are also inconsistent with evidence from
the literature on displaced workers, which documents persistent effects of job loss on wages
and labor force outcomes. Davis and von Wachter (2011) show that, in periods of high un-
employment, wage loss is up to three years of pre-displacement earnings. This study and
related work relies on higher quality longitudinal data from administrative records that ac-
curately track worker outcomes for extended periods. To the extent that wages accurately
reflect a worker’s marginal product, the steep decline in wages suggests that, conditional on
finding employment, displaced workers are not as well suited for their new jobs. The most
recent Displaced Workers Survey - a occasional supplement to the CPS - shows that 62% of
long-tenured displaced workers (i.e. workers employed for over 3 years) from 2007-2009 came
from construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, or professional and business
services23. These are precisely the same sectors into which construction workers reallocate
suggesting that weak labor market conditions in these sectors make them unlikely to absorb
transitions from construction. Moreover, in the latest wave of the Displaced Workers Survey,
displaced construction workers exhibit among the lowest rate of reemployment in another
industry at 23.9% - second lowest next to education and health services at 19.4%. In short,
23Construction workers alone account for 13% of long-tenured displaced workers with a total of 6.8 mil-
lion workers displaced over the 2007-2009 period. These findings are also supported by Charles, Hurst, and
Notowidigdo (2012).
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evidence on displaced workers suggests significant costs to reallocation over the medium term.
2.5.6 Skilled and Unskilled Labor
While evidence on the degree of labor reallocation across sectors is mixed, one dimension
along which workers cannot readily reallocate is skill level. In this section, we extend our
baseline model to include skilled and unskilled workers and show that sector-specific shocks
can still shift the Beveridge curve even when industry reallocation is costless. Firms in all
sectors now hire both skilled and unskilled workers using a fixed proportions technology to
produce sectoral output. Workers at a given skill level can freely reallocate across sectors,
but workers cannot reallocate across skill levels.
The intermediate good firm’s problem from Section 2.3.4 is modified as follows:
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Relative to the baseline model, firms in each sector i hire both skilled workersN si,t and unskilled
workers Nui,t subject to a fixed proportions technology where a unit of effective labor requires
a constant sector-specific combination of skilled and unskilled labor νi. Firms post vacancies
V si,t and V
u
i,t for both types of workers with skill-specific job-filling rates q
s
t and qut . Given
costless reallocation within skill cohorts, the job-filling rates are the same across sector for a
given skill level. Wages may differ across skill levels but vacancy posting costs are assumed
to be the same.
Optimizing behavior by firms implies a single vacancy posting condition for hiring a fixed
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This vacancy posting condition generalizes the standard vacancy posting condition. For sec-
tors with a higher ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, wages and search costs for skilled workers
account for a larger share of the marginal product of labor. Changes in the marginal product
for a sector characterized by a relatively high skill workforce have a greater effect on skilled
worker employment than unskilled worker employment.
The household problem is left largely unchanged with households free to assign skilled
and unskilled workers to search across sectors but unable to transform unskilled workers
into skilled workers or vice versa. At each skill level, workers search in sectors to equate
their probability-weighted surplus from finding a job - the same condition as in Section 2.3.1.
This optimality condition implies the Jackman-Roper condition with labor market tightness
equated across sectors for a given skill level.
We calibrate a two-sector version of this model to demonstrate that sector-specific shocks
to the low-skilled sector can generate a quantitatively significant shift in the Beveridge curve.
Following the discussion in Section 2.5.4, we partition the economy into two sectors and two
skill levels, segmenting workers as either college graduates or workers with less than a four-
year college degree. As noted in Table 2.8, sectors differ markedly in the skill composition
of their workforce. We define the low-skilled sector as construction, mining, leisure and
hospitality, trade and transportation, and other services, assigning all remaining sectors to a
composite high-skilled sector. The employment weighted ratio of college graduates to non-
college graduates is 0.193 for the low-skilled sectors while this ratio is 0.64 for the other sector
and determines the value for the parameter νi.
For the remaining parameters, our calibration strategy largely follows our strategy de-
scribed in Section 2.5.1. Bargaining power ν, matching function elasticity α, the elasticity of
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Table 2.10: Skilled/unskilled model parameters
substition η across goods, and the discount rate β are the same as in Section 2.5.1. Sectoral
separation rates are chosen to match the employment weighted separation rates (2000-2006
averages) reported from JOLTs. The remaining parameters to be chosen are the matching
function efficiencies for skilled workers ϕs and unskilled workers ϕu, the reservation wages for
skilled workers zs and unskilled workers z, the cost of posting vacancies κ, and the preference
for the low-skilled sector’s good φ. These parameters are chosen to jointly match the follow-
ing targets: unemployment rate U/L = 5%, vacancy rate V/L = 2.5%, employment share of
low-skilled sector Nls/N = 38.9%, vacancy share of low-skilled sector Vls/V = 37.1%, skill
premium zs/z = 1.82, and share-weighted average accounting surplus of 10%. The calibration
target for employment shares is 2003-2006 average from the BLS establishment survey, while
the calibration target from vacancy shares is the average share of vacancies for low-skilled
sectors from the JOLTs data over the same period. The skill premium is chosen from esti-
mates in Goldin and Katz (2007), while the share-weighted average accounting surplus is the
same as the baseline calibration24. The labor share for the skilled sector Ls = 30% matches
24See Table A8.1, data for 2005.
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the 2003-2006 average share of college graduates in the CPS. The model generates an unem-
ployment share of 51% for the low-skilled sector (versus 50% in the CPS) and unemployment
rates by skill level of 4.5% and 5.2% for high skilled and low-skilled workers respectively. Our
calibration is summarized in Table 2.10.
The experiment we conduct is a preference shock that reduces the share of low-skilled
employment from 38.9% to 38% corresponding to the reduction observed in the current reces-
sion. This fall in employment share is driven largely by construction and partially offset by
increases in the other constituent sectors classified as low-skilled. A shock that reduces the
input share to φ￿ = 0.547 reduces the employment share to 38%, raises the unemployment
rate to 5.12% and raises vacancies from 2.5% to 2.72% accounting for a sizable outward shift
in the Beveridge curve. As seen in Figure 2.10, this shock increases the unemployment rate
by 0.5 percentage points holding vacancies constant, explaining a bit over 1/3 of the observed
shift in the Beveridge curve. For higher levels of unemployment, the shift is smaller analogous
to the shape of the Beveridge curve observed in the calibration with a distorted initial state.
Moreover, in contrast to the construction/non-construction calibration, the sector-specific
shock in this calibration delivers an increase in the natural rate of unemployment that is just
a quarter of the shift in the Beveridge curve confirming that the size of Beveridge curve shifts
and changes in the natural rate are not necessarily one for one.
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2.6 Financial Disruptions as Sectoral Shocks
In this section, we extend our baseline model to illustrate how sector-specific shocks could be
represented as financial shocks. If financial shocks are responsible for the shift in the Beveridge
curve, then Beveridge curve shifts no longer necessarily imply any changes in the natural rate
of unemployment. In particular, it is now possible for monetary easing to counteract any shift
in the Beveridge curve since changes in the conduct of monetary policy in and of itself could
generate a shift in the Beveridge curve. We show that a binding zero lower bound on the
policy rate - effectively a departure from the unconstrained monetary policy rule - operates
as a financial shock that disproportionately impacts the financially constrained sector.
2.6.1 Financial Frictions on the Firm Side
To model the effect of financial shocks on the production side, we now assume that some
sectors face a working capital constraint of the form considered in Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005). Financially constrained firms have to borrow to pay wages and the cost of
posting vacancies25. For these firms, their optimization problem is slightly modified from the
baseline model by introducing a borrowing rate ibt :










(Wi,TNi,T − κPTVi,T )
￿
, (2.32)
s.t. Ni,t =(1− δi)Ni,t−1 + qi,tVi,t, (2.33)
Yi,t =AtNi,t. (2.34)
Financially constrained firms’ vacancy posting condition now includes the borrowing rate and

















25To introduce financial frictions, we now assume that firms are operated by a distinct set of agents with
stochastic discount factor Qbt . Given our focus on labor market steady states, the entrepreneur’s stochastic
discount factor does not enter into the steady state vacancy posting condition.
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In steady state, the second term with expected future borrowing rates drops out and changes
in the borrowing rate are isomorphic to a negative sector-specific productivity shock as in
equation (2.21). We show in the appendix that a collateral constraint as opposed to a working
capital constraint would imply the exact same vacancy posting condition. In Curdia and
Woodford (2010), and Mehrotra (2012), the borrowing rate is endogenous to monetary policy
as the sum of the nominal deposit rate - the instrument of monetary policy - and an exogenous
credit spread less changes in expected inflation:





While the credit spread is exogenous, the borrowing rate is not and credit spread shocks may
be offset by a reduction in the policy rate or increases in inflation expectations. The presence
of a working capital constraint (or other type of financial friction) creates a channel for
increasing labor market mismatch between financially constrained and unconstrained sectors,
while the effect of the deposit rate on the borrowing rate renders movements in mismatch
partially endogenous.
2.6.2 Financial Frictions on the Household Side
Analogous to the production side, financial frictions on the household side can generate the
same change in relative prices as a sector-specific preference shock does in our baseline model.
The most realistic financial friction on the household side involves costs of borrowing for pur-
chasing durable goods as modeled in Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) or Monacelli (2009).
Since durable goods are lumpy purchases, households typically borrow to make these pur-
chases.
However, the correspondence between sector-specific preference shocks and financial fric-
tions on the household side can be established in a simpler cash-in-advance type setting. We
modify our existing model with two types of households and incomplete markets. Assume
that a subset of patient households enjoys a fixed share of national income and carries positive
wealth from period to period (in the form of government debt). These households provide
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loanable funds in our setup. The impatient households in our economy supply labor (subject
to the search frictions and reallocation frictions detailed earlier) and carry zero wealth from
period to period since they are subject to a nonnegative wealth constraint that will bind in
the steady state. The impatient household consume two types of goods: Ct and Dt, but the
impatient household must borrow at the beginning of the period to purchase Dt, and repay
this loan at the end of the period out of income earned from working.
In this setting, the impatient household faces a static optimization problem (in addition
to the labor allocation decision detailed in Section 2.3.1):
max
Ct,Dt,Bt















where ibt is the net borrowing rate and the last constraint requires that borrowing inclusive of
interest be repaid in full by the end of the period. Instead of a single set of retailers selling
a continuum of differentiated goods, we now assume retailers for both types of goods as in
Monacelli (2009). These retailers are identical implying the same markup in each sector.
The optimality conditions for the impatient household determine the relative demand for
each good. Under the assumption that u (Ct, Dt) is separable:















Under log utility and a Cobb-Douglas aggregator for Ct and Dt, we have a relative demand
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condition that is analogous to the relative employment condition in our baseline model. When
patient households relative demand for consumption goods is small or is very similar to that
of the impatient household, it follows that a shock to the borrowing rate changes relative














While a shock to the borrowing rate is not isomorphic to a preference shock φ, changes in
borrowing rates shift employment shares and, in the presence of costly labor reallocation, will
increase mismatch across sectors.
2.6.3 Phillips Curve and Mismatch
Since financial frictions on the firm side fits most naturally into our existing model, we il-
lustrate how a change in the monetary policy rule increases mismatch thereby shifting the
Beveridge curve. We log-linearize a two-sector version of model where firms in the financially
constrained sector are subject to subject to a working capital constraint and there is no reallo-
cation of labor across sectors. When reservation wages are constant, the firms’ log-linearized
vacancy-posting conditions are given as follows:
pct = ibt + scαθct,
put = suαθut,
where c indexes the financially constrained sector, u indicates the unconstrained sector and
1−si is the surplus in sector i. When sc = su, the borrowing rate constitutes a wedge between
relative prices; an increase in the borrowing rate drives up the prices disproportionately in
the financially constrained sector.
An aggregate Phillips curve is obtained by combining the price index and the log-linearized
equilibrium conditions of the retailers, with the latter delivering the standard New Keynesian
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idt + ωt +
α
1− αsc (1 + ￿c)nct
￿
+ (1− ν) α




yt = γnct + (1− γ)nut, (2.37)
nct − nut = −η
￿
idt + ωt + sc (1 + ￿c)
α





where γ is the steady state share of output for the constrained sector, ν is the steady state
share of the price index for the constrained sector, and ￿i is the ratio or employment to
unemployment in each sector. The three equations summarize the supply block of the two-
sector model with financial frictions where labor markets are in their flow steady state. If
the initial steady state is distorted (i.e. Pct ￿= Put), output and price level shares need not be
equalized. Moreover, these shares will generally differ from employment shares and vacancies









1− αs (1 + ￿) yt
￿
+ βEtπt+1, (2.39)





and the inflation/output tradeoff is decoupled from the determination of employment shares.
The model is closed by adding the household’s aggregate IS condition and specifying a
monetary policy rule. We assume that the exogenous credit shock also affects some subset of
borrower households as described in the model of Mehrotra (2012). In that setting, an increase
the credit spread delivers a business cycle: a decrease in output, inflation, consumption, and
employment. Monetary policy is assumed to follow a standard Taylor rule:





idt =φππt + φyyt, (2.42)
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where σ is the average intertemporal elasticity of substitution and σb is the elasticity of
substitution for the borrower household. A solution to this five equation system (2.36) -
(2.38) and (2.41) - (2.42) is a process for
￿
nct, nut, yt,πt, idt
￿
as a function of the exogenous
shock ωt.
To see how a change in the monetary policy rule shifts the Beveridge curve, it is useful to
fix the level of employment nt and observe that equation (2.38) determines the distribution of
employment conditional on the response of monetary policy. To a log-linear approximation,
steady state employment is nt = τnct+(1− τ)nut where employment shares τ need not match





[nt − (1− τ)nut] , (2.43)
nut =
1+ηλc




(1 + ηλc) 1−ττ + (1 + ηλu)
, (2.44)
where λi is composite of the other parameters like the sectoral surplus sc. A weaker policy
response (decrease in idt ) to the increase in spreads ωt will increase the share of employment
at unconstrained firms so long as similar size shocks ωt are needed to deliver the same level
of employment under each policy26. This change in the distribution of employment shifts the
Beveridge curve since total vacancies are also a function of the distribution of employment.































where the second equality is obtained by expressing employment in the constrained sector in
terms of total employment and employment in the unconstrained sector. So long as uncon-
26In particular, instead of a Taylor rule, assume that monetary policy keeps the borrowing rate constant:
idt = −ωt. Then at the zero lower bound, monetary policy cannot offset the rise in the credit spread and the
share of employment in the unconstrained sector rises.
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strained firms face a tighter labor market or account for a disproportionate share of vacancies
(relative to their employment share), the coefficient on nut will be positive and the increase
at vacancies at these firms will more than offset the fall in vacancies at the constrained firms
shifting the Beveridge curve outward.
In addition to offering an explanation for the shift in the Beveridge curve, the interaction
of the zero lower bound and financial frictions at the firm level also offers a potential explana-
tion for the relative stability of inflation in the US despite persistently high unemployment.
A credit shock, by affecting firms’ costs of production, raises marginal costs for constrained
firms. This rise in costs for constrained firms partially offsets the fall in marginal costs from de-
creasing employment. The financial frictions channels dampens downward pressure on prices,
limiting the degree of deflation and, depending on the relative strength of these channels,
possibly generating higher inflation. Standard ZLB models in the spirit of Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003) have difficulty generating long-lasting zero lower bound episodes without
predicting counterfactually high levels of deflation (see Mehrotra (2012)). While extreme
downward rigidity in wages could also explain the absence of outright deflation, the presence
of a supply-side channel for financial frictions offers another realistic channel to account for
stable inflation at the zero lower bound.
2.7 Conclusion
Discussions about the slow recovery in the US following the Great Recession have raised the
possibility of sectoral shocks. Proponents of this view have cited the disproportionate impact
of the recession on housing-related industries and the shift in the Beveridge curve as evidence
of sector-specific shocks. We investigate the role of sector-specific shocks and their impact on
the Beveridge curve empirically and theoretically.
On the empirical side, a factor analysis of sectoral employment in the postwar data is used
to isolate sector-specific shocks while addressing the Abraham and Katz critique. We derive
a sector-specific shock index and show that this index is elevated in the current period and
distinct from the business cycle or the Lilien measure of sectoral shocks. Moreover, we show
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that this measure of sector-specific shocks is elevated in those periods when the Beveridge
curve shifts.
On the theoretical side, we build a multisector model with labor market search to investi-
gate how sector-specific shocks affect equilibrium variables like the aggregate Beveridge curve
and the level of employment. Our model shows that sector-specific shocks generally shift the
Beveridge curve through a composition channel due to differences in hiring costs and hiring
technology across sectors and a mismatch channel due to segmentation in labor markets. We
show analytically that, through the composition effect, sectoral shocks can raise or lower the
natural rate of unemployment, while the mismatch effect always raises the natural rate of
unemployment. Moreover, in our baseline model, sectoral shocks that shift the Beveridge
curve must also change the natural rate of unemployment.
We calibrate a two-sector version of our model and show that a negative preference shock to
the construction sector that matches the distribution of employment shares at the recession
trough generates a shift in the Beveridge curve that matches the magnitude of the shift
observed in the data. This shock raises the natural rate of unemployment by a quantitatively
similar level as the shift in the Beveridge curve - the natural rate rises 1.4 percentage points
and results are robust if goods are moderate substitutes instead of complements.
Finally, we show that financial shocks act like sector-specific shocks and can also generate a
shift in the Beveridge curve if a subset of firms is financially constrained. In this richer setting,
a change in the conduct of monetary policy can generate a shift in the Beveridge curve by
magnifying the effect of financial constraints. For example, if monetary policy switches from
a Taylor rule to a fixed nominal rate due to a binding zero lower bound, financial constraints
will lead to a higher level of mismatch across sectors. These changes in mismatch due to a
binding zero lower bound can still be addressed through unconventional monetary policy such
as price level targets or credit easing.
As noted in our quantitative results, the assumption of costly or no labor reallocation is
crucial in generating the observed persistance of the shift in the Beveridge curve. Existing
evidence suggests somewhat contradictory findings on the pace of labor reallocation. Ob-
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served transition rates in the CPS and the size of cross-sector flows suggest relatively frequent
transitions across sectors. However, evidence from the Displaced Worker Survey and an ex-
tensive literature studying labor market outcomes after job loss point to fairly high costs to
reallocation. Future research will seek to reconcile these findings to determine the business
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3.1 Introduction
The labor market recovery since the trough of the Great Recession in 2009 has been character-
ized by a pronounced decline in labor market churn. As shown in Figure 3.1, job creation and
job destruction during the recovery have fallen relative to their pre-recession averages, despite
positive net job creation during each period. Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2011) also
document the sharp fall in job creation in the Great Recession, and Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and
Miranda (2012) show an acceleration in the decline of employment and job creation among
young firms.















































































































A broad literature has documented the importance of overall labor market turnover in the
process of labor reallocation and productivity growth2. Moreover, higher job flow rates in the
time series and cross section typically coincide with a healthier labor market, characterized
by higher levels of employment growth and lower unemployment rates. The decline in job
flows exhibited in the Great Recession may provide clues explaining the slow recovery in the
labor market.
Recent work by Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2012) demonstrates that new and
2For an overview, see Haltiwanger (2012) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999)
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young firms account for a disproportionate share of job creation and job destruction due to
their up and out pattern of expansion. Using 2000-2006 averages from the Business Dynamics
Statistics, new firms account for about 3% of employment but for nearly 17% of job creation.
Similarly, young firms (defined as firms 5 years or younger) account for 12% of employment
but 16% of job creation and 21% of job destruction respectively. Given the disproportionate
contribution of new and young firms to labor market churn, some economists in the business
press have speculated that the credit crisis may have had a disproportionate impact on young
businesses. They argue that a decline in house prices may impair the formation of new firms
and the expansion of existing firms by reducing the value of collateral and thereby restrict-
ing their access to finance. Figure 3.2 provides some suggestive support for this hypothesis,
showing a strong correlation between the decline in house prices at the state level and the de-
cline in job creation from expanding establishments as measured in the Business Employment
Dynamics.
In this paper, we argue in favor of this hypothesis - that the financial crisis and sharp
decline in housing prices explain the large and persistent decline in job creation and job
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destruction. In particular, we argue that a collateral shock tightens the availability of credit
for new firms and young expanding firms leading to a decline in aggregate job creation and
job destruction. We investigate this hypothesis both empirically and theoretically.
In our empirical work, we provide direct evidence that a decline in collateral values di-
minishes job creation and lagged job destruction using state- level data from the Business
Dynamics Statistics (BDS). We exploit state-level variation in job flows and housing prices
to examine the effects of movements in state housing prices on job flows. To address issues
of causality, we control for state and time fixed effects and add direct controls for the state
business cycle. We also utilize an IV approach based on the differences across states in their
sensitivity to movements in aggregate US house prices. This land supply elasticity approach
- used to examine the effect of real estate shocks on investment - is applied here to examine
the effect of housing prices on job flows.
To analyze the theoretical effect of a collateral shock on job flows and employment, we build
a model of firms dynamics with financial frictions and decreasing returns to scale. Newly born
firms and young firms accumulate assets and expand towards their efficient scale. Mature firms
are financially unconstrained and are free to expand or contract depending on idiosyncratic
shocks to firm productivity. Firms differ in productivity levels so that some businesses remain
small without any binding financial constraint. Our model is calibrated to match the average
size and age distribution of employment in the Business Dynamics Statistics.
Our empirical results show that a shock to housing prices reduces job creation persistently
and reduces job destruction with a lag. These results hold under both the OLS and IV
specifications and are robust to alternative controls for the state business cycle. Moreover,
we document differences across firm age and size categories in the sensitivity of job flows to
housing price shocks. In particular, we find that job creation for middle-sized firms (firms
with 20-99 employees) and new firms exhibit the strongest sensitivity to housing price shocks.
Similar patterns hold for job destruction with middle-size firms and young firms (less than 5
years old) exhibiting a long-run decline in job destruction in response to a decline in housing
prices.
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Using our model of firm dynamics, we show that collateral shocks diminish job creation
and job destruction in steady state. Moreover, the collateral shock replicates the empirical
pattern of job flows sensitivity across firm size and age. The collateral shock reduces job
creation for larger firm size categories by reducing employment demand for credit-constrained
firms and shifting the size distribution towards smaller firms. This effect is partially offset
by the general equilibrium effect of a decline in wages which causes unconstrained firms to
become larger. As a result, job flows for middle-sized firms exhibit the greatest sensitivity to
housing price shocks. Likewise, a tightening collateral constraint reduces job creation for new
and young firms by increasing the required asset level to achieve a given level of employment.
Collateral shocks diminish job destruction by shrinking the size of firms leading to lower job
destruction from firm deaths. Our model highlights the various mechanisms culminating in
lower job flows from a collateral tightening and replicates the patterns in job flow sensitivity
documented in our empirical work.
3.1.1 Related Literature
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. Firstly, our empirical work is related
to a literature documenting the real effect of housing price shocks. Recent papers by Gan
(2007) and Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) examine the effect of collateral shocks on firm
investment. Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) use firm-level financial data to show that a
decline in the value of real estate for a firm’s headquarters has a statistically significant effect
of firm investment. Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2013) documents that small business starts
and employment levels showed a strong sensitivity to increases in housing prices during the
boom years from 2002-2007. Both papers use the land supply elasticity instruments proposed
in Saiz (2010), and our IV strategy follows a similar approach. Our paper focuses on the effect
of housing prices on job flows.
Likewise, our work draws on and contributes to an empirical literature documenting dif-
ferences in job flows across firm size and age categories. The influence of startups and young
firms on job creation and job destruction is documented in Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
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(2010), but we establish facts about the sensitivity of job flows across firm size and age to
housing prices. Our empirical work is closest to contemporaneous work by Fort, Haltiwanger,
Jarmin, and Miranda (2012) that examines the cyclical role of housing prices on employment
and job flows. Our results are consistent with their results and differ primarily in the use of
an instrument variables approach to establish the causal effect of housing price shocks on job
flows by firm size and age. Additionally, we reconcile the empirical patterns we document
with a firm dynamics model with financial frictions.
Finally, our work is related to an emerging literature on quantitative firm dynamics mod-
els. Our model comes closest to Khan and Thomas (2011) who study the effect of a credit
shock in a model with collateral constraints and firm-specific capital. They find that credit
shock recessions behavior quite differently than productivity-driven recession, but they do
not explore the implications for their mechanism on job flows. Gomes (2001) and Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) also build firm dynamics models with various financial frictions to fit facts on
the firm age and firm size distribution and stylized facts about the financing of small versus
large businesses.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses our data and presents empirical
results on the link between collateral values and job creation and job destruction. Section 3.3
presents a simple continuous time firm dynamics model and characterizes firm behavior. Sec-
tion 3.4 discusses our benchmark discrete time firm dynamics model. Section 3.5 describes
our calibration strategy and shows the quantitative effect of a collateral shock. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Empirical Strategy and Results
3.2.1 Empirical Strategy
Any test of the hypothesis that an increase in financial frictions diminishes job flows must over-
come several challenges of both measurement and causality. Our empirical strategy addresses
these issues by using state-level variation in job flows and financial conditions to determine
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the causal effect of increased financial frictions on job flows.
The first issue we confront is finding suitable proxy for financial conditions at the state
level. Since financial constraints are not typically observable, we use data on the growth rate
of state house prices as a proxy for financial conditions. To the extent that lending to firms
is secured by either the firm’s real estate or the owner’s real estate, movements in housing
prices should directly affect the ability of a firm to obtain financing. For firms with access to
corporate debt and equity markets, housing price movements may be a poor proxy for financial
conditions. However, the vast majority of firms do not issue debt or equity securities, instead
relying upon bank financing or other forms of collateralized finance. Fairlie and Krashinsky
(2012) provide direct evidence for changes in housing equity on entrepreneurship using data
from the Current Population Survey. Data from the Survey of Small Business Finances and
aggregate balance sheet data from the Flow of Funds also suggests the importance of real
estate collateral for firm credit. Moreover, as noted in our discussion of related literature, an
extensive literature documents the importance of real estate prices for both investment and
employment.
In addition to finding a suitable proxy for financial frictions, the relative dearth of time-
series data on aggregate job flows limits the analysis of the relationship of financial frictions
and job flows in the aggregate data. Instead, we exploit state-level variation in job flows and
housing prices to improve the power of our estimates and increase useful variation from state
and regional housing price booms.
The most significant challenge in establishing a causal affect of housing price movements
on job flows is ruling out an aggregate demand channel that drives the correlation between
job flows and housing prices. We address this concern in several ways. Firstly, we include
state and time fixed effects to account for the business cycle and differences across states in
job flows. Secondly, to control for state-specific demand shocks, we include measures for the
state business cycle. Our baseline regression takes the following form:
yit = αi + δt + γ (L)∆GSPit + β (L)∆hpit + ￿it
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where yit is job creation or job destruction for state i at time t. ∆GSPit represents the growth
rate of the state-level business cycle variable, while ∆hpit is the growth rate of state housing
prices. Our coefficient of interest is the sum of the coefficients β(1) on state housing prices.
Alternatively, we also adopt an IV strategy following the methodology laid out in Saiz
(2010) where differences in land supply elasticities generate differential responses in house
prices to national shocks. Specifically, we use movements in national housing prices inter-
acted with a state dummy variable as an instrument for state housing prices. The identifying
assumption is that whatever causes movements in national house prices is uncorrelated with
state-specific aggregate demand shocks. Our IV strategy is similar to the methodology used
in Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) in their study of government spending multipliers. The
authors use movements in national government defense spending as an instrument for state
government spending by exploiting differences in state sensitivity to government defense ex-
penditures. Our IV regression takes the following form:
yit = αi + δt + β (L)∆￿hpit + ￿it (2nd stage)
∆hpit = αi + δt + ρi(L)∆hpt + uit (1st stage)
where ∆￿hpit is the fitted value for state house prices obtained from the first-stage regression
of state house prices on national house prices. As before, the coefficient of interest is the sum
of coefficients β(1) measuring the effect of housing prices on job flows.
Together the OLS specification and IV specification attempt to control for an aggregate
demand channel and establish the causal affect of movements in house prices on gross job
creation and job destruction.
3.2.2 Data
We draw on several distinct data sources for measures of job flows, house prices, and state
measures of the business cycle. Data on job flows comes the Business Dynamics Statistics
compiled by the US Census Bureau. The Business Dynamics Statistics is drawn from the
Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Database (LBD), a confidential database that tracks employ-
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ment at the establishment and firm level over time. The Business Dynamics Statistics report
job creation and job destruction by firm age and size categories at the state level; prior to the
development of BDS, these data were only available to researchers with access to confidential
Census microdata. The job flows data in the BDS is drawn from Census Bureau’s Business
Register, which consists of the population of firms and establishments with employees covered
by unemployment insurance or filing taxes with the Internal Revenue Service3.
Specifically, we use data on gross job creation and job destruction at the state level from
1982-2010, where job creation measures the increase in employment at new firms or expanding
firms and job destruction measures the decrease in employment at exiting firms or contracting
firms. Firm level employment is recorded in March of each year and job flows are measured
with respect to employment in the previous year. Our data set includes job flows from 50
states and the District of Columbia resulting in a balanced panel of 29 x 51 observations.
Our house price data comes from the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s state level house
price indices. We use the all-transactions indexes which provide a quarterly time series of
housing prices from 1975 to present. These data are not seasonally adjusted, but we use
year-over-year changes in the log of the house price index as our measure of state housing
price growth. National housing prices are measured in the same way using the national house
price index4.
State-level business cycle measures come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Our baseline measure for the state business cycle is the growth rate of gross state product. We
use measures of annual gross state product and compute the growth rate as the change in the
log of gross state product. Since job flows are measured as of March in a given year, we use
the growth rate of gross state product in the previous year. For example, an observation of
job creation for a given state in 2010 is matched with the growth rate of gross state product
in 2009. Since housing prices are reported quarterly, no similar lag is required for house
price growth. In addition to gross state product, we also use personal income growth and
3A more complete description of the BDS and access to job flows data is available at http:/
www.census.gov/cesdataproducts/bds/.
4Housing price data may be downloaded from: http://www.fhfa.gov.
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Table 3.1: Effect of housing prices on job flows
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employment growth as alternative proxies for the state business cycle using BEA regional
data on personal income and employment.
3.2.3 Empirical Results
Aggregate Job Flows
Table 3.1 displays the coefficients of state housing price growth on job creation and job
destruction at the state-level. State job creation and job destruction are converted to logs
and detrended using a linear state-specific time trend. As Table 3.1 shows, both the OLS and
IV specifications give statistically significant coefficients for state house prices on job creation
on impact and with a lag. For job destruction, the impact effect of house prices is negative,
but the lagged coefficient is positive implying that a decline in house prices reduces lagged
job destruction. It is worth noting that since the sample ends in March 2010, our conclusions
for the effect of house prices on job flows are exploiting variation that does not include any
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of the slow recovery after the Great Recession5.
Table 3.1 also computes the sum of the coefficients on housing prices. For job creation,
the sum of the coefficients is positive and statistically significant indicating that house price
movements have a persistent effect on job creation. For job destruction, the sum of the coef-
ficients under the baseline OLS and IV specifications is not statistically different from zero.
However, excluding time fixed effects, the IV specification delivers a positive long-run coeffi-
cient for housing prices on job destruction, implying that housing price shocks diminish job
destruction. The specification without fixed effects also displays higher first stage F statistics.
While somewhat low first-stage F statistics may raise concerns about weak instruments, since
coefficients under the IV specification are higher than the OLS coefficients, our estimated
coefficients would be biased downward suggesting that we underestimate the effect of house
prices on job creation and lagged job destruction.
Category-Specific Job Flows
To further examine the effect of housing prices on job flows, we decompose the effect of
housing prices on job flows by firm size and firm age. As before, we utilize both the OLS
and IV specifications. Our OLS specification is a generalization of the state-level job flows
regression:
yiht = αi + δt + κh + γh (L)∆GSPit + βh (L)∆hpit + ￿iht
where yiht is job creation or job destruction for state i, in year t and category h. In addition
to state and time fixed effects, we include category fixed effects. In these regressions, we
allow state house prices to have differential effects on job flows across categories, and our
coefficient of interest is βh(1) - the sum of coefficients of state house prices by category.
The IV specification is analogous to the IV specification for aggregate job flows, where the
5Figure 3.1 uses a different data set, the Business Employment Dynamics, maintained by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics that is available with a shorter delay.
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Table 3.2: Effect of housing prices on job flows by initial firm size
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instrument is now national house price movements interacted with a state-category dummy:
yiht = αi + δt + κh + βh (L)∆￿hpit + ￿iht (2nd stage)
We first consider job flows by initial firm size, and consider three categories: small firms
(1-19 employees), medium-sized firms (20-99 employees), and large firms (100+ employees).
Initial firm size assigns firm size categories based on employment in the previous year to avoid
reclassification bias (see Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) for a discussion) which would
conflate job flows for firms with differing initial conditions.
Table 3.2 displays the results from the category-specific regression of job creation and
job destruction on housing prices. The table shows the sum of coefficients on state housing
prices, βh(1) under the OLS and IV specifications respectively. For job creation, middle-sized
firms exhibit the highest sensitivity to housing prices, followed by large firms and small firms
respectively. In the case of the IV specification, the coefficient of housing prices on job creation
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Table 3.3: Effect of housing prices on job flow by firm age
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for small firms is not statistically different from zero. For job destruction, the order of the
coefficients on housing prices across categories follows the same ordering as for job creation.
Job destruction for middle-sized firms display a positive coefficient on housing prices, but the
coefficient is not statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficient on job destruction for
small firms is negative and statistically significant.
Table 3.2 also shows that the difference in coefficients between middle-sized firm and small
firms is statistically significant across all specifications for both job creation and job destruc-
tion. In contrast, the difference for middle and large sized firms is generally not significant. In
summary, we find evidence that job creation at middle-sized firms is most sensitive to housing
price movements and job destruction at middle-sized firm responds negatively to a decrease
in housing prices.
We also consider job flows by firm age categories: new firms, young firms (1-5 years of
age), and mature firms (6+ years of age). These firm age categories are same categories used
in Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010). Table 3.3 shows that job creation at new firms
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Table 3.4: Effect of housing prices on firm entry and exit
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exhibit the strongest response to housing prices followed by job creation at young and mature
firms respectively, with all coefficients statistically significant under both specifications. By
definition, new firms have zero job destruction. Job destruction at young firms shows a
positive and statistically significant coefficient on housing prices, while the sensitivity of job
destruction at mature firms to housing prices is not different from zero. As the last row of
Table 3.3 shows, the difference in coefficients on job creation for new firms versus mature
firms is statistically significant, as is the difference in coefficients on job destruction for young
firms versus mature firms.
Firm Entry and Exit
In addition to documenting the effect of housing prices on job flows, we can also examine the
behavior of firm entry and exit due to housing price shocks. Firm entry or exit on the state
level is expressed in logs. The first column of Table 3.4 displays the effect of housing prices
on firm entry rates, showing a strong effect of housing price movements on on firm entry rates
under both OLS and IV specifications. The second column of Table 3.4 looks at firm death
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rates for firms 1 year of age. We find some evidence that housing price shocks initially lead to
a higher death rate but subsequently reduce death rates in the next period. This is consistent
with the effect of house price shocks on firm entry - if a negative house price shock reduces
entry on impact, then it should lower firm exits for firms 1 year of age with a lag. Similarly,
the last column of Table 3.4 provides evidence that house price shocks reduce firm exit with
a 2 period lag consistent with a strong effect of housing prices on firm entry. The sum of the
coefficients for house prices on firm exits are either poorly estimated or inconclusive in sign
providing no definitive evidence of an effect of housing prices on firm deaths.
3.3 Simple Model
In this section, we build a simple continuous time firm dynamics model to characterize the
behavior of a collateral shock on asset accumulation, employment, and job flows. This simple
model shows the mechanisms at work that causes a collateral shock to diminish employment
and job creation at young firms and middle-sized firms.
The core framework is a real business cycle model. To this we add (i) a financial friction
that limits the amount of borrowing, (ii) firm heterogeneity, (iii) a non-CRS production
technology.
The economy consists of three types of agents: households, heterogeneous firms, and
intermediaries. Each household consumes, supplies labor and trades in a market for capital.
The household consists of measure n of workers. Workers supply labor to firms and return
their wages to the household. Each firm hires workers from households and buys capital
from intermediaries to produce. Intermediaries issue one-period real risk- free bonds and rent
capital to firms. Every period σ firms die and transfer their assets to the household and σ new
firms are born; these entrepreneurs receive an initial transfer of assets from the household.
There is a single consumption good in the economy that serves as the numeraire good. There
are two types of assets in the economy: capital and the risk-free one period real bonds. Capital
can be freely converted to the consumption good and vice versa using one-to-one technology.
There is no aggregate uncertainty in the economy. The only idiosyncratic uncertainty in
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the economy is the risk of death for individual firms.
3.3.1 Households




e−ρtU [c− v (n)] dt. (3.1)
The household faces a budget constraint
a˙ = wn+ ra+Π− c, (3.2)
where r is the return on household assets a, ρ is the rate of time preference, Π is net payouts
to the household from the ownership of firms, wn is household labor income. We assume
preferences with no wealth effect on labor supply to simplify the analysis of equilibrium in
the labor market.
The household takes its initial assets and the equilibrium behavior of prices as given. In










The economy is composed of a measure 1 of firms which produce homogeneous output. Firms
behave competitively on the output, capital and labor markets. Each firm faces an exogenous
rate of exit σ in which case the firm transfers its assets to the household and disappears.
Every period σ firms exit and σ new firms are born with an initial endowment of assets a06.
Each firm has productivity of z￿, where z is common across firms while ￿ is a firm-specific
productivity. Both values are constant over time for a given firm. We assume that ￿ ∈ {￿L, ￿H}
6a0 will be chosen to match the average share of employment at new firms in the US.
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with ￿L < ￿H . We also assume that the probability of being born with a high firm-specific
productivity is µ, i.e., Pr(￿ = ￿H) = µ.
Let the firms use Λt,t+τ = e−ρτU ￿ (ct+τ ) /U ￿ (ct) as their discount factor between periods






where at+τ is wealth of the firm in period t + τ , k is the amount of capital the firm decides
to rent in period t. The firm faces two constraints. First, the wealth accumulation equation:





￿φ − rkk − wn, (3.5)
where first term z￿
￿
kαn1−α
￿φ represents diminishing-returns-to-scale production function.
The second and the third terms represents cost of capital and labor inputs respectively.
Second, the firm faces financial constraint of the following form:
k ≤ χa, (3.6)
where χ denotes the borrowing capacity which is common across firms; χ = ∞ corresponds
to frictionless capital rental markets, and χ = 1 to self-financing. This specification reflects
the prediction of financial contracts in models with limited contract enforcement. See Evans
and Jovanovic (1989) for an early use of this specification of the financial constraint7.
7From Buera and Shin (2011): “Our collateral constraint can be derived from the following limited en-
forcement problem. Consider an individual with financial wealth a ≥ 0 deposited in the financial intermediary
at the beginning of a period. Assume that the firm rents k units of capital. Then it can escape with fraction
1/λ of the rented capital. The only punishment is that the firm will lose its financial wealth a deposited in
the intermediary. In particular, the firm will not be excluded from any economic activity in the future: The
firm is even allowed to instantaneously deposit the stolen capital kα and continue operating. (This assumption
is essential for obtaining the simple static collateral constraint. If there are any dynamic considerations, the
constraint will also depend on the shock realization and its persistence.) In the equilibrium, the financial
intermediary will rent capital only to the extent that no firm will renege on the rental contract: k/λ ≤ a.”
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3.3.3 Intermediaries
Households and firms have access to competitive intermediaries that receive deposits (issue
risk-free one-period bonds) and rent out capital at rate rk to firms8. The zero profit condition
of the competitive intermediaries implies:
rk = r + δ, (3.7)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
3.3.4 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is paths for {c(t), aH(t), nH(t), aF (t), nF (t), k(t), w(t), r(t), rk(t)}∞t=0
such that
1. households optimize: solve (3.1) and (3.2) given initial level of assets aH(0) taking prices
{w(t), r(t)}∞t=0 as given
2. firms optimize: solve (3.3) - (3.5) given initial level of assets aF (0) taking prices {w(t), r(t)}∞t=0
as given
3. markets clear:











e−σtaF (t, ￿H)dt+ (1− µ)σ
￿ ∞
0
e−σtaF (t, ￿L)dt+ aH(t) for all t;




e−σtn(t, ￿H)dt+ (1− µ)σ
￿ ∞
0
e−σtn(t, ￿L)dt for all t.
8Following Buera and Shin (2011) we assume that firm cannot borrow intertemporally.
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3.3.5 Characterization
In this section we characterize the steady state equilibrium of the economy in which prices
are constant over time but firms enter and exit at rate σ.
Household optimality requires:
c˙ = − u
￿(c)
u￿￿(c)
(r − ρ), (3.8)
w = v￿(n). (3.9)
The first equation is the standard continuous time Euler equation. The second line is the
labor supply equation which equates real wage with the marginal disutility of working. See
Appendix C.1 for the derivation details. Equation (3.8) immediately implies that the real
interest rate is equal to the discount factor in the steady state, i.e., r = ρ.
To describe firm problem solution we specify the Hamiltonian for the firm’s problem:





￿φ − rkk − wn+ ra￿− η[k − χa]
The maximum principle implies:
Hk = λF [z￿αφkαφ−1n(1−α)φ − rk]− η = 0, (3.10)
Hn = λF [z￿(1− α)φkαφn(1−α)φ−1 − w] = 0, (3.11)
λ˙F = −
￿
e−σtΛ0,t + λF r + ηχ
￿
, (3.12)
k ≤ χa, η ≥ 0, η[k − χa] = 0. (3.13)
Case 1 Assume that the collateral constraint binds. This implies that η > 0 and k = χa.










Substituting optimal employment and capital in output function we can rewrite the law of
motion for assets as follows










1−φ(1−α) [1−φ(1−α)], B = rkχ−r;ψ = φα/(1−φ(1−α)) <
1.














where a0 is the initial level of wealth.
Solution a(t,χ, ￿) is monotonic in t, can be convex or concave in t, non-monotonic in χ
and increasing in ￿ (see Appendix C.1.3 for the details). Because assets and labor demand are
related by equation (3.14) the same conclusion can be reached about properties of employment.
n(t,χ, ￿) is monotonic in t, may be convex or concave in t, is non- monotonic in χ, and
increasing in ￿.
Case 2 The collateral constraint does not bind. This implies η = 0 and k < χa. Optimality





























and n(t) = min {n(t), n∗}, where k(t), n(t) are constrained optimal choice of capital and
labor. Figure 3.3 shows the firm-level employment dynamics for two firms with different level
of productivities. The more productive firm cannot achieve its optimal level immediately
and has to grow before it reaches its optimal employment level n∗(￿H). In contrast, the
low-productivity firm can immediately jump to its optimal level of employment n∗(￿L).
Figure 3.3: Firm employment dynamics
The assets of an unconstrained firm continue to grow according to a˙ = π∗ + (1 + r)a,
where π∗ is the profit level of an unconstrained firm. Figure 3.3 demonstrates the role of age
versus size in identifying the effect of a collateral shock. The collateral constraint is irrelevant
for low productivity firms; a tightening of the collateral constraint (at least locally) has no
impact on employment for these firms. In contrast, for high-productivity firms, which grow
from small to large firms, the collateral constraint impacts their rate of growth while leaving
the optimal level employment unchanged.
Let’s t denote the moment in time when a firm grows out of its financial constraint
(assuming that the firm was financially constrained at the beginning of its life). This time t





Lemma 3.2. Consider two financial constraint parameters χL,χH where χL < χH . Denote
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T (χL,χH) : k (T (χL,χH),χL) = k(T (χL,χH),χH) - that is, T (χL,χH) is the time at which
the employment path of the credit constrained high-productivity firm crosses under χL and χH
respectively. Assume that t(χL) < T (χL,χH). Then it follows:
1. n(t,χL) ≤ n(t,χH),
2. t(χH) < t(χL).
The results of the lemma are presented in Figure 3.4. The lemma shows that a collateral
shock depresses employment for the high-productivity, credit constrained firm and extends
the time it takes for the firm to reach its optimal size. As a result, employment at the high-
productivity firm is depressed at every age level after an adverse collateral shock. However,
since the optimal size of the firm is unchanged, job creation for any given firm is unchanged
over its lifecycle conditional on surviving long enough to reach its optimal size.
Figure 3.4: Firm employment dynamics: comparative statics with respect to χ
If the firm’s optimal size is left unchanged, how does a collateral shock depress job creation
and job destruction? Given the constant hazard rate of exit σ, since it takes longer to
reach optimal size, fewer firms survive, thereby lowering aggregate job creation. Since job
destruction in this model is attributable solely to firm exits, the decrease in job destruction
139
is due to fewer firms surviving to any given level of employment. It can be shown that job
destruction JD = σN where N is aggregate employment.
It is also worth noting, that an aggregate productivity shock z has a qualitatively different
effect on employment paths for firms than a collateral shock χ. A productivity shock depresses
employment at all ages; while the optimal size of the firm is independent of the collateral
constraint, productivity directly affects the optimal size. As such, a productivity shock will
affect both high and low-productivity firms, and constrained and unconstrained firms. Like
Khan and Thomas (2011), a productivity shock will interact with the financial constraints to
have asymmetric effects on firm employment across age and size categories.
Aggregate labor demand






n(t, ￿H , w, r, rk,χ)e−σtdt+ σ
￿ ∞
t







n(t, ￿L, w, r, rk,χ)e−σtdt+ σ
￿ ∞
t
n∗(￿L, w, r, rk)e−σtdt
￿
. (3.17)
In a dynamic steady state equilibrium r and rk are pinned down by the household pref-
erences. Hence, any change in χ will have a direct effect on the aggregate labor demand and
an indirect effect through an equilibrium change in wages w.
Assumption 3.1. Parameters of the model are such that in equilibria to be considered all
firms with low productivity are not credit constrained.






n(t, ￿H , w, r, rk,χ)e−σtdt+ σ
￿ ∞
t
n∗(￿H , w, r, rk)e−σtdt
￿
+ (1− µ)n∗(￿L, w, r, rk) (3.18)
Lemma 3.3.
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• (PE) Assume that w is constant and t(χL) < T (χL,χH), then Nd(w,χL) < Nd(w,χH).
• (GE + No wealth effect) Assume that t(χL) < T (χL,χH), then N(w(χL),χL) < N(w(χH),χH).
Proof : See Appendix C.1.4 for a proof. ￿
As Lemma 3 shows, under certain mild conditions, a tightening in the collateral con-
straint reduces aggregate labor demand when wages are held constant. Employment at low-
productivity firms is unchanged, while employment at the high-productivity firms falls for
firms that are credit constrained and remains unconstrained for firms with sufficient assets.
Since employment is weakly lower after the collateral shock, aggregate employment falls.
Wage adjustment partially offsets the direct effects of the collateral shock. A lower wage
raises optimal size of all firms increasing employment for unconstrained firms. So long as the
labor supply is upward-sloping, wage adjustment will not fully undo the direct effect of the
collateral shock.
3.4 Benchmark Model
In this section, we describe a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with endogenous
firm entry and exit. The agents, markets, assets and production technology are the same as in
the simple model. We add uncertainty to aggregate productivity and the collateral constraint
as well as uncertainty to firm-specific productivity.
Time is discrete and is indexed by t = 1, 2, . . .. The common component of productiv-
ity zt follows a Markov process that takes values in the set Z with conditional distribution
H(zt+1|zt). The idiosyncratic component of productivity ￿t follows a Markov process that
takes values in E and has conditional distribution G(￿t+1|￿t). Financial shock χt also follows
a Markov process with values in K and conditional distribution Q(χt+1|χt).
In addition to the aggregate states, a firm’s problem will be characterized by the firm’s
initial level of assets and its current level of idiosyncratic productivity. Thus, the aggregate
state of the economy xt consists of {zt,χt, aHt , µt}, where µt is the distribution of firms over
assets and idiosyncratic shocks and aHt is the wealth of the representative household. Observe
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that if the households were heterogenous we would need to keep track of the households
distribution over their state space. However, because households are identical they can be
summarized by a single state variable aHt .
Denote µ￿ = Γ(z,χ, aH , µ) as the law of motion for the firm distribution. Also denote
Φ(xt+1|xt) as the conditional distribution of the aggregate state. This conditional distribution
can be expressed as follows
dΦ
￿
z￿,χ￿, (aH)￿, µ￿|z,χ, aH , µ￿ =1￿µ￿ = Γ(z,χ, aH , µ)￿1￿(aH)￿ = f(z,χ, aH , µ)￿
· dH(z￿|z)dQ(χ￿|χ). (3.19)
3.4.1 Households
The household problem can be summarized as follows:
V H(a, x) = max
c,n,a￿
￿





s.t. c+ a￿ = wn+ (1 + r)a+Π.
Households choose consumption c, labor supply n, and next period assets a￿ subject to a
standard budget constraint taking firm profits as given.
3.4.2 Firms
All operating firms must pay fixed cost cF > 0 every period. The incumbent firm solves the
following problem:










s.t. a￿ = z￿
￿
kαn1−α
￿φ − rkk − wn+ (1 + r)a,
k ≤ χa.
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Incumbent firms operate a decreasing returns to scale production technology subject to id-
iosyncratic and aggregate productivity shocks. Firms choose whether to exit or maximize
a weighted average of next period assets and their continuation value, where the weight σ
reflects the exogenous probability of exit. Firms choose capital k, next period assets a￿, and
employment n subject to a standard accumulation equation for assets and the same constraint
on renting capital described in the previous section.
There are two possibilities for entry. Firstly, firms enter exogenously: each period a
measure σ of firms enter without paying the cost of entry and immediately start producing.
Secondly, measure σ0 of prospective firms can pay a fixed cost cE to enter. The firm that
enters in the current period starts producing immediately. The decision to pay cE occurs
after firms learn their current level of productivities. The value of a firm that has learned its
initial productivity ￿ is V F (￿, a0, x). Firms that pay to enter will enter if and only if:
V F (￿, a0, x) ≥ cE .
We assume that the initial productivity is drawn from stationary distribution G0(￿).
3.4.3 Intermediaries
Perfectly competitive intermediaries operate identically as described in the previous section.
The zero-profit condition for intermediaries implies:
rk = r + δ
3.4.4 Recursive Equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium is a collection of functions V H(a, x), V F (￿, a, x), c(a, x), a￿H(a, x), n(￿, a, x),
k(￿, a, x), a￿F (￿, a, x), w(x), r(x), rk(x),Γ(x),Λ(x) such that:
1. households, firms, intermediaries optimize;
2. capital, labor, goods markets clear;
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3. Γ: for all Borel E ×A ∈ R+ ×R+





dµ(￿, a)dG(￿￿|￿) (survived incumbents)
+ 1 (a0 ∈ A)σ
￿
￿∈B0(x,a0)T E dG0(￿) (exogenous entry + no exit)
+ 1 (a0 ∈ A)σ0
￿
￿∈BE(x,A)
T E dG0(￿), (endogenous entry)
where
BE(x, a0,A) = {￿ : V F (￿, a0, x) ≥ cE},
B0(x, a0) = {￿ : V F (￿, a0, x) > 0},
B(x,A) = {(￿, a) : V F (￿, a, x) > 0,π(x, ￿, a) + (1 + r(x))a ∈ A},
given µ0.
3.4.5 Stochastic Steady State without Endogenous Firms Entry and Exit
In this section we assume that cE = ∞ and cF = 0, i.e., firms enter and exit exogenously.
A stochastic steady state is an equilibrium in which there are no aggregate shocks, i.e., χ is
constant and z is constant, and prices, distribution of firms and assets of households do not
change over time.
Household optimality requires that in the steady state equilibrium the real interest rate
equals the discount factor:
1
β
= 1 + r, (3.20)
and the wage equals marginal disutility of working:
w = v￿(n) (3.21)
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z￿tφ(1− α)kαφt n(1−α)φ−1t = w. (3.23)
These conditions are the discrete time equivalent of the firm’s policy functions described in
the previous section.
3.5 Quantitative Predictions of the Model
To explore the quantitative implications of our model, we calibrate the version of our bench-
mark model without endogenous entry and exit and examine the effect of a collateral shock
in our model on job flows and the distribution of job creation and job destruction across firm
size and firm age categories.
3.5.1 Calibration Strategy and Targets
Our calibration strategy chooses several common parameters from the literature. Given that
our empirical evidence on job flows is observed in annual data, we use annual values for several
common parameters. As shown in Table 3.5, the household’s discount rate β, the depreciation
rate of capital δ, and the capital share α are all standard. The parameter φ governing the
degree of decreasing returns to scale is set at 0.95, comparable to values chosen in Cooley
and Quadrini (2001) and Khan and Thomas (2011). The Frisch elasticity ν is chosen at
two extreme values to gauge the importance of labor supply response in our quantitative
experiment. A Frisch elasticity of zero conforms to the case of a vertical labor supply curve,
while an infinite Frisch elasticity conforms to the case of a horizontal labor supply curve. In
the former case, wages adjust so that total employment is unaffected by the collateral shock.
In the latter case, wages are unchanged so employment is demand determined. In effect, this
case conforms to the partial equilibrium effect of the collateral shock or, equivalently, the
effect of a collateral shock with perfect real wage rigidity.
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Table 3.5: Calibration values
Aggregate Parameters Value
Discount rate β 0.96
Depreciation rate δ 0.1
Capital share α 0.3
Decreasing returns φ 0.95
Frisch elasticity ν 0,∞
Initial assets a0 8
Collateral constraint χ 20
It remains to choose an initial level of assets a0, the collateral constraint parameter χ,
firm exit rate σ, and a support and distribution of idiosyncratic productivity levels ￿, and a
transition process for the idiosyncratic productivity shocks. For simplicity, we assume that
firms’ idiosyncratic productivity level does not change so there are no transitory idiosyncratic
productivity shocks. We select the distribution of the idiosyncratic productivity levels to
target the distribution of employment by mature firms in the data. In our model, firm that
survive sufficiently long converge towards an optimal level of employment. We take averages
of employment share by firm size categories for firms over 21 years of age in the Business Dy-
namics Statistics from 2000-2006. We back out the implied level idiosyncratic productivity so
that the optimal employment size of the firm is at the midpoint of the employment bin range.
We target the share of employment by firm size in the data by computing the distribution
over idiosyncratic productivity levels. Table 3.6 shows the size bins used and the employment
shares that our calibration targets. The last column shows the implied distribution of firms
that matches the employment shares we are targeting.
Instead of choosing a single constant exit rate for firms, we choose time-dependent exit
rates for the first five years before a constant exit rate for firms older than five years. In
the absence of endogenous entry and exit, the firm’s policy functions and the steady state
are unaffected by this assumption. We choose entry and exit rates to match the empirical
age distribution of firms using 2000-2006 averages from the BDS. Table 3.7 provides the age
distribution of firms and the distribution implied by our calibration. By construction, the
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empirical distribution and model distribution match for firms age 0-5, but differs for older
ages when a constant exit rate is assumed. The exit rate for firms older than age 5 is σ = 0.069
and implies a model age distribution that does well in matching the empirical distribution.
Table 3.6: Idiosyncratic shock calibration











The final parameters that we choose are the initial level of assets a0 and the collateral
constraint parameter χ. We jointly choose these parameters shown in Table 3.5 to best match
the distribution of employment by firm age and size. The empirical and model distributions
are shown in Table 3.8. Our calibration closely matches the age distribution of employment
and does a reasonable job matching the size distribution of employment. Our calibration
has a somewhat lower distribution of employment among new and younger middle-sized and
larger firms and consequently too large employment share for small firms.
3.5.2 Collateral Shock Experiment
We consider the effect of a 20% tightening of the collateral constraint parameter from χ = 20
to χ = 16. This tightening roughly conforms to the magnitude of the drop experienced in
US housing prices during the Great Recession. Table 3.9 displays the effect of this shock on
the distribution of job creation and job destruction by firm age and size categories. The top
panel shows the effect of the collateral shock on job creation and the bottom panel shows the
effect on job destruction. The first three columns show job flows as a percentage of total labor
supply: the first column is the baseline, the second column reflects the case of a horizontal
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Table 3.7: Exit rate calibration












demand curve and shows the effect when wages do not adjust, the third column shows the
effect of wage adjustment on job flows when labor supply is vertical and wages adjust to
ensure the same level of employment as in the baseline case. The last two columns express
columns two and three as a percentage of the baseline (first column).
As the first row shows, the collateral shock depresses overall job creation and job destruc-
tion (in steady state job creation equals job destruction). Even with a fall in wages that
ensures the same level of total employment, overall job creation still falls. This is due to the
fact that firm exit rates are declining with age. A fall in wages raises the optimal size of
mature firms, which raises their employment demand, but the tighter credit constraint lowers
job creation among new and young firms. As a result, job creation falls even though wages
adjust to ensure the same level of employment.
Effect on Job Creation
The effect of the collateral shock for job creation by age and size largely mirrors the empirical
patterns we document. For firm age categories, younger firms exhibit the greatest response
to a collateral shock followed by new firms and mature firms. This ordering differs from
our empirical work where new firms exhibited the greatest decline in job creation followed
by young and mature firms respectively. However, the absence of an active entry margin
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Table 3.8: Distribution of employment by firm size and age
1-19 emps 20-99 emps 100+ Total
Births 1.5 0.8 0.6 2.8
1-5 years 5.7 3.4 3.0 12.1
6+ years 12.1 13.6 59.3 85.0
Total 19.3 17.8 62.9
1-19 emps 20-99 emps 100+ Total
Births 2.9 0.2 0.0 3.0
1-5 years 6.1 6.1 1.6 13.7
6+ years 11.1 15.6 56.6 83.2
Total 20.0 21.8 58.2
Business Dynamics Statistics, 2000-2006
Baseline Calibration
in our calibration is likely crucial for this discrepancy. Given our results on firm entry and
house prices, an active entry margin should increase the sensitivity of job creation among
new firms. In the absence of wage adjustment, all age categories experience a decrease in
job creation. Job creation falls the most for young firms due to binding collateral constraint,
while job creation falls least for mature firms since job creation is simply delayed due to a
collateral shock. In the partial equilibrium case, optimal size is unchanged so even with a
tighter constraint surviving firms still ultimately create the same number of jobs.
For firm size categories, our model with wage adjustment matches the ordering of sen-
sitivity across size categories with middle-sized firms experiencing the biggest decline in job
creation relative followed by large firms and small firms respectively. Moreover, in the case of
small firms, a collateral shock generates either a small decline or an increase in job creation
in the partial equilibrium and general equilibrium cases respectively. Our empirical evidence
on job creation by small firms showed a response to housing price shocks that was not sta-
tistically different from zero. A collateral shock has a stronger effect on medium-sized and
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Aggregate 8.09 7.27 7.70 90 95
Births 38 33 35 89 94
1-5 years 24 18 20 76 84
6+ years 39 39 44 100 113
1-19 emps 37 37 39 98 105
20-99 emps 20 18 19 86 94








1-5 years 25 22 23 87 93
6+ years 75 68 76 91 101
1-19 emps 25 25 28 102 112
20-99 emps 24 21 22 86 92
100+ emps 51 44 49 86 96
Si
ze







large firms because the collateral constraint is more relevant to these firms in comparison to
small firms. Low productivity firms need not accumulate a great deal of assets to achieve
their optimal size, while high productivity firms must wait to accumulate capital to achieve
optimal size. These higher productivity firms transit through the middle-sized employment
category and therefore exhibit the effects of a tighter collateral constraint on their growth
rates. When wages adjust, the effect on large firms is partially offset by increased job creation
among unconstrained firms - lower wages imply larger optimal size and increases job creation
among these high productivity, unconstrained firms.
Effect on job destruction
Our model also does a good job of matching the empirical patterns of housing prices on job
destruction. Job destruction falls for young firms relative to mature firms, consistent with the
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empirical ordering we documented. Moreover, in the general equilibrium case, job destruction
among mature firms increases relative to baseline, consistent with the insignificant estimates
for job destruction in our firm age regressions. Given that young firms become smaller after
the collateral shock, the jobs destroyed by these firms when they exit also fall. In other words,
since these firms create fewer jobs, they also destroy fewer jobs when they exit. In contrast,
since mature firms continue to grow to their optimal size, job destruction falls by less for this
category. There are two competing effects in the general equilibrium case: given exogenous
exit rates, fewer firms survive to their optimal size reducing job destruction, however, as wages
fall, optimal size increases leading to greater job destruction for firms that exit after reaching
their optimal size.
For firm size categories, we find declines in job destruction for middle-sized and large
firms while an increase in job destruction for small firms. This ordering is consistent with our
empirical evidence and consistent with the finding that collateral shocks raise job destruction
for small firms. The ordering and signs are also consistent across both partial equilibrium
and general equilibrium cases. Job destruction falls for middle-sized and larger firms because
constrained firms become smaller after a collateral shock, while unconstrained firms do not
become bigger. As a result, higher productivity firms spend a longer period of time as smaller
firms. When these firms exit, this decreases job destruction among middle-sized firms but
increases job destruction for small firms. In general equilibrium, lower wages offset this
effect for the highest productivity firms mitigating the effect of the collateral shock on job
destruction for large firms relative to middle-sized firms.
3.6 Conclusion
The US housing crisis has raised concerns the depressed real estate values may inhibit firm
formation and expansion, disrupting the process of innovation and labor market turnover that
characterizes a healthy economy. An extensive literature has documented the importance of
real estate collateral for new firms to obtain lending and for small businesses to obtain financ-
ing for expansion. Moreover, recent work also documents the disproportionate contribution of
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new and young firms to overall labor market turnover. Given these facts, it stands to reason
that job flows may be particularly sensitive to a decline in collateral values.
In this paper, we provide support for this hypothesis illustrating the empirical and the-
oretical link between job flows and housing prices. Using state- level variation in job flows
and housing prices, we show that both job creation and lagged job destruction decline in
response to fall in housing prices. We control for aggregate demand effects by introducing
direct controls for the business cycle and using a land supply elasticity approach common in
the empirical literature on the real effects of collateral shocks. We also document size and age
patterns in the sensitivity of job flows to housing prices, showing that job flows for new and
young firms (0-5 years of age) are most sensitive to housing prices shocks as are job flows for
medium-sized firms (20-99 employees).
We build a simple firm dynamics model with collateral constraints and examine the effect
of a collateral shock on job flows and the distribution of job flows by firm size and age.
We show analytically in a simple version of our model that a collateral shock must reduce
employment, job creation and job destruction, and demonstrate why a collateral shock should
have stronger effects for young firms and medium-sized firms. We calibrate our benchmark
model to match the distribution of employment by firm size and age seen in the data. Our
calibrated model replicates the empirical pattern of job flow sensitivity to a collateral shock
by firm size and age categories.
Future work will extend our numerical work to include transitory productivity shocks to
match the overall level of job flows and better match the distribution of job flows across age
and size categories. Given the importance of house prices on firm entry, we will also extend
our quantitative work to include an endogenous entry margin. Moreover, examination of the
transition path under a collateral shock may provide further clues about whether a collateral
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In this section, I briefly consider fiscal policy in a model where a subset of the population
operates as rule of thumb agents who simply consume current income each period and a model
where agents face a borrowing constraint. This section relates to a literature on fiscal policy
and rule of thumb agents developed by Mankiw (2000) and Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles
(2007), and a literature examining the effects of monetary policy when agents face borrowing
constraints such as Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli (2009). As this section illustrates, the
credit spread model considered in this paper can easily be related to rule of thumb or borrowing
constraint models and, therefore, the policy implications are likely to carry over to a broader
class of DSGE models.
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A.1.1 Rule of Thumb Agents
Rule of thumb agents face a static optimization problem and choose hours period-by-period
facing a simple budget constraint with consumption equal to current disposable income:
Uc (Cyt , N
y
t )Wt = −Uh (Cyt , Nyt ) (A.1)
Cyt = WtN
y
t − Tt (A.2)
Log-linearizing these equilibrium conditions and combining with the equilibrium conditions
for the firms and saver households discussed earlier delivers a closed form solution for output
in terms of government purchases and taxes:
yt =
α￿
α+ scσ(1− α) + sc 1−sy1−ly σsϕs − sc(1− α)φυ
￿gt
− αφY /σycy￿






















The multiplier on government spending has several terms similar to the multiplier derived in
Section 5, with the parameters φ and υ as the new terms. For Frisch elasticies less than unity,
υ < 1, and for households with sufficient symmetry, φ ≈ 0. Therefore, a tax reduction for
the borrower household has negligible effect on output for plausible calibrations, and the gov-
ernment spending multiplier remains below unity, consistent with the numerical experiments
shown in Figure 1. Intuitively, a transfer from one household to the other has offsetting effects
on the labor supply of each household, leaving total labor supply relatively unchanged and,
therefore, output unchanged. To the extent that φ > 0, tax rebates will be expansionary and
the government spending multiplier will be larger than in the representative agent benchmark.
Under sticky prices, analytical solutions with rule of thumb agents can be obtained under
the assumption of GHH preferences or wage rigidity that eliminates a labor supply effect. For
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simplicity and comparability to the rest of the paper, I consider the case of rigid wages. The
Phillips curve from Section 4.2 obtains along with an intertemporal IS curve of the form:





















(1− α) yt + βEtπt+1
The last term in the IS equation can be treated as equivalent to the credit spread ωt, and
responds to both changes in income and transfers. A temporary increase in transfers that is
gradually withdrawn, as in the case of a debt-financed tax rebate, is equivalent to a fall in
the credit spread that eventually becomes positive as the transfer turns negative when taxes
are raised to return the public debt to its steady state. Relative to the credit spread model,
transfers appear directly in the intertemporal IS equation instead of operating indirectly
through private sector debt. As before, when monetary policy is unconstrained, the Phillips
curve is unchanged and monetary policy is free to target any combination of inflation and
output subject to the Phillips curve tradeoff.
When monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound, both purchases and trans-
fers may be used for stabilization and an explicit tax rebate multiplier can be derived when
there is a constant probability that the shock causing the zero lower bound to bind disappears.
While a financial shock no longer appears because of the absence of intermediation, any of
the shocks that cause the zero lower bound to bind in representative agent models - like a
discount rate shock - would suffice here1. The solution for output at the zero lower bound is
1We can easily reintroduce the financial shock and credit spread by simply adding a measure of rule-





t + (1− ηs − ηb)Cyt . As before, under the assumption of zero debt elasticity of the credit spread,
the log-linearized economy at the zero lower bound is summarized by an aggregate intertemporal IS curve
and the standard Phillips curve. Moreover, in a lifecycle model with distinct borrowing and credit spreads,
the stochastic steady state would be characterized by saver households, borrower households, and households
living in autarky.
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similar to the solution derived in Section 6 with the addition of a multiplier on the tax rebate:
yzlb = ν∗g (gzlb − taxzlb)− ζ
ν∗g =
(1− ρ) (1− βρ)
(1− ρ) (1− βρ) ￿1− incy 1α￿− sc (1− sb)σs κα (1− α) ρ
where incy is the rule-of-thumb agents share of wage income in national income. Comparison
to the multiplier derived in section 6 reveals that the multiplier νg may be higher or lower;
the effect of higher inflation reducing real interest rates (the last term in the denominator) is
attenuated relative to the saver/borrower model while the presence of rule-of-thumb agents
raises the direct effect of government spending on the consumption of rule-of-thumb agents
(the incy term) and the multiplier. Unlike an old-style Keynesian model, the government
spending multiplier and tax rebate multiplier are the same, and the balanced budget multiplier
is zero.
The reason the multiplier is the same for both government spending and tax rebates is
that both affect the savers consumption in the same way. A rise in government spending or
equivalent fall in tax rebates raises aggregate demand by the same amount, and equilibrium in
the goods market requires either a rise in output or a fall in the savers consumption induced
by a rise in the real interest rate. With the nominal rate held constant and no direct effect of
either policy on the Phillips curve, the savers consumption response is the same and, therefore,
the output multiplier is the same for each policy. When the government’s budget is balanced,
the aggregate demand effects cancel out and the savers consumption decision is unchanged.
Finally, it’s worth relating this equilibrium analysis of the zero lower bound with rule-
of-thumb agents to the extensive literature on the determinants of consumption and the
aggregate consumption function where the real interest rate is taken as fixed and exogenous2.
The multipliers attached to any particular fiscal policy are heavily dependent on the behavior
of the real interest rate, and therefore conclusions regarding fiscal multipliers are inherently
general equilibrium questions. In the same way that the credit spread - absent wealth effects
2See for example Carroll (2001) and Kaplan and Violante (2011).
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- does not alter the Phillips curve, a more complex (and realistic) theory of consumption is
unlikely to alter the effects of fiscal policy away from the zero lower bound. Unless fiscal
stabilization has large effects on the production side of the economy - that is, incentives to
supply labor and capital - monetary policy can achieve the same aggregate demand objectives
of fiscal policy away from the zero lower bound. The nature of the aggregate consumption
function will only become relevant at the zero lower bound where fiscal policies that have
larger affect on desired consumption will be preferred to policies with a smaller effect.
A.1.2 Borrowing Constrained Agents
A broad range of models consider a class of agents that are constrained either by an exogenous
or endogenous borrowing constraint but assume a single rate for lending and borrowing funds.
These model often assume that the borrowing constraint binds at all times and solve for the
dynamics of the model by log-linearizing around a binding constraint. Relative to the rule of

















Bt−1 = WtN bt +Bt
Bt ≥ B
To a log-linear approximation, the borrower’s budget constraint differs from the rule-of-thumb
budget constraint only by including the lagged interest rate. If steady state interest payments
are small, this term can be safely disregarded and the fiscal multipliers obtained in Section
7.1 remain a good approximation in the case of exogenous constraints. Without further
assumptions on the model, a general characterization of fiscal multipliers with an endogenous
borrowing constraint is difficult.
Under sticky prices and a demand driven labor market, a similar Phillips curve and in-
tertemporal IS curve determine output and inflation. When borrowers are constrained by
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an endogenous or exogenous constraint, their optimal choice of borrowing is governed by an







where the Lagrange multiplier represents the shadow price of the constraint. Since the con-
straint is assumed to be always binding for sufficiently small shocks, the borrower’s Euler
equation can be log-linearized and summed with the saver’s Euler equation to obtain an
intertemporal IS curve of the form:





As before, the last term can be regarded as the credit spread, and changes in fiscal policy
will shift the credit spread depending on the nature of the borrowing constraint. Importantly,
the multiplier is likely to be changed by policy given that any change in income, wages, or
taxes will affect the shadow price of the borrowing constraint. Though the mapping of a
borrowing constraint model into the credit spread model will depend on further assumptions,
the insights on fiscal policy from the credit spreads model should carry over to alternative
models of borrowing and lending.
A.1.3 Housing and Credit Spreads
I maintain the assumption of patient and impatient households, but I now assume a single
market interest rate for savers and households. Instead of a credit spread, impatient household
are constrained to borrow only a possibly time-varying fraction of the value of their residence.
The impatient household’s chooses :






















Relative to the equilibrium conditions in Section 1.3, the Euler equation changes and a housing
















Furthermore, if impatient households are the only agents that demand housing services and
the supply of housing is fixed, the housing Euler equation will determine the market-clearing
price of housing. We can log-linearize the model around a steady state assuming that the
collateral constraint is always binding. Under these assumptions, an aggregate IS equation of
the same form as the rule-of-thumb case emerges. To a log-linear approximation:


























(1− α) yt + βEtπt+1
The preceding equations along with a monetary policy rule do not fully specify the equilibrium
of the economy; the borrower household’s Euler equation and housing Euler equation are
needed to determine the dynamics of housing prices and the Lagrange multiplier on the
borrowing constraint.
The growth rate of borrower’s consumption takes the place of the credit spread in the





= γyEt (yt+1 − yt)− γtaxEt (taxt+1 − taxt)
+γb (Etχt+1 − (2 + r)χt + (1 + r)χt−1)
+γb (Etqt+1 − (2 + r) qt + (1 + r) qt−1)
where γy, γtax, and γb are the appropriate constants. An exogenous tightening of the collateral
constraint can be represented as a fall in χt and, ignoring the equilibrium dynamics of housing
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prices, will act like an increase in the credit spread so long as the stochastic process for χt
is dominated by the middle term for some period of time. In particular, an AR(3) process
of χt could generate an AR(1) process for the “interest-rate” shock represented by borrower
consumption growth in the aggregate IS equation.
The inclusion of housing dynamics further complicates matters since simply a fall in hous-
ing prices does not guarantee at rise in borrower consumption growth beyond the initial
period. Nevertheless, it appears plausible that a collateral shock could cause act in the same
manner as a credit spread shock in the aggregate IS equation even with endogenous house
prices. Stronger conclusions require greater structure placed on the saver household’s demand
for housing and residential investment which will both determine the market clearing housing
price.
A.2 Equivalence with Overlapping Generations Model
In this section, I show that the steady state of the model with infinitely-lived agents with
differing degrees of time preference is isomorphic to the steady state of a model with finitely
lived agents who share the same rate of time preference but differ in effective labor over the
life cycle.
Household live T periods with variation in the disutility of labor supply over the life cycle,
and each generation that dies in a period is replaced by a generation of equal measure in
the next period so that the total population is constant. Household choose consumption,
hours worked, and whether to borrow or save in each period. Formally, for each generation
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βt {u (Ct(i))− θi}












where θi is an exogenous process for effective labor supply that captures the hump-shaped
profile of earnings over the lifecycle. The household is prohibited from borrowing in the final
period of life. The first-order conditions characterizing the household’s optimal consumption
and savings decisions are given below:
uc (Ct(i), Nt(i)) = λt(i) (A.3)











+ φdt (i) (A.6)
λT−i(i) = −φbT−i(i) (A.7)
λT−i(i) = φdT−i(i) (A.8)
φbt(i)Bt(i) = 0 (A.9)
φdt (i)Dt(i) = 0 (A.10)
Household optimality requires that households do not borrow or save in the final period.
Subtracting the Euler equation for borrowing from the Euler equation for deposits shows that











I consider a steady allocation of consumption, borrowing and labor supply across genera-
tions where wages, interest rates, and the price level are constant, and assume that the utility
functions and distribution of θi over the generations are sufficient to guarantee that a steady
state exists.
The firm’s problem, the intermediaries problem, fiscal policy, and monetary policy are









A steady state of the overlapping generations model with credit frictions is a set of
aggregate quantities
￿
Y , N, C, F , K, Πf
￿
, a distribution of consumption, labor supply,
deposits and borrowings over generations
￿







, a set of prices￿
W, Π, id, ω, MC
￿
, a fiscal policy
￿
Bg, T , G, reb
￿
that jointly satisfy the steady state ver-
sions of:
1. Household optimality conditions (A.3) - (A.10)
2. Household budget constraints
3. Firm optimality conditions in (1.15)
4. Government budget constraint, fiscal rule, and solvency condition (1.10)
5. Monetary policy rule (1.13)
6. Market-clearing conditions
Given a definition for the steady state of the overlapping generations model, for suitable
choices of the distribution of θi and other model parameters, the steady state of the infinite
horizon model is equivalent to the steady state of the overlapping generations model.
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Proposition A.1. Consider a steady state of the overlapping generations model. There exists
a set of discount rates and functions for household utility that give the provide steady state in
the infinite horizon model.
Proof. Since the firm’s problem, intermediaries’ problem, fiscal and monetary policy are un-
changed in the overlapping generation model, a steady state in the OLG model satisfies parts
3-5 of the steady state version of the definition of an equilibrium in the infinite horizon model.
It remains to show that household optimality conditions and market clearing conditions may
be satisfied.
Let Ω is the set of borrowers in i￿ {0, 1, . . . T}. Savers and borrowers consumption and
labor supply can be defined in the OLG model and will satisfy the corresponding market

























For suitable definitions of the utility functions for each household, household’s labor supply

















Under the assumption that firm profits are only paid to savers and the assumption that θi
implies only one switch from borrowing to saving midway through the lifecycle, summing the
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Finally, the interest rate and borrowing rate from the OLG model determine the discount





































Law of motion for public sector and private sector debt:



























Kt = λstYt + θβEtΠ
ν−1
t+1Kt+1


















t (1 + idt−1)
Credit spread determination:







Yt = ηCbt + (1− η)Cst +Gt




















Sectoral Shocks, the Beveridge
Curve and Monetary Policy
B.1 Model Details
B.1.1 Household’s Problem















(Wi,tNi,t +Πi,t) +Bt − EtQt,t+1Bt+1, (λ1,t)
Ni,t = (1− δi)Ni,t−1 + pi,t(Li,t −Ni,t−1), (λ2,t,i)
K￿
i=1
Li,t = 1. (λ3,t)
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The optimality condition with respect to consumption index is
uc(Ct, Nt) = λ1,tPt. (B.1)
The first order condition with respect to Bt+1 in any possible state at t+1, taking into account












The optimality condition with respect to labor force in sector i is
λ2,t,ipi,t = λ3,t +R2(Li,t−1, Li,t) + βEtR1(Li,t, Li,t+1) (B.3)
The optimality condition with respect to the employed labor in sector i can be written as
follows
λ2,t,i = uN (Ct, Nt) + λ1,tWi,t + βEt [(1− δi − pi,t+1)λ2,t+1,i] . (B.4)
Note that λ2,t,i represents the utility value of additional employed worker in sector i for the
household conditional on the equilibrium path of wages {Wi,t}∞t=0.
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B.1.2 Retailer’s Problem
The retailers problem is similar to the standard specification in Woodford (2003). Monopo-
listically competitive retailers set prices to maximize profits:
max
Pt(l)




T−t [Pt(l)− PfT ]YT (l),






where Pt (l) is the nominal price chosen by retailer that sells differentiated good l and who faces
a downward sloping demand schedule and discount future profits by the nominal stochastic
discount factor Qt,T . Parameter χ is the Calvo parameter governing the degree of price



























The inflation rate is derived from the Calvo assumption with a fraction 1 − χ of firms
resetting their prices to Pt (l) /Pt:
Pt =
￿




In a zero inflation steady state, a log-linearization of these equilibrium conditions delivers
the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve.
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B.2 Additional Proofs
For several proofs, we will refer repeatedly to the equilibrium conditions that determine the
steady state Beveridge curve and the natural rate of unemployment in the K-sector model.
A solution of the multisector model with “fast-moving” labor markets is a value for aggregate
output Yt, real marginal cost Pft/Pt, consumption Ct, state-variables in the retailers pricing
problemKt, Ft and sectoral prices and quantities {Yi,t, Ni,t, Ui,t, Vi,t, Pi,t/Pt,Wi,t/Pt, pi,t, qi,t}Ki=1







































⇒ Yi,t = ￿φi,t ￿A1−ηi,t Yt￿Pi,tPft
￿−η
, (B.7)









[1− β (1− δi)] , (B.9)
Wi,t
Pt






















and the following dynamic conditions:








ζ − 1uc(Ct, Nt)
Pft
Pt
Yt + βχEtΠζt+1Kt+1, (B.15)




(1 + idt )/Πt+1, (B.17)




in terms of the exogenous variables: aggregate productivity At, government spending Gt, and
sector-specific productivity and demand
￿ ￿Ai,t, ￿φi,t￿K−1
i=1
. We consider either the case of no
reallocation or the case of costless reallocation. With no reallocation
Li,t = Ni,t−1 + Ui,t (B.19)
and with costless reallocation
1 = Nt + Ut, (B.20)
Vi,t/Ui,t = Vj,t/Uj,t, for i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,K. (B.21)
B.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2
To that aggregate productivity shocks At trace out the same Beveridge curve as government
spending shocks Gt, we must show that for any value of the government spending shock
Gt, there exists an aggregate productivity shock At that implies the same level of aggregate




Observe that equations (B.5) and (B.7) - (B.9) can be combined to derive the following
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modified sectoral demand conditions and vacancy posting conditions:




















[1− β (1− δi)] . (B.23)
Collectively, equations (B.10) - (B.13) forK sectors, theK equations (B.19) (or (B.20) and
(B.21)), and theK equations in (B.22) and (B.23) define the quantities
￿




as a function of {Pft/Pt, At}. Thus, aggregate vacancies and unemploy-
ment are the same conditional on the same combinations of Pft/Pt, an endogenous variable,
and At, an exogenous variable. The absence of wealth effects on labor supply is important,
otherwise household consumption Ct would tie these equations back to the rest of the equi-
librium conditions.
Since vacancies and unemployment are functions solely of AtPft/Pt, any combinations
of Gt and At that implies the same value for marginal cost times aggregate productivity
implies the same values for vacancies and unemployment. Define the function PfP (G, A) as
the endogenous value of real marginal cost for different combinations of the aggregate shocks











Then, it follows that:
V
￿
G, 1, { ￿A}Ki=1, {￿φ}Ki=1￿ = V ￿G0, A, { ￿A}Ki=1, {￿φ}Ki=1￿ ,
U
￿
G, 1, { ￿A}Ki=1, {￿φ}Ki=1￿ = U ￿G0, A, { ￿A}Ki=1, {￿φ}Ki=1￿ .
￿
B.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4
We show that under perfect substitutability, sectoral employment has a factor representation
in terms of the exogenous sectoral productivity process. Under perfect reallocation, the
relative price of goods across sectors must be equalized. From equation (B.6), Pi/P = µ−1
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for all sectors i = 1, 2, . . . ,K. For simplicity, assume no aggregate demand shocks and set




[1− β (1− δi)] .
Log-linearizing equations (50) - (55) and combining, we have:
ai,t = (1− si) α˜iLi/U i1− α nit,
where si is the steady state surplus and α˜i is a composite parameter that depends on the
matching function elasticity α and other matching function parameters when bargaining power
is nonzero. The diagonal matrix H is obtained by simply inverted the expression to solve for
sectoral employment.
￿
B.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2.6
In this proof, we show that sector-specific shocks raise the natural rate of unemployment
and shift outward the Beveridge curve in the absence of labor market reallocation. We be-
gin by listing the equilibrium conditions that determine aggregate employment. Under the
assumption of no heterogeneity in matching function efficiencies or separation rates, the sys-
tem of equations determining employment are given by the following conditions where time














ANi = φ˜iY Aηg (θi)−η
δNi = ϕθ1−αi (Li −Ni)
where g is an increasing and concave function of sectoral labor market tightness. These 2K+1
equations determine equilibrium output Y , sectoral employment Ni, and sectoral labor market
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tightness θi in terms of the labor force distribution Li taken as given and constant, sectoral
shocks φ˜i, and an aggregate productivity shock A that traces out the Beveridge curve.



















































, an expression of aggregate employment N , sectoral employment shares
ni, and the distribution of the labor force Li. The function h is defined in terms of the function






where g is given by:





θα (1− β (1− δ)) + ν
1− ν κβθ
It is readily shown that h is a decreasing and strictly convex function for standard assumptions
on the matching function parameters which ensure the coefficients on the polynomial terms
of θ in the function g are positive.
Let N0 be the level of employment when Li = φ˜i and let N1 be the level of employment
when Li ￿= φ˜i. When Li = φ˜i, labor market tightness θi is equalized across sectors and the






































where the first strict inequality follows from the strict convexity of h and the fact for some
sectors i and j, it must be the case that xi ￿= xj . The second equality follows from the
definition of xi.
The left-hand side of the previous equation is bounded above by 1. This can be shown by
considering the cases of η < 1 and η > 1 separately, and applying the properties of convex or
















￿1/η ηη−1 ≤ 1
and vice versa in the case of η > 1.















− 1 < 1
N1
− 1
⇒ N0 > N1
and the natural rate of unemployment must rise in the case that Li ￿= φ˜i as required.
It can be readily verified that when Li = φ˜i, then Ni = φ˜iN with aggregate tightness and
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employment implicitly defined by the following equations:




Since sectoral shocks do not appears in these equations, aggregate shocks keep tightness
equalized across sectors even if reallocation is costly. To show that vacancies rise under a
sector-specific shock, we derive an expression for aggregate vacancies in terms of aggregate




























. Define the share of employment in a given sector
under the sectoral shock as ni = N ￿i/N ￿ and ratio of labor to employment as li = Li/N ￿ =































































where the first inequality follows from the strict convexity of the inverse labor market tightness
and the last equality follows from the fact that N ￿ = N , which follows from the assumption
that unemployment is equalized.
￿
B.2.4 Proof of Proposition 2.7
Under costless reallocation, the equations determining the steady state Beveridge curve in a


























+ (1− nA) δBϕB
￿￿
(B.27)
where gi (θ) = z + 11−ν
κ
ϕi
θα (1− β (1− δi)). Hiring costs are increasing and strictly concave
in θ. Moreover, the condition ϕA > ϕB (or δA < δB) is a sufficient condition for gA ≤ gB for
θ ≥ 0 with gA = gB at θ = 0. The ratio gA/gB = 1 at θ = 0 and limθ→∞gA/gB = ϕB/ϕA < 1.
We must first show that, if φ˜￿ > φ˜, then N ￿ > N . For equation (B.25), if φ˜ → φ˜￿, then
holding constant θ, the RHS of equation (B.25) falls. Thus θ￿ > θ. If we show that n￿A > nA,
then it must be the case that N ￿ > N . Since gA/gB is monotonic and decreasing, if θ → θ￿,
then n￿A > nA using equation (B.26) since the ratio gA/gB is less then 1 and falling and
φ˜￿ > φ˜. Thus, we conclude that N ￿ > N and the natural rate of unemployment falls.
To show that the Beveridge curve shifts, we consider the implied level of vacancies for























+ (1− nA) δBϕB
￿
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where the bar superscript signifies the sector-specific shock. It cannot be the case that θ = θ,
since equation (B.26) would not be satisfied. If θ < θ, then nA > nA. Taking ratios of












which is a contradiction since the ratio gA/gB is decreasing in tightness. Therefore, it must be
the case that θ > θ and nA < nA. Under costless reallocation, vacancies simply V = θ(1−N).








and the Beveridge curve shifts inward.
￿
B.2.5 Proof of Proposition 2.8
Holding constant {Ai, φi}Ki=1, we define V (G, z) and U (G, z) as aggregate vacancies and
unemployment for given values of the government spending shock G and the common reser-





= U (1, z).
The government spending shock only affect vacancies and unemployment via the real




. Relative prices are equalized in steady state since sectoral
productivities and hiring costs are equalized. Therefore, the surplus in each sector is the same:
Pi
P
Ai = z + g (θi)
µ−1A− z = g (θ)
For each sector θ = g
￿
µ−1A− z￿−1 where g is an increasing and concave function. If µ = µ,
then z = A−￿µ−1A− z￿ ensures the same labor market tightness in each sector when µ−1 = 1,
which is the case of no government spending shocks, and tightness is invariant to combinations
of µ and z. As a result, aggregate vacancies and unemployment are equalized as required.
If labor reallocation is costless, then Proposition 2.3 applies. However, in the absence of
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labor reallocation, sectoral shocks will shift the same Beveridge curve as shown in Proposition
2.6. Therefore, the fact that two aggregate shocks, government spending shocks and reserva-
tion wage shocks, trace out the same Beveridge curve does not follow because no shocks shift
the Beveridge curve.
￿
B.2.6 Proof of Proposition 2.9
We compute the balanced growth path of the multisector model with costless reallocation. We
proceed by stating the equilibrium conditions and solving the model. Under the assumptions
in Proposition 9, the model equilibrium conditions given by (B.5) - (B.13) and (B.19) or

































At = Wt +
κt
ϕ
θαt (1− β (1− δ))







1− β ￿1− δ − ϕθ1−αt ￿￿
Yt = Ct + κtVt
θt = Vt/Ut
1 = Nt + Ut








Since hiring costs are equalized, it must be the case that P˜it/Pt = 1 and Nit/Nt =
φ˜it. Combining the vacancy-posting condition, Nash-bargained wages and the assumption for
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vacancy costs, we obtain the following:














This vacancy posting condition combined with labor market clearing and the definition of
market tightness jointly determine labor market variables N, U, V, θ where the time subscript
is dropped since none of these variables is a function of exogenous variables that change over
time: namely At and Lt.
Since growth in the labor force is modeled as a net addition of new households, the
labor market variables have a per capita interpretation and each variable grows at the rate
gl = ∆L/L. Thus, the unemployment rate, vacancy rate, and employment rate are constant.
It is straightforward to compute the growth rates of per household output, consumption and
wages given the resulting expressions:
Yt = AtN
Yt = Ct + κtV







1− β ￿1− δ − ϕθ1−α￿￿
with gy = gc = gw = gA.
However, these growth rates are constant only in the special case when sectoral productiv-
ities are equalized and grow at the same rates. Since the expression for aggregate productivity
is a sum, different growth rates across sectors will generally change the growth rate of aggre-
gate productivity. Moreover, changes in preference shares over time will also alter productivity
growth rates. If all structural change is driven by changes in product shares, all per capita
growth rates are zero and all aggregates grow only with the labor force. Employment shares
will mirror their productivity-adjusted product shares along the growth path.
More generally, if sectoral TFP growth rates differ, then output, consumption and wage
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growth will be asymptotically constant. If η > 1, then limt→∞∆A/A = γmax where γmax is
the TFP growth rate of the fastest growing sector. Alternatively, if η < 1, then the opposite
holds and TFP growth converges to the growth rate of the slowest growing sectors. These
results are analogous to the asymptotic growth rates computed in Acemoglu and Guerrieri
(2008). If η = 1, the TFP aggregator is Cobb-Douglas and the aggregate TFP growth rate is
a weighted average of each sector’s TFP growth rate.
￿
B.3 Calibration and Model-Based Measures
B.3.1 Structural Factor Analysis
To a log-linear approximation, sectoral employment can be expressed by solving the equations
that determine the steady state Beveridge curve in our model (shown at the beginning of the
appendix):
Mnt = Hat = H (Φzt + ￿t)
where nt = (n1,t, . . . , nK,t)
￿
is the vector of log-linearized sectoral employment expressed in
terms of the exogenous variables, the vector at = (a1,t, . . . , aK,t)
￿
of sectoral productivity
shocks. As argued, the exogenous sectoral productivity process can be decomposed into its
first principal component and a vector of sectoral shocks ￿t = (￿1t, . . . , ￿Kt)
￿
with cov (zt, ￿i,t) =
0 for ∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
The matrixM is determined by the model parameters and the steady state values of labor
market variables. To compute this matrix, it is necessary to choose parameters and solve for
the model steady state. We calibrate an 11-sector version of our model where the sectors
conform to the NAICS supersectors for which there is readily available data on employment,
unemployment and vacancies. Our reduced form sector-specific shock index was computed
using 13 NAICS sectors, but we use only 11 sectors since retail trade, wholesale trade, trans-
portation and utilities are combined into a single sector in the data on unemployment and
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vacancies from the CPS and JOLTs respectively.
To calibrate the 11 sector version of the model, some parameters are chosen directly
while some parameters are chosen to match targets. As in the calibrations shown earlier,
the household’s discount rate β, matching function elasticity α, and bargaining power ν are
all set to the values described in Section 2.5.1. Separation rates for the 11 sectors are set
to match the 2000-2006 average in the JOLTs data. We chose matching function efficiencies
ϕi, CES product shares φi, reservation wage z, and the vacancy posting cost κ to match the
following targets: the distribution of vacancies Vi/V , the distribution of employment Ni/N , an
unemployment rate U/L = 5%, a vacancy rate V/L = 2.5%, and a share-weighted accounting
surplus of 10%. Vacancy shares and employment shares are set using 2000-2006 averages from
the JOLTs and payroll survey respectively. Initial labor market tightness is equalized across
sectors so that unemployment shares match vacancy shares. The table below summarizes the
calibration targets, parameters, and components of the matrix M that is used to rotate the
sectoral employment data. We consider two possible values for the elasticity of substitution η,
with η = 0.5 and η = 2. Table B.1 summarizes the calibration for the case of complementary
goods:
When goods are substitutes the product shares, output shares, and diagonal elements of
M are changed. For brevity, the employment shares, vacancy shares, separation rates, and
matching function efficiencies are omitted from this table as they are the same as in Table
B.1. These new steady state values are summarized in Table B.2.
B.3.2 Relation of Sector-Specific Shock Index and the Beveridge Curve
Consider a steady state where θi = θh for all sectors i, h = 1, 2, . . . ,K. In the absence of labor
market mismatch, it follows that unemployment shares and vacancy shares are equalized. To




















A log-linear approximation to the sectoral Beveridge curve provides the following expression:
nit = αuit + (1− α) vit
Using the expressions for aggregate vacancies and unemployment and the fact that U i/U =





nit = αut + (1− α) vt
























Table B.2: New parameters: η = 2
It is worth noting that in our numerical calibration, the aggregate component of nit approxi-























Our result demonstrating an equivalence between sector-specific shocks and shocks to the
borrowing rate in a model with a working capital constraint can be generalized to other types
of financial shocks. A common shock considered in the literature is a Kiyotaki and Moore type
shock to the value of collateral. We modify the problem of the intermediate goods producer
to include a time-varying collateral constraint that limits the ability of the firm to borrow to
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finance the wage bill and the cost of posting vacancies:










(WiTNiT − κViTPT )
￿
,
s.t. Ni,t = (1− δi)Ni,t−1 + qi,tVi,t,
Yit = AtNit,
λtK ≥Wi,tNi,t + κVi,tPt.
Fluctuation in λt can represent a tightening of lending standards by financial institutions or
a fall in the value of collateral like real estate or other forms of capital. For simplicity, we
continue to assume that labor is the only variable factor of production and that constrained
firms have some fixed endowment of capital. The vacancy posting condition in this setting is



















where ϕt is the Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint and replaces the interest
rate on borrowed funds. In steady state, the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint enters
as a sector-specific productivity shock for any sector that faces a working capital constraint.
A decrease in the value of λt tightens the constraint and raises the Lagrange multiplier.
Therefore, our choice of modeling the financial shock as an interest rate shock instead of a
shock to collateral values has no qualitative effects on the behavior of firms.
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Appendix C
Job Flows and Financial Shocks
C.1 Simple Model: Characterization
C.1.1 Household
The Hamiltonian for the household problem is a sum of instantaneous utility function and the
right-hand side of the wealth evolution equation multiplied by the Lagrange multiplier λH
H = e−ρt[u(c)− v(n)] + λH [wn+ ra+Π− c]
Maximum principle necessarily implies
Hn = −e−ρtv￿(n) + λHw = 0
Hc = −e−ρtu￿(c)− λH = 0
λ˙H = −λHr
If we substitute out the Lagrange multiplier we get
c˙ = − u
￿(c)
u￿￿(c)






C.1.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1
To solve equation
a˙ = Aaψ −Ba,
introduce the following change of variables y = log a. Hence,
y˙ = Ae(ψ−1)y −B.
We can rewrite this equation as follows
dy








Ae(ψ−1)y −B − d[(ψ − 1)y]
￿
= dt.





− (ψ − 1)y = B(ψ − 1)t+ const.
Transforming back to original variable
log[A−Ba1−ψ] = B(ψ − 1)t+ const.






= B(ψ − 1)t.








C.1.3 Properties of a(t,χ, ￿)
Monotonicity in t. By taking first order derivative of (3.15) with respect to time we can
show that depending on the initial condition the following three cases are possible
a￿(t)

















Note that once we combine the two cases it we will not be optimal to borrow up to firms
borrowing limit k = κa if a0 > (A/B)1/(1−ψ). This implies that in equilibrium all the firms
will never decrease its level of capital rentals.




































































rkχ− r < 0.
Hence,
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￿1/(1−ψ) then there exists Ta <∞ such that
a2(t,χ)

> 0 if t < Ta,
= 0 if t = Ta,
< 0 if t > Ta,




￿1/(1−ψ) then a2(t,χ) < 0.
￿




n(t, ￿H , w, r, rk,χL)e−σtdt+
￿ ∞
t(χL)




n(t, ￿H , w, r, rk,χL)e−σtdt+
￿ ∞
t(χH)




n(t, ￿H , w, r, rk,χH)e−σtdt+
￿ ∞
t(χH)
n∗(￿H , w, r, rk)e−σtdt
GE effect.
In the absence of wealth effect the equilibrium on labor market can be expressed as follows
N = Nd(w,χ) = N s(w). Taking full derivative we obtain
dN
dχ
= N s1 (w)
Nd2 (w,χ)
N s1 (w)−Nd1 (w,χ)
> 0,
where N s1 (w) > 0, Nd2 (w,χ) > 0, Nd1 (w,χ) < 0 are the derivative of the corresponding func-
tions. ￿
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Job creation and job destruction. Firm-level job creation is
jc(t) = max{n˙(t), 0}

= n˙(t) if t < t
= 0 if t ≥ t
Note that for any firm that reaches its optimal size it is true that




The first term takes into account that at the moment of birth the firm increases its employment
from 0 to n¯(0).
